GOS SEEMS TO BE ON THE RIGHT TRACK WITH DARFUR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001551 SIPDIS DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NEA/ARP NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: GOS SEEMS TO BE ON THE RIGHT TRACK WITH DARFUR, YET ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS REF: A. KHARTOUM 1549 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1532 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1528 ¶D. KHARTOUM 1521 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4(b) a nd (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Influential regime insider and presidential advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail told CDA Fernandez that the GoS has recalibrated its focus from frantically searching for ways to avoid an ICC indictment of GNU President Al-Bashir to finding a solution to the Darfur crisis. Ismail stated the GoS finds it imperative that AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur Djibril Bassole play a central role in the Qatari Initiative, particularly with regards to uniting rebel demands and persuading the rebels to come to the table. Ismail said that he will travel to Doha to meet with the Emir and emphasize this point. He encouraged the USG to also intervene with the Qataris on the importance of Bassole's participation in the Initiative and requested that the USG send the "right message" to the rebel movements to persuade them to join negotiations that are likely to occur soon after the conclusion of the Sudan Peoples' Initiative. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Presidential Advisor for external affairs Mustafa Osman Ismail told CDA Fernandez on 19 October that the GoS has shifted its focus from defeating a potential ICC indictment of President Al-Bashir to a serious quest for a solution to the Darfur crisis (which can help Sudan make a case for ICC deferment of an indictment). Ismail outlined his understanding of the Darfur plan, explaining that the GoS must first and foremost focus on finding a political settlement to the crisis through the Sudan Peoples' Initiative (SPI),Darfur-Darfur dialogue, and support to AU-UN Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole. He said it is important for Bassole to unite rebel demands and bring the movements to the table on negotiations that will likely occur in Doha soon after the conclusion of the SPI. Secondly, the GoS should coordinate more closely with UNAMID on deployment and improvement of the humanitarian situation on the ground in Darfur. Ismail mentioned that the GoS would like to take the USG up on its offer to provide transportation for troops �00A;(particularly the Rwandans) and materiel to Darfur. The U.S. should not let DPKO blame Sudan for its own mistakes. The third component of the plan is to bring "justice to Darfur." The fourth and final component, yet "certainly not the number one priority" according to Ismail, is for the GoS to reach out to the international community and work closely with the African Union and Arab League to have them contact the UNSC on the tabling of an Article 16 suspension of a likely Al-Bashir ICC indictment. CDA applauded the GoS' new approach of prioritizing the need to find a solution to the Darfur problem while working on the ICC issue tangentially, yet not as the primary item. ¶3. (C) CDA encouraged Ismail to take heed of Secretary Rice's advice on moving forward in Darfur, particularly with regards to the need for the USG to see positive progress on the ground in Darfur. "There is not a lot of time left (on the ICC issue)", said Fernandez, "but there is some." Fernandez told Ismail that the SPI Conference in Kenana on 17 October was "good" because the GoS succeeded in bringing together a number of different players from opposition parties, to ICC indictees, to civil society and DPA signatory and Presidential Advisor Minni Minawi to the event to voice different views on a solution to the Darfur crisis and raise issues of concern. "This is good, but it is the easiest thing (for the GoS) to do; it is not enough for us." ONE of our biggest fears is that this is a public relations stunt. Ismail pleaded with the CDA to speak positively about the SPI and the conference in Kenana publicly, saying "the USG should come out and encourage the GoS," particularly at this critical time. He encouraged the CDA to issue a positive statement about the events in Kenana. CDA noted that, we will wait and see, if there is anything to be positive about. ¶4. (C) Having attended recent meetings with French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in Cairo, Ismail said that all Kouchner wanted to talk about was resolution of Sudan's ICC crisis. Ismail claimed he refused and told Kouchner he was only interested in talking about resolving the Darfur crisis. To underscore the GoS' change in approach, Ismail pointed KHARTOUM 00001551 002 OF 003 out that Al-Bashir did not once mention the ICC in his opening speech at the SPI on 16 October. CDA responded that the GoS is "looking at things the right way" (for now). What we fear is that the Arabs want to save President Al-Bashir by solving the Darfur problem (referring to the Arab League's Darfur Initiative). "This is backwards - fix Darfur first, and that will help Al-Bashir." Ismail jovially offered, "Tell Secretary Rice that she may not solve the Israel-Palestine conflict, but she might see an end to the Darfur crisis in the next three months, with American help." ¶5. (C) CDA reminded Ismail that the USG's top priorities in Darfur are the improvement of the humanitarian situation on the ground, progress in the deployment of UNAMID, and finding a political settlement to the conflict. He emphasized the importance of the GoS allowing Bassole to play a central role in the achievement of a political settlement, particularly with regards to uniting rebel demands and persuading them to attend negotiations in Doha. Ismael requested that the USG tell the Qataris to allow Bassole to be "at the center of the process." Ismail said that he would travel soon to Doha to meet with the Emir in order to deliver the GoS message that Bassole should be given latitude to work with the rebels within the Qatari Initiative. "We need to be realistic that we can't put an end to the Darfur problem without the rebels," said Ismail. Right now, the rebels are reluctant to negotiate with the GoS because they want to see President Al-Bashir weakened by an ICC indictment, explained Ismael. "The USG is needed to bring the rebels in," said Ismail. He urged the USG to send the "right message" to the rebels. CDA responded that the USG may pressure the rebels to attend negotiations in Doha, but only if the USG sees that the SPI and the Qatari initiative are part of a "legitimate process" (after Kenana). "We can pressure them to go, but we will not pressure them to agree - that is between you and the rebels." CDA urged that the GoS think about what it can put on the table early on, so as to persuade rebel movements to attend negotiations. CDA remarked that if Bassole is distant from the initiative, the USG (and international parties) will look at the process with even greater skepticism. ¶6. (C) Ismail posed the question (which he said was initially asked of him by President Al-Bashir),"what makes you think that Bassole can succeed when (former UN and AU joint mediators) Eliasson and Salim failed?" CDA explained to Ismail that Bassole doesn't possess any "magic" to ensure a peaceful settlement to the Darfur crisis, but did say that Bassole is seems to be more practical, down-to-earth, humble, and realistic about finding a solution than his predecessors. Furthermore, Bassole understands that uniting rebel demands is more important than attempting to unite rebel movements. In addition, Bassole is committed to spending time in Darfur and understands that he must get to know and work with the rebel movements. Ismail claimed that the GoS will "work hard with Bassole" to find a settlement. ¶7. (C) At the end of the meeting, CDA Fernandez raised the issue of the Sudanese Government's rejection of work permits and exit visas for the USG-funded International Rescue Committee (IRC) to continue its health, education, and rule of law programs in Darfur. "This is against your interests, and the USG is angry about it - why are you doing this?" CDA told Ismael that the Embassy was planning to issue a press release denouncing the GoS' actions. Ismail pleaded that the statement not be issued and asked CDA for more information on the problem. CDA promised to provide additional details on GOS obstruction of the IRC in South Darfur and said he would hold the press release temporarily. Ismail promised he would look into the issue. CDA noted that the Darfur humanitarian issues had seen the least amount of progress in the past few weeks (compared to UNAMID deployment and a political process) of the areas of American interest raised by the USG with Sudan. ¶8. (C) Comment: While Ismail's words are encouraging, it is still too early to tell if the SPI will produce any real substance leading to meaningful negotiations in Doha (Ref A). The next two weeks will be critical in assessing the sincerity of the regime. If something substantial does emerge from Kenana and the regime is prepared to make significant concessions, a combination of Qatari inducements and U.S. pressure may convince Abdel Wahid and Khalil Ibrahim to go to Doha, but this is far from assured. As usual with KHARTOUM 00001551 003 OF 003 this regime, it only does what it believes in its own interests and continually shoots itself in the foot with unnecessarily hostile actions in Darfur. The recent obstruction of IRC is a case in point, though as it is now in the interests of the regime to do so, we expect that there could be an opportunity for the IRC issue to be resolved following this and additional interventions. FERNANDEZ