GOS BLOCKS U.S. TRIP TO DARFUR AND FLIRTS WITH A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001594 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: GOS BLOCKS U.S. TRIP TO DARFUR AND FLIRTS WITH A SOFA VIOLATION REF: KHARTOUM 1577 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (SBU) On September 29, the Sudanese MFA finally informed CDA Fernandez that the GoS would not allow an embassy trip to Nyala and a joint UNAMID-USG trip to East Jebel Marra, Darfur scheduled for September 30. This denial came after a week of submitting three dipnotes, high-level discussions between multiple USG representatives (including CDA Fernandez and U/S of the MFA Mutriff Sadiq) and even the Embassy's prompt response to the unusual request for information about the airplane's flight crew. While this is not the first time that the GoS has denied USG travel, it illustrates a number of realities about the nature of the Sudanese government, its strategy in dealing with the international community, and their paranoia about more exposure to the troubled region of Darfur. ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE REBELS BLOCKED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) For months, if not years, the GoS has specifically requested USG assistance in putting pressure on rebel leaders to participate in the peace process. This trip to Jebel Marra was designed to do just that and deepen contact with commanders from the Sudan Liberation Army of Abdul Wahid Al-Nur. The official diplomatic note submitted to the MFA and multiple USG representatives from different agencies all delivered this message to different branches of the Sudanese Government including Sudanese intelligence, the Ministry of Defense, and other agencies. (Note: This is not the first time that the GoS blocked Embassy officials from traveling to this rebel-controlled area, as the MFA denied granting a travel permit to poloff for a UNAMID-sponsored trip to Jebel Marra in July 2008.) (COMMENT: Post has long questioned the GOS's sincerity on its desire for international pressure on the rebels, and this thwarted trip, during a crucial period in the peace, process strengthens this view. END COMMENT.) CREATIVELY BLOCKING UNAMID'S (AND THE USG'S) WORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) UNAMID'S Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) guarantees the hybrid force's freedom of movement around Darfur. As this Jebel Marra to Nyala trip was a joint USG-UNAMID mission, the GoS would not/not have been able to block the trip without a violation of the SOFA. Although travel to Nyala is routine for USG officials on private aircraft, the MFA made the unprecedented request for information about the plane's flight crew to Nyala. Embassy promptly submitted the information in a dipnote and verbally informed the GoS that the chartered flight crew would not be involved in the Jebel Marra portion of the trip. (COMMENT: This unprecedented request was likely part of the GoS's usual strategy of using bureaucratic obstacles to enforce political decisions. This GoS focus on blocking the flight to Nyala also indicates that the GoS recognized that it would not be able to impede USG-UNAMID travel within Darfur. Although embassy officers repeated multiple times to the GoS that they would like to travel to Nyala even if the Jebel Marra trip is canceled, GoS interlocutors appeared suspicious of this and decided to block the trip altogether. This strategy is reminiscent of other GoS interaction with UNAMID. For example, UNAMID contacts told us (reftel) that the GoS will not respond (either positively or negatively) to UNAMID visa requests to western countries it deems dangerous, as the GoS recognizes that an outright denial could be a SOFA violation. END COMMENT.) DEFLECTING RESPONSIBILITY AND SHIFTING THE BLAME - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (S) Multiple USG agencies (State, USAID, CIA, Defense Attache) planned on participating in the visit and informed their interlocutors at different levels. Throughout the week leading up to the trip, Sudanese contacts in many ministries claimed that they were waiting for permission from rival ministries. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told CDA Fernandez that the MFA had to receive permission from intelligence, while at the same time contacts in Sudanese intelligence told regional affairs officers that they must wait for MFA approval. Even within the MFA, different departments (protocol, Department of Peace, Americas Department, office of the Undersecretary) shifted the blame and responsibility throughout the week leading up to the trip. USG officials in Khartoum closely and regularly shared information from their respective Sudanese officials KHARTOUM 00001594 002 OF 002 throughout the week, showing the contradictions, deflection of responsibility, and outright lies. (COMMENT: This strategy of 'pointing the finger at the other guy' is regularly employed by the GoS. For example, GoS officials in Khartoum regularly dismiss the Kalma IDP camp massacre as the work of unruly local actors, while state and city officials in South Darfur point to a Central Reserve Police directed by Khartoum. Furthermore and most recently VP Taha told Minni Minnawi that only MoF Al-Jaz could approve funding the Darfur Reconstruction fund, despite the fact that Taha outranks Al-Jaz. Examples such as these are all too common in the GoS. END COMMENT.) COMMENT - - - - - ¶5. (C) The GoS resorted to its usual strategies of delay, shifting blame, and avoiding direct confrontation and violations in shutting down an important USG trip to Darfur. These events also indicate that the GoS is increasingly sensitive and paranoid about allowing access to some of the most remote, militarized, and politicized regions of Darfur (such as Jebel Marra and West Darfur) in the runup to possible peace talks in Doha and a looming ICC indictment of President Bashir. CDA Fernandez will discuss this issue with Intelligence Chief Salah Gosh on October 30 with septel to follow. FERNANDEZ