"FM ALOR WARNS OF POSSIBLE, UNSPECIFIED "SUDANESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001405 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: "FM ALOR WARNS OF POSSIBLE, UNSPECIFIED "SUDANESE BOMBSHELL" AT UNGA REF: KHARTOUM 1374 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor told CDA Fernandez on September 15 that, despite his warning last week that Sudan intends to defy the ICC (reftel),the National Congress Party (NCP) of President Bashir is coyly keeping all its options open. Alor said that he had learned that an expensive London law firm ("Palestinians based in London") had been summoned to Khartoum over the past 3-4 days to give the regime legal advice on dealing with the ICC. Alor was told that the firm had presented "a huge bill" for its services and that "for now, they were asked for their legal advice, and for now, we don't need legal representation before the court - yet." GET A LAWYER - JUST IN CASE -------------- ¶2. (C) FM Alor added that Bashir had asked him to summon the Sudanese Ambassadors in London and The Hague for urgent consultations in Khartoum and they had arrived the previous day and met senior officials, including Sudan's Justice Minister who assured them "we have no intention of cooperating with the ICC at all." The Sudanese Ambassador to the Netherlands, a career diplomat, responded that there was then "no reason for him to have been summoned." Alor wondered how much in the loop was Justice Minister Sabdarat in the regime's political deliberations (Sabdarat is not an NCP member). ¶3. (C) Alor had been tasked by FVP Salva Kiir to appease Bashir about perceptions of SPLM "disloyalty" and had met him on September 14. He told Bashir that "you may have misunderstood the position of the SPLM on the ICC." The SPLM is for legal engagement with the court because it buys Sudan time. Legal engagement gives UNSC members a chance to lobby the court on Sudan's behalf and "any good team of lawyers" can do the same. Sudan can use the time game to really make peace in Darfur, provide compensation to IDPs, promote reconciliation and "make the current position of Ocampo irrelevant." Alor ended the talk by telling Bashir "the SPLM is with you." ¶4. (C) Alor expressed concern about UK press reports that the UK and France were considering "letting Sudan off the ICC hook without paying a price." He said that without �00A;extracting concessions from the regime for its past behavior in return for an ICC indictment postponement "you would ensure that the regime will be more brutal in the future." We are in favor of Bashir surviving because he is less worse than those around him but "ICC could be the best way of pushing for Sudan's transformation," in addition to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. GIMMICK OR SUBSTANCE AT UNGA? -------------- ¶5. (C) The FM remarked on the just submitted list of 40 plus Sudanese officials who will make up Sudan's delegation to UNGA. CDA Fernandez noted that Sudan was the last country in the world to submit its names for the upcoming general assembly and getting them visas would be a mammoth undertaking. The makeup of the delegation made it seem like Sudan was going for peacetalks, not for speech-making. Alor opined that the regime wants to send a "mixed message, they can go either way, making things better or worse in Sudan." "Don't be surprised if there is an NCP bombshell or gimmick in New York to catch the attention of the world," he added. Alor expects that whatever happens "will probably be for PR" but if there are specifics, "like we are handing over the two current ICC suspects next Tuesday," then you should pay attention. ¶6. (C) CDA then met separately with Alor's ostensible subordinate, MFA Under-Secretary Mutriff Siddiq, an NCP insider close to VP Taha. Siddiq apologized for the extremely late submission of the Sudanese delegation's passports and pointedly noted that he had just approved 15 USG visa requests the day before. Despite the lateness of the submission, "I formally ask that VP Taha be able to meet with President Bush or, if that is not possible, with the next most senior person in the US delegation." CDA responded that, he could make no promises one way or the other, given the extreme lateness and strangeness of such a request, but he would pass the information on. Siddiq said that Sudan had KHARTOUM 00001405 002 OF 002 only decided what course to take in the last 48 hours and "it would be worth the Americans' while to see Taha." Siddiq added that Sudan had no intention of being negative or confronting the U.S. at the UN. On the contrary, the regime was acutely conscious of the Americans' interest in seeing "deeds in Darfur and not just words." ¶7. (C) Comment: Given the deep skepticism worldwide about the Khartoum regime, it would take some very substantive concessions indeed by the NCP to constitute a positive, attention-getting bombshell or gimmick. Although a minority in the regime does favor concessions and engagement to definitively solve Darfur (including, perhaps, Taha),a more likely course is, as Deng suggests, a "mixed message" holding out the tantalizing promise of real progress on Darfur coupled with some saber-rattling. Adding added spice is the choice of Taha, one of several rivals scheming to replace Bashir, to head the delegation. Ali was once so kept under wraps because the President feared he was "America's Choice" to replace him. Choosing the mild-mannered, closely monitored Taha (who is just as complicit in the regime's actions as many "hardliners") is indicative of the regime's desperation. And while the idea of an 11th hour "bombshell" by the regime is intriguing, it would be almost out of character for the calculating NCP. Only once have they taken a bold, positive move (at a time of great pressure on the regime) and that was the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The NCP's man who accomplished that was Ali Osman Taha. End comment. FERNANDEZ