Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM1586
2008-10-28 08:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
WEST DARFUR GOVERNOR:THE FUR TRIBE IS FIGHTING
VZCZCXRO6319 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHKH #1586/01 3020834 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 280834Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2178 INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001586
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG AND AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: WEST DARFUR GOVERNOR:THE FUR TRIBE IS FIGHTING
THREE FIRES AT ONCE - THE GOS, ARABS, AND ZAGHAWA
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001586
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG AND AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: WEST DARFUR GOVERNOR:THE FUR TRIBE IS FIGHTING
THREE FIRES AT ONCE - THE GOS, ARABS, AND ZAGHAWA
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)
1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 27, former Darfur rebel and
current Governor of West Darfur Abulgasim Imam told CDA
Fernandez that the Fur tribe is defending itself against
three hostile groups, the Government of Sudan, Arab militias,
and the Zaghawa tribe. Imam acknowledged the failure of both
the Sudan Liberation Movement and the self-proclaimed rebel
leader of the Fur, Abdulwahid Al-Nur, and requested that the
U.S. support the Fur tribe "as it has suffered more than any
other group in Darfur." END SUMMARY.
"ABDUL WAHID IS WEAK AND A POOR LEADER"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) Visiting Khartoum to participate in the Sudan
People's Initiative, Abulgasim Imam requested meeting CDA
Fernandez discretely and unofficially, "as I cannot always
only represent the government." Abulgasim opened the meeting
stating that the situation in West Darfur is "very negative"
and then strongly asserted that the Fur suffer from the poor
leadership and personal ambition of Paris-based Darfuri Abdul
Wahid Al-Nur. "We are becoming a victim from (his) control
from outside," stated Imam. Abdulwahid has failed to unite
the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Fur people, and his
stubbornness stems from this weakness, stated Imam. If Abdul
Wahid Al-Nur does participate in negotiations in Qatar
alongside JEM's Khalil Ibrahim, he will not represent all of
the Fur people and any deal signed only with him will not
bring lasting peace to Darfur, stated Imam. The Sudan
Liberation Movement has failed to unite, to become a
political party, and to fundamentally change Darfur. Other
Fur voices need to be included in the political process,
asserted Imam.
DARFUR'S THREE FIRES AND ALLEGED U.S. SUPPORT FOR ZAGHAWA
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Darfur's tribes have become polarized, said Imam,
and the Fur have started to fear the Zaghawa as much as the
GoS and Arab militia. These are Darfur's three "internal
fires" that are compounded by external pressures, asserted
Imam. Imam stated that many Darfuris believe that the U.S.
consciously supports Zaghawa dominance in the region. CDA
Fernandez replied that support for the one signatory of the
Darfur Peace Agreement, Minni Minnawi (from the Zaghawa
tribe,) should not be construed as a preference for the
Zaghawa tribe over others. CDA Fernandez also stated that
the NCP's fear of the Zaghawa is well known and that some
individuals in the party may be spreading such rumors for
their own benefit. While the USG is also against regime
ethnic targeting of the Zaghawa, that doesn't mean we favor
one tribe over another, "we don't want to see one victimizer
(the regime and its janjaweed allies) substituted for
another."
A SECURITY STATE
- - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) Imam stated that the Ministry of Defense, National
Intelligence, and other security structures consistently
usurp his authority at the state level. Imam added that the
Sudanese intelligence holds the real power in Darfur, and
that even state governors must bow to the demands of NISS,
MoD, and other agencies. Whether it is the approval of
visits from diplomats or establishing investigatory
committees into recent immigration from West Africa into his
state, Imam stated that the security apparatus has stepped in
and reversed his decisions using security justifications. He
had been specifically prevented in establishing a committee
to look at reports of settlement by Khartoum of Arab nomads
from neighboring countries onto traditional Fur land in Wadi
Salih. Despite this control from the central government,
Imam stated, "We want a real authority in the form of a
federal system, and we fear a collapse of the government."
5. (C) The Fur would like close coordination with the U.S.
during this important period, stated Imam. More
specifically, the Fur would appreciate U.S. support for Fur
civil society organizations, visits of prominent Fur leaders
to the U.S. and "more grass root work in Fur communities."
CDA Fernandez replied that the Fur are an essential part of
any lasting solution to Darfur and welcomed regular
communication with Imam and other Fur leaders. He noted that
he intends to travel to the Fur heartland of Jebel Marra on
October 30, if he is not prevented from doing so by the
KHARTOUM 00001586 002 OF 002
regime. CDA further agreed that the US (and the international
community in general) needs to very much take into account
Darfur's complex ethnic reality when supporting Darfuri
opposition or counterparts to the Khartoum government.
COMMENT
- - - -
6. (C) A former Fur SLA commander, the sincere and
soft-spoken Abulgasim joined the government with the
declaration of commitment (DOC) groups following the signing
of the DPA in 2006. Now technically part of the government
that attacked and displaced many of his fellow Fur tribesmen,
Imam represents a series of conflicting identities, interests
and constituencies - a heavy burden for one of Sudan's
youngest governors. Imam's concern over Abdul Wahid's
arrogance, dominance, and misrepresentation of the Fur people
is valid, and a point that must be addressed prior to the
next round of negotiations on Darfur's future. The governor's
fear of the predatory Zaghawa, and misperception of the US
role in supporting the DPA, is widely shared among both
Darfur's African and Arab tribes. The fact that Darfur's two
neighbors who are most involved in the conflict, Libya and
Zaghawa-ruled Chad, clearly do tilt towards the Zaghawa, that
most military commanders among the rebels come from this
minority tribe, and that Zaghawa have been pushing down into
Fur agricultural land (just like the Arab tribes who
constitute the janjaweed) further exacerbates the complex
ethnic tinderbox which is Darfur.
FERNANDEZ
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG AND AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: WEST DARFUR GOVERNOR:THE FUR TRIBE IS FIGHTING
THREE FIRES AT ONCE - THE GOS, ARABS, AND ZAGHAWA
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)
1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 27, former Darfur rebel and
current Governor of West Darfur Abulgasim Imam told CDA
Fernandez that the Fur tribe is defending itself against
three hostile groups, the Government of Sudan, Arab militias,
and the Zaghawa tribe. Imam acknowledged the failure of both
the Sudan Liberation Movement and the self-proclaimed rebel
leader of the Fur, Abdulwahid Al-Nur, and requested that the
U.S. support the Fur tribe "as it has suffered more than any
other group in Darfur." END SUMMARY.
"ABDUL WAHID IS WEAK AND A POOR LEADER"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) Visiting Khartoum to participate in the Sudan
People's Initiative, Abulgasim Imam requested meeting CDA
Fernandez discretely and unofficially, "as I cannot always
only represent the government." Abulgasim opened the meeting
stating that the situation in West Darfur is "very negative"
and then strongly asserted that the Fur suffer from the poor
leadership and personal ambition of Paris-based Darfuri Abdul
Wahid Al-Nur. "We are becoming a victim from (his) control
from outside," stated Imam. Abdulwahid has failed to unite
the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Fur people, and his
stubbornness stems from this weakness, stated Imam. If Abdul
Wahid Al-Nur does participate in negotiations in Qatar
alongside JEM's Khalil Ibrahim, he will not represent all of
the Fur people and any deal signed only with him will not
bring lasting peace to Darfur, stated Imam. The Sudan
Liberation Movement has failed to unite, to become a
political party, and to fundamentally change Darfur. Other
Fur voices need to be included in the political process,
asserted Imam.
DARFUR'S THREE FIRES AND ALLEGED U.S. SUPPORT FOR ZAGHAWA
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Darfur's tribes have become polarized, said Imam,
and the Fur have started to fear the Zaghawa as much as the
GoS and Arab militia. These are Darfur's three "internal
fires" that are compounded by external pressures, asserted
Imam. Imam stated that many Darfuris believe that the U.S.
consciously supports Zaghawa dominance in the region. CDA
Fernandez replied that support for the one signatory of the
Darfur Peace Agreement, Minni Minnawi (from the Zaghawa
tribe,) should not be construed as a preference for the
Zaghawa tribe over others. CDA Fernandez also stated that
the NCP's fear of the Zaghawa is well known and that some
individuals in the party may be spreading such rumors for
their own benefit. While the USG is also against regime
ethnic targeting of the Zaghawa, that doesn't mean we favor
one tribe over another, "we don't want to see one victimizer
(the regime and its janjaweed allies) substituted for
another."
A SECURITY STATE
- - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) Imam stated that the Ministry of Defense, National
Intelligence, and other security structures consistently
usurp his authority at the state level. Imam added that the
Sudanese intelligence holds the real power in Darfur, and
that even state governors must bow to the demands of NISS,
MoD, and other agencies. Whether it is the approval of
visits from diplomats or establishing investigatory
committees into recent immigration from West Africa into his
state, Imam stated that the security apparatus has stepped in
and reversed his decisions using security justifications. He
had been specifically prevented in establishing a committee
to look at reports of settlement by Khartoum of Arab nomads
from neighboring countries onto traditional Fur land in Wadi
Salih. Despite this control from the central government,
Imam stated, "We want a real authority in the form of a
federal system, and we fear a collapse of the government."
5. (C) The Fur would like close coordination with the U.S.
during this important period, stated Imam. More
specifically, the Fur would appreciate U.S. support for Fur
civil society organizations, visits of prominent Fur leaders
to the U.S. and "more grass root work in Fur communities."
CDA Fernandez replied that the Fur are an essential part of
any lasting solution to Darfur and welcomed regular
communication with Imam and other Fur leaders. He noted that
he intends to travel to the Fur heartland of Jebel Marra on
October 30, if he is not prevented from doing so by the
KHARTOUM 00001586 002 OF 002
regime. CDA further agreed that the US (and the international
community in general) needs to very much take into account
Darfur's complex ethnic reality when supporting Darfuri
opposition or counterparts to the Khartoum government.
COMMENT
- - - -
6. (C) A former Fur SLA commander, the sincere and
soft-spoken Abulgasim joined the government with the
declaration of commitment (DOC) groups following the signing
of the DPA in 2006. Now technically part of the government
that attacked and displaced many of his fellow Fur tribesmen,
Imam represents a series of conflicting identities, interests
and constituencies - a heavy burden for one of Sudan's
youngest governors. Imam's concern over Abdul Wahid's
arrogance, dominance, and misrepresentation of the Fur people
is valid, and a point that must be addressed prior to the
next round of negotiations on Darfur's future. The governor's
fear of the predatory Zaghawa, and misperception of the US
role in supporting the DPA, is widely shared among both
Darfur's African and Arab tribes. The fact that Darfur's two
neighbors who are most involved in the conflict, Libya and
Zaghawa-ruled Chad, clearly do tilt towards the Zaghawa, that
most military commanders among the rebels come from this
minority tribe, and that Zaghawa have been pushing down into
Fur agricultural land (just like the Arab tribes who
constitute the janjaweed) further exacerbates the complex
ethnic tinderbox which is Darfur.
FERNANDEZ