SUDAN WILL PROPOSE "REAL DARFUR CEASE-FIRE,"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001597 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/C, SE WILLIAMSON, NEA/ARP, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: SUDAN WILL PROPOSE "REAL DARFUR CEASE-FIRE," PREVENT REBEL ATTACKS ON CHAD - FOR NOW REF: KHARTOUM 1594 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Sudanese Government has approved in principle, for the first time, US Embassy travel to rebel-held Jebel Marra. The GOS also will control the Sudan-Chad border between now and January and will not allow Chadian rebel attacks on Chad during that period. The Khartoum regime hopes Chad will reciprocate by reining in the Darfur rebels but is taking this step unilaterally. Sudan's intelligence chief is also eager to see a real and verifiable cease-fire in Darfur, unlike past announcements, in the run-up to possible talks in Doha. He also shed light on violence at a North Darfur IDP camp, on negotiations with Minni Minnawi, and signaled progress on visas for US MILOBS. End Summary. DARFUR ROAD TRIP APPROVED - WITH STRINGS -------------- ¶2. (C) CDA Fernandez and CoS met on October 30 with National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director Salah Ghosh at NISS HQ to discuss the Sudanese Government's obstruction of an US Embassy team visiting rebel-held (SLA-Abdul Wahid Nur) Jebel Marra. The unprecedented Embassy request had been mulled over by the regime for a week before eventually being declined (reftel). Ghosh said that he had fought for approval, even engaging in a shouting match with Minister of Defense Abdulraheem Hussein, in front of VP Taha. MOD had prevailed but Ghosh had not given up hope that he could make it happen. Charge said that "if the regime wants us to influence the rebels towards peace, you have to let us talk to them." He added that it was especially important for USAID to be allowed to visit such areas to study whether or not a shift from humanitarian to development assistance - in certain cases - was warranted. Ghosh said that he agreed completely with this rationale. He would continue to push for approval of such a Charge-led visit, for a lower profile visit without the CDA, or for a visit with NISS and military intelligence escort (Note: 30 minutes after the meeting, NISS called RAO to say that Sudan was approving a US Embassy trip to Jebel Marra. to include USAID and RAO with NISS and DMI escort -- without the Charge. End note). CEASEFIRE NEEDED - THIS TIME FOR REAL? -------------- ¶3. (C) Ghosh said Sudan was focused on preparing for the success of the Sudan Peoples' Initiative (SPI) and the upcoming Doha talks. He had carefully read CDA's remarks after the beginning of the SPI and Ghosh and others had taken to heart those remarks, about "tangible progress on the ground" being essential if the US is to have any confidence in the process. Ghosh said that Sudan wanted to announce a real, verifiable cease-fire with an effective monitoring mechanism as soon as possible. He said that, following up on SE Williamson's request three weeks ago, he had succeeded in getting some visas for US MILOBS assigned to UNAMID approved and the MFA had just been notified of this. Sudan wanted American help, along with UNAMID, in coming up an effective cease-fire commission. "It can't be like past cease-fire announcements," he emphasized, noting that these were broken almost immediately by both sides, as happened right before the Sirte talks in October 2007, and had been widely derided as "p.r. campaigns". Sudan hoped to get JEM and SLA/Unity, "the two most active movements militarily," involved. He would be speaking to UN/AU Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole later in the day to make the same pitch. Sudan was open to American and UN ideas on how to make this work this time. UNILATERAL RESTRAINT ON CHADIAN BORDER -------------- ¶4. (C) Moving on to Chad, Ghosh said that Sudan wanted to improve relations with its neighbor and had tried to do so directly and through the French. "We were caught in a chicken or egg situation," he joked, with Chad asking for Sudan to stop the Chadian rebels first and Sudan asking that Chad stop the Darfuri rebels first. Sudan was taking the first step to show its good faith and "will not allow any attacks from Chad from Sudanese territory from now until the end of the year." You can monitor this and see if we are telling the truth or not, he added. CDA Fernandez assured Ghosh that the US will KHARTOUM 00001597 002 OF 003 indeed be watching very closely to see what the Chadian rebels actually do and whether or not Sudan keeps its word. WOOING BACK THE ZAGHAWA -------------- ¶5. (C) CDA Fernandez then raised the issue of SLM leader Minni Minnawi and the failure of the September 19 El Fasher Agreement to implement the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). He had spoken to Minnawi last night and he confirmed that the GOS had still not fulfilled the financial portions of the El Fasher accord. Ghosh animatedly explained his role in wooing Minnawi back. NISS had met with Zaghawa traditional tribal leaders, "from all eight divisions of the Zaghawa tribe," with the Zaghawa Shura Council, and with Zaghawa intellectuals, to clear the air with this key tribal grouping. They had complained about being targeted after the May 2008 JEM Omdurman attack, "this is true, the JEM attackers were Zaghawa -- we weren't rounding up Coptic Christians -- but those who may have had tribal links with the attackers." Ghosh readily admitted that there had been excesses, people fired from their jobs, Zaghawa merchants had been harassed, others had been excluded from the civil service. A NISS-Zaghawa committee had been set up to address these issues and had led in part to Minnawi's brief return to Khartoum. ¶6. (C) Ghosh acknowledged that Minnawi's problems were not "real implementation of agreements" but his own internal problems with political and military leaders within his movement. There was also the larger, troubling issue of ethnic tension between the abrasive Zaghawa and other Darfuris (both Arabs and Africans, like the Fur). Minnawi was afraid of implementing the DPA security arrangements because if his forces were absorbed into the police and SAF he would have no private militia at his disposal as counterweights to other rebel groups and janjaweed forces. Ghosh said that some in the regime had wanted to force Minni to disarm and held up other parts of the DPA to pressure him, "this was a mistake on our part." Security arrangements should not have been linked to other promises made and the NCP had changed its view, "which brings us to the question of money". There were two problems: the regime's budget is very tight and the lack of transparency in the TDRA (Transitional Darfur Regional Authority) meant that the funds would be wasted. There was $200 million available for Darfur but if it is deposited with Minni's people at the TDRA "it will vanish and never be seen again" as there was little accountability or capacity. The Government had suggested to Minni that it would fund a list of projects but Minnawi had been unable to come up with any proposals to date, "just give him the money, that is his position". The regime was still ready to compromise and meet him half-way but wouldn't just hand over large amounts of cash. NOT REPEATING ABUJA IN DOHA -------------- ¶7. (C) The regime's travails with Minnawi had underscored the challenges that needed to be addressed in the upcoming Doha talks. Just like a superficial, badly planned and thought out cease-fire had failed and discredited the regime, top-level agreements ("itifaq fawqi") with no roots on the ground would also fail. The GOS did not want to see a repeat of the Abuja peace talks in Doha, with the regime picking off one rebel leader, gaining some small tactical benefit, but not actually seeing any real improvement on the ground. If there was to be a roomful of Zaghawa (Minnawi, Khalil Ibrahim, Abdullah Yahya, etc.) balanced by the sole prominent non-Zaghawa leader, Abdul Wahid Nur, the Zaghawa would once again monopolize the talks. Additionally, there needed to be reconciliation on the ground to go with the high level political action, "resolving the problem between the Zaghawa and Masalit in Gereida, or the Mahamid Arabs and Fur in Korma." ¶8. (C) CDA Fernandez asked the spy chief about reports of violence at Kassab IDP Camp, near Kutum, in North Darfur. Wild and inaccurate rumors seemed to be circulating in Washington and one of them had even made it into the new York Times. Ghosh said that there was absolutely no government attack, nor even GOS presence, at Kassab IDP camp. "These were thieves who tried to rob a checkpoint" manned by South Africa police, one of whom was killed. Ghosh offered to share KHARTOUM 00001597 003 OF 003 full details of the incident with CDA and will do so through RAO in the next few days (Note: Embassy contacted rebel commanders Suleiman Marjan of SLA-AW, Abdallah Banda of JEM/CL and Abu Bakr Kado of SLA/Unity on October 30 who said that the situation around Kutum and in North Darfur was 'calm" or "quiet," they knew of no fighting in Kassab IDP camp. Marjan and Kado did complain of the constant buildup of SAF logistics and forces on the edges of Dar Zaghawa, but no actual fighting - yet. End note). ¶9. (C) Comment: This was a bravura performance by the ruthless, thoughtful and capable Ghosh who serves as the regime's "fireman" rushing to put out the latest conflagration caused by Khartoum's odious policies (when Ghosh is not actually lighting the fires himself). He deftly sketched much of the framework of the regime's approach to the Doha talks, revealing the NCP's usual attention to detail which can extend to both implementing or subverting agreements. Such a framework includes an effort to address immediate US concerns (travel to rebel areas, UNAMID visas) coupled by a recognition of what factors would - at least temporarily - qualitatively improve the situation on the ground, such as a cease-fire and sealing the Chadian border. If implemented, these will highlight the regime's skewed self-image as a responsible partner during the crucial coming months of possible peace talks and an ICC arrest warrant against President Bashir while giving it the flexibility to break these agreements in the future should circumstances call for a policy reversal. Ghosh is no fool and knows that even if the mechanics of a cease-fire can be worked out, many of the rebels have now deteriorated to simple banditry to survive and would be hard pressed to stop even if asked by their supposed political leaders. His analysis of the travails with Minnawi are, unfortunately, quite accurate although fiscal responsibility has never prevented the NCP from giving money to all sorts of dubious characters if it thought it was expedient to do so. They rightly fear that Minni would use additional funds to "buy" more commanders, forces and weapons which is what the regime itself does all the time. End comment. FERNANDEZ