SLM/MM ON EAST JEBEL MARRA FIGHTING AND ZAMZAM INCURSION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001406 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: SLM/MM ON EAST JEBEL MARRA FIGHTING AND ZAMZAM INCURSION ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On September 15, three senior leaders of the Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM) in North Darfur told poloff that SLM/MM "routed" GoS forces in East Jebel Marra on September 14 following combat on September 13 in the same region. SLM/MM leaders also gave a detailed description of the attack on Zamzam IDP camp on September 10. SLM/MM leadership described the GoS military campaign in North Darfur state as "very significant," as it is the first time that the GoS has used its own forces to directly and openly attack SLM/MM. END SUMMARY ¶2. (SBU) Poloff met with the following SLM/MM leaders on September 15: Ahmed Bahr, a representative at the North Darfur Legislative Council; Adam Ali Ware, a former ceasefire commission representative for SLM/MM, and Mohammed Yousif the Secretary General for SLM/MM in North Darfur. SLM/MM "ROUTED" GOS FORCES ON SEPTEMBER 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) According to these sources, following a failed attack on SLM/MM on September 13, GoS forces retreated to Tawila. On September 14, GoS forces then reportedly staged another attack on SLM/MM forces south of Tawila. Ware stated that SLM/MM forces led by field commanders Ahmed Abu Diggin and Muhammad Shain were prepared for the attack and "routed" the GoS. Secretary General Yousif stated that he does not expect any more fighting in this region in the coming days "as we so clearly defeated the GoS force." Yousif predicted that if there is fighting, it will return to far North Darfur near Birmaza and Disa. These contacts stated that although GoS casualty figures are not known for this second attack, at least 200 GoS fighters died in the first wave of fighting. EARLIER FIGHTING IN EAST JEBEL MARRA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) SLM/MM leaders stated that heavy fighting on September 13 preceded the "decisive victory" on September 14. These contacts said that GoS forces started the attack with heavy aerial bombardment at 15:00 on September 13. A force of 80-90 vehicles then followed the bombing, accoriding to Ware. In addition to GOS "technicals" (Landcruiers,) the force reportedly included three combat helicopters, four armored personnel carriers (APCs) and 20 military trucks. Sources stated that the military trucks dropped off a large number of troops and then retreated, "as the GoS is more keen on preserving military vehicles than its people." Contacts stated that fighting continued until approximately midnight, resulting in the deaths of three children, one woman, and five SLM/MM fighters. Additionally, one section of the village of Colgi was entirely destroyed in the attack. Seventeen SLM/MM fighters were wounded in the attack and were transported to Dar Es Salaam (N. Darfur) for treatment, and these SLM representatives reported ICRC traveled there and treated the SLM/MM fighters. Ware, Bahr, and Yousif repeated several times that all of the fighting between SLM/MM and GoS forces occurred in liberated areas under SLM/MM control. COMPOSITION OF GOS FORCE - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) SLM/MM contacts stated that the GoS force was led by janjaweed and accompanied by Central Reserve Police (CRP) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). They said that in these most recent attacks in Birmaza and East Jebel Marra the GoS has relied heavily on Arab tribes for the majority of its fighters. (Ahmed Bahr claimed to have seen a long list of Arab casualties from the Zayidia tribe from the SLM/MM-GoS fighting confirming this.) Money and longstanding grievances against the Zaghawa have motivated the Arab tribes to join the GoS force, they said. These contacts also alleged that many janjaweed are being quickly incorporated into mid-level and senior positions in the GoS military and paramilitary. In the latest wave, over 700 former janjaweed were trained in Eastern Sudan and are awaiting a formal commission to GoS forces following a post-Ramadan graduation ceremony, according to Bahr. They said the CRP are an elite and well-paid force, claiming that even its lowest ranking soldiers earn more than senior officials in the ordinary GoS police. (Note: This seems a bit of a stretch, but is worth noting the perception that the CRP are "professional" and well-paid. End note.) ZAMZAM ATTACK ACCORDING TO SLM/MM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) SLM/MM contacts stated that on September 10, seventeen Central Reserve Police vehicles entered Zamzam IDP camp. The CRP then destroyed the SLM/MM headquarters, freed four individuals at an SLM/MM prison, and pillaged the Zamzam market. According to these sources, the attack started when a well-organized CRP force bypassed an SLM/MM checkpoint at 19:00 on September 11 on the southern side of Zamzam and traveled directly to the SLM/MM office. The CRP KHARTOUM 00001406 002 OF 002 allegedly entered the office and stole SLM/MM information, office equipment, and approximately $10,000 USD before burning the office. Following this attack on their headquarters, the CRP entered the SLM/MM controlled prison and released 4 inmates and detained three SLM/MM "policemen" (who still remain in CRP custody as of September 15.) "They were targeting SLM/MM by going straight to our headquarters and prison," alleged Yousif. ¶7. (SBU) Following these targeted attacks on SLM/MM facilities, the CRP force then reportedly entered the market, shooting their weapons into the air and intentionally scaring the IDPs, said Yousif. The force looted approximately 200 shops, stealing close to 500 mobile phones from IDPs and several shops, and burning over 25 homes. He said the force also beat several IDPs including one pregnant woman who later miscarried as a result. These sources claim that 14 people in all were wounded in the attack. According to these contacts, the North Darfur police were equally surprised by this CRP incursion. Within minutes of the CRP movements in Zamzam, the regular GoS police reportedly entered the market and fired upon CRP forces. Ware stated that once the GoS police realized that the CRP was responsible for the attack, the GoS police quickly retreated. ¶8. (SBU) SLM/MM leaders stated that following the attack, they repeatedly tried to meet with the North Darfur Governor, who canceled three consecutive appointments on September 12. SLM/MM leaders finally cornered the governor on September 13 who, accompanied by members of his State Security Implementation Committee, justified the CRP incursion saying that SLM/MM was unlawfully detaining IDPs. Yousif said he responded that the DPA does allow for the establishment of signatory-controlled courts and prisons. Following a heated discussion, the Governor eventually agreed to set up two separate committees, one to investigate the CRP attack, and another to assess overall security in North Darfur. Yousif stated that the committee will consist of six members, three from SLM/MM and three others from the government. "We are not entirely satisfied with this, it is more like a tranquilizer than a real and final solution," stated Yousif. INCREASED FRUSTRATION - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) SLM/MM North Darfur leaders stated that they expect that more incursions could occur in IDP camps as the government intentionally seeks to break up the camps. They claimed that over 4,000 IDPs have already left Zamzam following the attack. All three SLM/MM contacts strongly asserted that both the attacks in Birmaza and East Jebel Marra were specifically designed to target Minnawi's forces. "How can the government conduct these raids when it touts its Sudan People's Initiative, discusses a Ramadan truce, and targets its partners in the Government of National Unity," noted Yousif. Continuing, Yousif emphasized that the GoS "only knows how to use power, force, and coercion, and it will take a real power like the U.S. to forcefully put this government in line." SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIGHTING - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) SLM/MM contacts acknowledged that the GoS had attacked SLM/MM forces before, but only indirectly with proxy forces (such as SLM/Free Will.) "This is the first time that the GoS has attacked us with one of its own forces," stated Yousif. Bahr called the attack "a big change in GoS strategy" as "this attack was out in the open for all to see that the GoS really is aggressively targeting us." COMMENT - - - - ¶11. (SBU) Post contacts presented one side of the story. We have no independent confirmation of SLM/MM's reports of victory, on numbers of dead, GoS vehicles destroyed or attacks on displaced Zamzam residents. Though much of what was said cannot be verified at this time, this report shows SLM/MM perceptions of the events on the ground. The fighting at least in Jebel Marra seems to have died down. SLM/MM North Darfur leaders believe that the GoS is intentionally targeting their movement, attacking them openly and directly for the first time in a widespread military campaign, and attempting to break up IDP camps. Whether accurate or not, these perceptions will be one of many factors driving the Darfur conflict in the foreseeable future. CDA will raise these issues with regime officials this week and urges that we make clear to the GOS at every level that military escalation by the regime and heavy-handed incursions into IDP camps (such as what led to the Kalma Camp Massacre) are American redlines in Sudan. FERNANDEZ