CHARGE'S MEETING WITH UNAMID SPECIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001533 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, IO/PSC NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID SOCI KPKO AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH UNAMID SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ADADA REF: KHARTOUM 1483 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to UNAMID Joint Special Representative Adada, relations with the GoS, narrowly-defined, have turned the corner and UNAMID deployment is accelerating, with 14,000 peacekeepers expected to be on the ground by year,s end. He agreed that harassment of humanitarian NGOs in South Darfur continues, however. UNAMID,s complicated relations with the civil population varies across Darfur, depending on how politicized the population is in Darfur's IDP camps. Charge Fernandez emphasized that the U.S. stands ready to do whatever it can to assist UNAMID,s deployment. END SUMMARY. Improved Relations ) If Narrowly Defined - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Late October 16, following the opening session of the Sudan People,s Initiative (septel),CDA Fernandez met with UN/AU Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada and Abdul Mohammed of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation at Adada,s residence in Khartoum. CDA Fernandez asked about the state of UNAMID,s relations with the GoS and progress on deployment. Adada said the GoS and UNAMID relations have improved significantly and have &turned the corner.8 The Charge pressed Adada on whether he meant relations broadly or narrowly defined. For example, the Embassy continues to hear frequent and detailed complaints of harassment of humanitarian NGOs and certainly GOS relations with IDPs in Darfur is still poor. ¶3. (C) Adada said he was referring UNAMID,s specific mandate and Sudan,s compliance with their mutual agreements, such as the SOFA, adding that the UN,s humanitarian mandate is not his responsibility. However, he agreed that harassment of humanitarian NGOs is continuing. He said he had met the previous day with NISS Director Salah Gosh, who had said &We know NGO,s are being harassed in South Darfur. We are investigating why this is happening. This is not our policy" noting that NGOs in West and North Darfur states are having less problems with the authorities. Charge noted that Gosh had told him the same thing ten days earlier, and that Gosh had added with a laugh, &But the Janjaweed are in charge in South Darfur.8 The CDA continued that the problem there is with the Wali,s office and the HAC, not with the national agencies, but the result is the same: limiting humanitarian access. ¶4. (C) CDA Fernandez noted that the GoS does deliberately continue to delay visa issuances to Western (including U.S.) military officers detailed to UNAMID. This is not a huge problem, but it is an irritant. Adada said that the GoS claims this is a bilateral issue between GoS and the specific countries inolved, noting that one GOS official said that "we don't give the Canadians visas because they don't give us visas." The Charge replied that this is untrue, that the GoS gives the U.S. different excuses for delaying visas for MILOBS. Progress on UNAMID Deployment - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) The Charge noted that he had just returned from Washington consultations, where he was told that expediting UNAMID deployment is a major Administration priority before the end of its term. Adada responded that &the ball is now in our court.8 Upgrading the airport at El Geneina is UNAMID,s top priority, which he optimistically estimated would be done in four to six months. The CDA said that this was good news, but that the U.S. has heard more negative reports, based on the lack of capacity in Sudan to perform the construction required. ¶6. (C) Charge Fernandez asked whether it is true that African peacekeeping battalions now deploying to UNAMID would have 800, up from 500 personnel. Adada confirmed that the current Nigerian and Rwandan battalions that are rotating out will return to Darfur at full strength. The CDA commented that the U.S. is very interested in seeing these numbers increase. He added that the U.S. may decide that it will offer airlift to bring them in, in which case we would seek UNAMID,s assistance in persuading the GoS. ¶7. (C) Adada said that UNAMID hopes to deploy 14,000 peacekeepers by the end of the year and to have deployed 80 KHARTOUM 00001533 002 OF 003 percent of its total by March. Asked about containers, he said there are now 3,000 because even though containers are now moving more freely, "more keep arriving from Port Sudan". With the end of the rainy season, UNAMID will be able to use two roads and the railroad from El Obeid. The GoS has agreed that movements may take place whenever UNAMID has assembled at least 30 trucks, rather than only every two days. Adada commented that the El Obeid-Nyala railroad is in poor condition and has low capacity. But a Canadian railroad expert has arrived to advise UNAMID in its use. September 29 Helicopter Crash Follow-up - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) The Charge asked about the September 29 crash in Nyala of an MI-8 helicopter contracted by UNAMID (reftel). Adada said that in August he and HAC State Minister (and ICC-indictee) Ahmed Harun had agreed to establish a joint task force on security issues. The task force would start to work soon, with its initial priorities being the helicopter crash, IDP-camp security, and the security of supply routes. UNAMID has told the GoS that it wants to be part of the investigation of the cause of the crash. ¶9. (C) CDA Fernandez commented that while two months after the Kalma camp massacre, there is still no official accounting for what happened, immediately following the helicopter crash the South Darfur Wali had claimed it was shot down by ground fire from the Kalma camp. Adada noted that the Russian pilot had not reported ground fire to the control tower, although he had had sufficient time before crashing to maneuver the helicopter two kilometers away from populated areas. Only an investigation could determine the actual cause of the crash, he added, but the lack of any comment by the pilot about taking fire cast doubt on the Kalma ground fire story. UNAMID Relations With the Darfuri Population - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) The Charge inquired about UNAMID,s relations with the Darfuri population, saying we have received mixed reports. Adada responded that the IDPs fall into three groups. In El Fasher, the camps are highly politicized and there is an ongoing power struggle among rebel groups within them for control. UNAMID has been driven away from Zamzam Camp because of a dispute with some of the camp inhabitants (Minni Minnawi followers) over blood money from a UNAMID traffic accident. In El Geneina, the IDPs are focused on serious humanitarian issues; such as schools, medical services, food, water, and better security, and do not seem to be very politicized. In a recent change, relations are best with the IDPs in Nyala, who are happy with the Bangladeshi peacekeepers. He added that he hopes that the Kalma camp can serve as a model for the rest of those in Darfur, now that the second Formed Police Unit (FPU),from Indonesia, is arriving in El Fasher. The Charge agreed that the massacre in Kalma, along with the 24 hour presence now of the Bangladeshi unit inside Kalma have helped make the IDPs there more appreciative of UNAMID,s role. ¶11. (C) Asked about the reality GoS claims of voluntary returns made at the Sudan People,s Initiative (SPI) session, Adada denied there are any returns, in fact the camps are growing. He said that the IDPs would return home if they could, but are afraid. Abdul Mohammed said that the UN is conducting consultations with the local population, with the objective of getting stakeholders to identify their concerns. Once common ground is identified among local groups, they can begin to work to resolve the issues. Polling done by the UN indicates that Darfuris are much more focused on local concerns ) establishing local peace, local security, local reconciliation - rather than abstract political issues. The CDA noted that such a process will tend to make Khartoum irrelevant. Mohammed agreed, saying that the conflict will not be resolved by the GoS engaging in traditional peace talks with the rebel movements but will have to be more inclusive. SPI: Three Years Too Late - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (C) Asked how the U.S. views the Sudan Peoples, Initiative, the CDA replied that we are hopeful, but skeptical. He said that everyone knows what is needed, but have been unable to bring all of the elements together. The SPI is three years late and the NCP now is working against the clock of the ICC indictment. Qatari understanding of the KHARTOUM 00001533 003 OF 003 situation in Darfur seems quite superficial but they can bring a lot of money to the table. Adada agreed that one can accomplish a lot with money in Darfur. Abdul Mohammed said that Qatari money can be used to buy social peace and prevent the rebel movements from degenerating into tribal militias and banditry. It also can be used to push the movements to think politically, rather than militarily. The Charge repeated that time is running out if the regime really intends to change its behavior in Darfur. ¶13. (C) Asked whether he thought the movements will negotiate with the GoS, the Charge responded that they would avoid this, waiting for the GoS to weaken. Abdul Mohammed characterized Abdul Wahid as waiting in Paris for the West to give him control of Darfur. JEM,s approach is more nationalistic, it wants a solution, but not one dictated by the outside. Other movements consist of individuals, warlords, some of them protgs of Libya, which keeps them under its control. Finally, there are the currently impotent intellectuals, such as Sharif Harir who will be happy if provided a political forum to express their views. Comment - - - - ¶14. (C) Adada,s narrow focus on the status of his own mandate, rather than the UN,s broader mission of securing peace and improving the humanitarian situation in Darfur is symptomatic of the organization,s problems. His upbeat assessment of UNAMID,s deployment prospects is good news, if it is borne out in the end, but Adada has always been ahead of the curve, seizing on and exaggerating whatever small progress has been achieved to date. That said, the UN,s own inertia, rather than GoS foot-dragging, continues to be the biggest obstacle at this time, as the regime tries to show that it is on its best behavior as it maneuvers to avoid greater international isolation as a result of an ICC indictment. FERNANDEZ