PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHAZI SALAHEDDIN GOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001404 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AS FRAZER, SE WILIAMSON, AF/SPG, IO/UNP NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UNGA SU SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GHAZI SALAHEDDIN GOS THINKING CLOUDED BY SUSPICION REF: A. KHARTOUM 1387 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1390 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salah Eddin, current thinking of GoS policy makers is clouded by the suspicion that the West is less interested in resolving the Darfur conflict than it is in regime change in Khartoum. He agreed that Sudan needs to deliver a more substantive message on Darfur, but questioned how much control the GoS has over conditions there. He said that Sudan,s delegation is not going to the UNGA to pick a fight, but to &consult with friends8 and show that others stand with Sudan in the conflict with ICC Prosecutor Ocampo. He said that the SPLM (including FM Deng Alor) were excluded from leading the UNGA delegation because of fears they would use the occasion to undercut the NCP. END SUMMARY. Sudan Will Consult with Friends at the UNGA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) In a September 15 meeting with GNU Presidential Advisor Dr. Ghazi Salah Eddin, CDA Fernandez pressed Salah on Sudan,s objectives for the UN General Assembly. &What do you hope to accomplish?8 The Charge said he is worried that Sudan,s UNGA delegation, headed by VP Taha, might be going to New York expecting high-level consultations with USG officials, who they would find are unavailable, leading to more hard feelings. Such meetings need to be carefully planned in advance, the Charge told Ghazi, and this has not been the case. He sensed that while Sudan would go to the UNGA to talk about ICC action against President Al-Bashir, U.S. officials will want to discuss Darfur. ¶3. (C) Salah replied that, initially, the Presidency planned to push for an UNGA resolution that would challenge the ICC,s jurisdiction in Darfur. This was a non-starter in Salaheddin,s opinion, "it just won't work" . Now, however, Sudan,s delegation will go to the UNGA &to consult with friends8 on the margins and send a message that others in the world, including the Arab League, NAM, OIC and the African Union, stand with Sudan against possible ICC action. Sudan,s delegation hopes to meet with as many other countries as possible while there, including the United States. However, Salah continued that he believed that more important than who the delegation meets with will be the kind of message it delivers. A Darfur Message That Delivers on Perception and Substance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) The Charge noted that he had just returned from a trip to Nyala (ref. A) and said that the GoS message is not being helped by its actions in Darfur. He described the events at the Kalma IDP camp as a &massacre,8 said the Wali of South Darfur is unrepentant, and called the local HAC chief &a criminal.8 The CDA said that if Sudan is really serious, it needs to take positive action on the ground in Darfur that is substantive, but that also will get credit from the international community. As he had with NCP strategist Sayed al-Khateeb (ref. B),the Charge argued that the GoS should concentrate on measures over which it has full control, namely, improving the humanitarian situation in Darfur. Sudan has been seemingly going in the opposite direction in the past weeks. ¶5. (C) Salaheddin questioned how much control the GoS has over conditions in Darfur. He asserted that third countries are supporting &spoilers8 in the conflict, who have little incentive to cooperate as long as the ICC action is pending. The Charge responded that the GoS needs to identify those measures on which the GoS can deliver in a reasonable period of time and act on them, rather than expect to get rewarded ahead of time for good behavior. GoS Thinking Clouded by Suspicion - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Ghazi said that the GoS is frustrated and that there is a growing feeling that the U.S. and the international community are less interested in resolving the Darfur conflict as they are in regime change in Khartoum. He said the IDP camps are becoming militarized, controlled by the rebel groups. He said that the GoS is considering a scheme to compensate the IDPs, coupled with resettlement, but that &no one will buy this idea8 coming from the GoS. KHARTOUM 00001404 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Charge Fernandez agreed that there is suspicion on both sides. Many would view a GoS compensation scheme suspiciously if it is not totally transparent. Compensation and resettlement cannot be done in a vacuum. People returning from IDP camps to their homes must be provided security and the assurance that they will not be driven out again by those who dispossessed them and are still armed by Khartoum. "These people weren't militarized or angry when they were in their original villages," he noted. ¶8. (C) CDA said that he understands Sudan is suspicious of the international community. He assured Ghazi that the USG is not pushing regime change, but if it occurred many would say the regime had brought it upon itself. The truth is that the West, including Washington, believe the GoS is caught in a trap of its own making and suffering the consequences. "Everything we talk about could have been done years ago." Ghazi repeated that lack of trust has become the heart of the regime's attitude and has clouded its thinking. ¶9. (C) Salaheddin said that Sudan is not going to the UNGA to pick a fight with anyone. He agreed that the GoS needs a more substantive message on Darfur. The CDA cautioned that the GoS will need to lay the groundwork carefully and not simply unilaterally unveil a plan. Any proposals will need to be serious and substantive to receive international support, otherwise it will be received as political theater. SPLM Seeks to Undercut the NCP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) CDA Fernandez said that he understood that the makeup of the UNGA delegation is an internal GoS affair, but thought it unfortunate that it included no participants from the SPLM, such VP Salva Kiir and Foreign Minister Deng Alor. He said frankly that, although it realizes that the SPLM has an agenda of its own, the USG respects and trusts the views of the SPLM. Ghazi responded that the NCP mistrusts the SPLM and is concerned that they only would use the opportunity of going on the UNGA delegation to undercut the NCP (Note: We have subsequently learned that FM Alor will be at UNGA). "We have noticed that they are telling others, including the Americans, to keep the pressure on us so that we crack." ¶11. (C) The CDA cautioned that the SPLM are the NCP,s GNU partners and that at some point, it must get SPLM buy-in for its initiatives if it expects international agreement. Ghazi responded that the SPLM act more like outsiders than partners in the GNU. The Charge answered that the SPLM think (for good reason) that the will be used by the NCP, then tossed aside. He repeated that the U.S. will not go along with NCP proposals unless the SPLM buys in to them too. Comment - - - - ¶12. (C) Dr. Salaheddin,s description of an NCP leadership whose judgment is clouded by suspicion is a good one. This cloudiness has increased because of the pressure of a looming ICC indictment of the Sudanese head of state. To some extent this is a projection onto others of its own behavior. However, it also reflects frustration that the West (especially the U.S.) cannot provide it with a list of specific goals it must accomplish to get out of its self-made predicament. Like a snake caught in a trap, the NCP continues to twist and turn seeking a way out. Many in the regime, like Dr. Ghazi, are no fools but hesitate to take or encourage decisive, positive steps to solve Darfur in fear of losing everything in the end. That makes action to end the crisis so much harder as time goes by. FERNANDEZ