MALLOCH BROWN ADVOCATES INCENTIVES TIED TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000145 SIPDIS SIPDIS ADDIS ABABA - PLEASE PASS TO A/S FRAZER AND SE WILLIAMSON NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: MALLOCH BROWN ADVOCATES INCENTIVES TIED TO MILESTONES FOR SUDAN AND HARMONIZED POLICY WITH U.S. REF: KHARTOUM 90 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: UK Minister for Africa, Asia and the UN Lord Mark Malloch Brown told CDA Fernandez January 30 that the UK would like to offer the Government of Sudan a package of incentives tied to milestones on peace in Darfur and CPA implementation, accompanied by a clear message of consequences for inaction. Malloch Brown said his government would like to harmonize this message to the Sudanese with the U.S. He pointed to the risks of a divided international community as something the Sudanese will exploit to their advantage. The Minister was somewhat optimistic that the UK's candidate for AEC chair Ambassador Derek Plumley would be accepted by the CPA parties and plans to address this plus the attempted PNG of the UNAMID COS with President Bashir in Addis Ababa. End summary. ¶2. (C) UK Minister Malloch Brown requested a meeting with CDA Fernandez January 30 to gauge U.S. views on Sudan prior to his trip to Addis Ababa for the AU summit, where he will meet with A/S Frazer and SE Williamson. Brown was accompanied by proposed AEC chair Ambassador Derek Plumley. Brown said he and Plumley had "positive" meetings with the NCP and SPLM and hoped to address the issue of Plumley's candidacy in Addis with President Bashir, as well as the regime's purported move to PNG UNAMID Chief of Staff Patrick Davidson-Houston. ¶3. (C) Brown said the UK, while realizing the risks and the dishonesty of the Khartoum regime, would like to pursue a strategy of engagement with the Sudanese government where specific incentives are tied to specific actions on their part - such as UNAMID deployment and CPA implementation. He requested that the UK and the U.S. harmonize their policies in this regard, noting that the Sudanese would obviously like to drive a wedge between the American and the Europeans, and this should be avoided. CDA replied that Embassy had proposed this type of approach to Washington and we will know more with the upcoming visit of Special Envoy Williamson. Brown said he would discuss a harmonized approach with A/S Frazer and SE Williamson in Addis Ababa. ¶4. (C) Brown had just returned from Juba and expressed concern that although the CPA is not in crisis, there is a general sense already that "the South is walking away." He also expressed concern that elections in Sudan could be violent, noting that there are two types of elections stealing - when the government would have won anyway, and what happened in Kenya, which leads to dramatic violence. He noted that the problem in Sudan is that the people here will believe the result was otherwise regardless of the outcome. Brown predicted the most dangerous period for Sudan will be between the elections and the referendum. CDA agreed, noting that "this could be Kenya on steroids." ¶5. (C) CDA observed that the Sudanese regime currently feels emboldened and has taken a harder stand on many issues. Two months ago the regime was nervous that its two biggest crises were running together while the SPLM had its ministers outside the government and was engaged in talks with the Darfur rebels. Now it is past that crisis, with the SPLM back in the government and the Darfur rebels divided. In terms of the Sudan-U.S. relationship, the regime appears to believe that the U.S. is distracted by Kenya and Iraq and can't deliver on anything - neither a better relationship nor additional pressure. So the regime's rhetoric has hardened and the NCP has even mounted a new proxy war in northern Bahr al Ghazal to gain territory in Abyei and push borders farther south. CDA predicted that the NCP will return to its strategy of process over outcomes and form over substance as it continues to delay and obstruct on all fronts. ¶6. (C) Comment: As post has suggested in reftel, the U.S. and the international community are running out of options to deal effectively with the Sudanese regime. A carefully-designed strategy of credible incentives tied to specific actions by the Sudanese government, along with credible additional pressures, may be our only hope of positive engagement on Darfur and the CPA. The UK's interest in harmonizing our messages is an opportunity we should not lose, because the Sudanese regime will certainly seek to divide the international community in our attempts to engage over the next critical six months. FERNANDEZ