CHD HOPES TO REDUCE HIJACKINGS IN DARFUR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001588 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, DRL NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: CHD HOPES TO REDUCE HIJACKINGS IN DARFUR REF: A) KHARTOUM 1438 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) is on track to restart negotiations to improve humanitarian security by focusing on measures against vehicle hijackings. Dennis McNamara told donors in Khartoum October 23 that CHD representatives intend to travel to Darfur for talks with rebel movements in late November. He added that CHD has received guarantees from government officials that the GOS will d participate in full-blown humanitarian security workshops with Darfuri rebel movements in January/February. Looking further afield, CHD's ambitions include restarting the moribund ceasefire commission and peace process. CHD asked the diplomatic community for assistance in bringing these efforts to fruition. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) In the short-term, CHD intends to create a "mechanism" to address vehicle hijackings, which CHD views as the key humanitarian problem in Darfur, and the first step towards achieving humanitarian security. With support from the UN's Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),CHD's "mechanism" will seek to ensure accountability from rebels and armed militias by sequentially incorporating them into agreements to refrain from hijacking vehicles of humanitarian organizations, and by sharing information on hijackings with OCHA and other members of the monitoring mechanism to remove the rebels' plausible deniability of participating in hijacking vehicles. McNamara addressed the concern that CHD's "mechanism" will end up creating another lethargic, bureaucratic body unable to solve problems quickly: "We are trying to keep this light - no bodies, no hearings, but practical agreements that reduce hijackings." ¶3. (SBU) Following CHD's productive workshops in Geneva with JEM and SLA/Unity in July in which both pledged "full support for the efforts of the humanitarian organizations to assist the people of Darfur," McNamara announced plans for follow-on meetings with rebel groups in November. McNamara predicts representatives from JEM, SLA/Unity and AbdulWahid will take part at yet-to-be-determined locations within rebel territory, but added that the participation of SLA/Minni Minnawi (MM) remained a question mark. McNamara did not describe Minnawi as reticent to engage in the talks, but said instead that his standing as a GOS representative supercedes his participation as a leader of an active rebel movement in Darfur. McNamara acknowledged that in areas of Darfur controlled by SLA/MM, there would be a need for "something special" shaped specifically for SLA/MM, given the fact that "Minnawi's people have been running loose in some areas with no real control." Antoine Gerard of OCHA requested the U.S. Embassy's assistance in contacting SLA/MM leaders on the ground with whom CHD could engage. ¶4. (SBU) McNamara was cautiously optimistic that the NCP would support CHD's initiative on increasing humanitarian security. He said that the notorious Adbul Rahman Hasabo, Commissioner of the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC),had given it his informal blessing and has promised the participation of NISS, HAC, the Department of Military Intelligence, and the governors of the three states of Darfur when CHD returns in January for further negotiations. McNamara asked Khartoum's diplomatic community for support: "Some discrete political backing might be useful - we need friends who can weigh in." ¶5. (SBU) On October 22, Theo Murphy of CHD told poloffs that as CHD slowly builds a consensus on humanitarian security, it also continues to look at how humanitarian needs can provide the foundation for a peace process in Darfur. Murphy stated that CHD has recently explored the possibility of establishing "the humanitarian equivalent of the ceasefire commission." Murphy stated that this commission would be composed of representatives from UNAMID, the GoS, and non-signatory rebel movements (JEM, SLA/Unity, and SLA/Abdul Wahid.) Murphy acknowledged that UNAMID may be reluctant to establish such a body, "as it does not have the necessary helicopters, nor the prerequisite ceasefire needed for such work." Murphy believes, however, that even if it lacks the capacity to thoroughly investigate and monitor , the international community should still form such a body and use the best available information at hand to monitor humanitarian access and security. Murphy hoped that, at the very least, CHD's initiative will spark a discussion on restarting the ceasefire commission. ¶6. (SBU) Comment: CHD's ambitious goals and perpetual optimism are commendable but most likely very unrealistic. We find it highly unlikely that the noxious Hasabo (who has routinely obstructed INGO work over the last two years) of the HAC will be cooperative, for example. Nevertheless, a pragmatic plan to start small with humanitarian access and vehicle hijackings, and then move towards the larger goal of a humanitarian ceasefire, deserves at least KHARTOUM 00001588 002 OF 002 notional support. Post will encourage this effort in our meetings with regime officials, and we will also encourage Minawi to participate fully. It is certainly true that the areas nominally under his control are some of the most insecure in the Darfur region. We fear rather that the regime hopes to use this process perhaps as a convenient club to beat rebel groups over the head, distracting attention from its own frequent actions hostile to humanitarian access. FERNANDEZ