UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001604 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NEA/ARP NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE REF: A) KHARTOUM 1577 B) KHARTOUM 1524 C) KHARTOUM 1468 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID will reach its target of sixty percent deployment by the end of the year, but only by temporarily positioning new troop arrivals in the transit camps within the super camps, rather than at their intended final destinations. The offer to provide US airlift for contingent-owned equipment will gain some time, but UNAMID officials are questioning whether it is worth the added cost. The UN mission has focused almost exclusively on deployment at the expense of improving operational readiness and mapping out strategies to meet core mission objectives. This has been compounded by the need to simultaneously plan for a full evacuation, as required under its current Phase IV security posture. Nonetheless, the arrival of the new Indonesian and Nepalese formed police units (FPUs) will allow UNAMID to patrol additional IDP camps, and civilian police have some success stories in helping mediate tribal disputes. Without military helicopters and with limited logistical capacity, the mission is not able to patrol over significant distances nor adequately investigate reports of fighting. Officials agree with the need to create a new security/ceasefire monitoring mechanism but have few ideas on how to go about it. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Polchief and Defense attach traveled to El Fasher from October 28-29 to meet with the following UNAMID officials: D/JSR Henry Anyihodo, D/JSR Hosan Medilli, Force Commander Lieutenant General Martin Luther Agwai, Deputy Force Commander Major General Karake Karenzi, COS John Allstrom, and J-5 Military Planning Chief Colonel Noddy Stafford. Deployment -------------- ¶3. (SBU) UNAMID is on track to meet its deployment goal of sixty-percent by the end of year, according to Stafford and Medilli. However, this will come at a price, and will not necessarily make UNAMID any more effective in the short- term. Because their permanent camps are not yet ready, large portions of the new battalions will be temporarily housed at the transit camps within the super camps in El Fasher and Geneina, although the Egyptians will deploy directly to Um Kadada (displacing the Rwandans who will move into the supercamp). According to Medilli this will create significant extra work due to the additional logistics required to move them later to their onward locations. Moreover, they will only be able to provide limited services while at the transit camps, such as security at the super camps and some patrols around the camps. Former AMIS camps still have not been upgraded and are in terrible condition. Without their COE, the battalions cannot do the necessary work to expand and improve the camps. ¶4. (SBU) Medilli said that COE is gradually making its way into Darfur via road and rail, and that over the next few months much of the backlog will be eliminated. Medilli said that he and other senior members of UNAMID's leadership have questioned whether the US airlift of COE is required, given the estimated $20 million price tag. Although UNAMID's estimated budget has ballooned from $1.4 billion to $2 billion, according to Medilli, the additional cost of the airlift may only gain the mission "a few weeks" in deployment time. Medilli said that DPKO is looking at the issue now, but he could not predict definitively whether the US offer would be declined or accepted. ¶5. (SBU) Medilli and Stafford said that despite the fact that UNAMID will reach its year-end deployment target of 60% (by temporarily housing new troops in the supercamps for onward deployment later,) the mission and DPKO are taking a hard look at whether 80% deployment by the end of March is achievable or even desirable - given the risk that the mission will not be able to adequately support all the troops. DPKO especially is concerned at the lack of a coherent plan for receiving and accommodating all of the troops. New or expanded camps will not be ready, not all COE will be in place, and there is a growing realization both in El Fasher and in New York that the mission will not be able to support the new battalions adequately. Stafford complained that DPKO is now requiring a detailed plan showing how the mission will be able to deploy and support all new arriving troops. Although he acknowledged that such a plan is useful, Stafford said he does not have the manpower to focus on current deployment issues while also creating detailed plans for all future arrivals. (Comment: Stafford, a Colonel. from the British army, comes across as highly capable and is widely respected within the mission. It was clear during this visit that he is overworked and under severe pressure, and does not have adequate qualified support staff to handle all of the demands being placed on him. As in most offices at UNAMID, he KHARTOUM 00001604 002 OF 003 is almost alone in his ability to write high-quality reports and analyses required by DPKO. Although he has eight or ten support staff, their skills appear to be limited. End comment.) Mission Challenges -------------- ¶6. (SBU) FC Agwai and D/FC Karenzi both noted that the requirement to deploy while simultaneously preparing evacuation plans (required under phase IV security) is having a negative effect on morale. D/JSR Anyidoho said that in effect UNAMID is being forced to "live a lie" in attempting to follow some requirements for phase IV (planning for an evacuation and limiting staff) while also deploying the mission. He noted that UNAMID is being forced to cheat on civilian staffing while also being forced by DPKO to account for decisions on staffing. Anyidoho said he expected that phase IV would remain in place due to the impending ICC process against President Bashir coupled with continued and increasing insecurity in Darfur. ¶7. (SBU) COS Allstrom and J-5 Chief Stafford noted that some units are responding to the challenges of poor equipment, logistical support, and morale better than others. They shared photos of camps in the field, first of a Rwandan camp that had adequate perimeter security, "hesco barriers" (large vertical fenced sandbags) and trenches, then of a Nigerian camp with poor fencing and empty hesco barriers with virtually no trenches. They noted that there is a reluctance on the part of the Nigerian troops to perform duties such as filling hesco barrier sand bags and digging trenches. Allstrom noted that FC Agwai (who is Nigerian) is almost to the point of ordering the Nigerian battalions to complete this work, which he said would probably work in this case since the troops are from his own country. ¶8. (SBU) FC Agwai noted that the lack of military TCC helicopters continues to have a negative impact on UNAMID's ability to operate effectively. He quipped that "very few of the assets in this mission are actually under my direct control." The current transport helicopters are contracted and therefore belong to the administrative side of the mission, according to Agwai. "Thankfully my colleagues are cooperative, but this is a very bad position to be in." Allstrom noted that there is a very serious problem with logistics and operational readiness at most camps. He said there are not enough serviceable vehicles at camps to be able to perform patrols safely; for example, at some camps the majority of the vehicles are out of service due to a lack of tires or batteries. UNAMID has begun purchasing more items locally, but not everything is available. Allstrom said that some units are performing patrols with only the two or three functional vehicles available. This leaves no back-ups to come get them if they encounter problems or come under attack. He said some of these same units don't have effective or functional long-range radios. Regular radios only work up to 7 kilometers, and many units do not have operable long-range radios, leaving them only with Thuraya phones in an emergency. Allstrom wants to put standard operating procedures and requirements in place that units will be measured against in order to force commanders to ensure certain requirements on security and operational preparedness are in place. FPUs and Civilian Police Making a Difference -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Despite these challenges, Allstrom noted that there has been recent progress in two areas - the performance of Formed Police Units (FPUs) and civilian police. With the arrival of the Indonesian FPU in El Fasher, UNAMID will now be able to provide security at troubled Zam Zam and Anu Shouk IDP camps, where residents have long requested such protection due to their distrust of government forces. The arrival of additional FPUs in the coming months will allow UNAMID to provide security at additional IDP camps. Allstrom also noted that civilian police within UNAMID (now 1700 strong) are making a difference on the ground, working alongside civil affairs officers, in resolving tribal disputes. Allstrom cited recent examples in October 2008 where civpols and civil affairs officers mediated between Zaghawa and Maaliya Arab tribesmen in the Muhajaria area of North Darfur, effectively preventing an escalation of fighting. Ceasefire Commission? -------------- ¶10. (SBU) D/JSR Anyihodo and FC Agwai both acknowledged that a new ceasefire mechanism is required, but they lacked ideas on how to approach such a process. Anyidoho noted that the GOS had kicked rebel CFC representatives out of El Fasher in May, but said hopefully that perhaps now with the much-improved level of KHARTOUM 00001604 003 OF 003 cooperation from the GOS, some progress in this area would be possible. Anyidoho agreed that it would be necessary to start small with a new commission with representatives from key armed groups that could coordinate on security issues. Anyidoho was highly critical of JMST Chief Mediator Bassole "who spends almost no time in El Fasher." Polchief pointed out that Bassole has only just begun his work, has focused by necessity on the main rebel leaders (including Khalil Ibrahim, who Bassole recently met in Darfur,) and now must focus on the Qatar process. Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) As UNAMID gets closer to the arrival of significant numbers of troops, as opposed to merely planning for their arrival, it was evident during this visit that there is going to be significant strain on the mission in effectively supporting the new troops and meeting mission objectives at the same time. Except for the FPUs, there seems to be little correlation to date between increased numbers and increased capacity to do the much needed missions of patrolling, protecting and investigating violence in Darfur. All of the logistical challenges still exist, and the fact remains that Darfur is an incredibly difficult place to operate. DPKO is probably wise to put pressure on UNAMID to show better planning on troop deployments, but should provide some capable staff - even if on secondment from headquarters - to make this happen. Given that the GOS is, for a change, currently cooperating on UNAMID visas, there is no reason not to be pro-active in providing the force with some surge administrative capacity. Anyidoho's comments about Bassole reflect an inherent bias within the mission, which will require close watching, against the JMST, Based on recent meetings with him, DDDC Chair and acting UNAMID political chief Abdul Mohammed appears eager to move beyond discussions and coordination with just civil society to discussions with rebel actors (normally a JMST role, though UNAMID also must liaise with rebels). Abdul Mohammed's dual role creates confusion, and we need to ensure that Adada and others (including at the UN secretariat) recognize the need to support Bassole and not undermine him. FERNANDEZ