MURDER OF SLA/MINAWI CEASEFIRE COMMISSION REPRESENTATIVE

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000014 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU SU UNSC CD SUBJECT: MURDER OF SLA/MINAWI CEASEFIRE COMMISSION REPRESENTATIVE REF: KHARTOUM 0005 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On the same day that JEM representative to the Ceasefire Commission GEN Mohammed Basher was arrested along with five other JEM members, an SLA/Minawi representative was killed in Mellit (North Darfur) along with his nephew, who worked for PAE. These two events demonstrate the challenges that UNAMID faces on the ground. END SUMMARY. SLA/MINNI MINAWI MEMBER MURDERED -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At approximately 10:00 a.m. on December 30 an AMIS Land Cruiser was carjacked in Mellit (North Darfur) by two bandits armed with AK47s who stopped the driver at gunpoint and then shot the two occupants of the vehicle, SLA/Minni Minawi representative to the Ceasefire Commission LTC Ahmed Mohammedin Wadi and his nephew, Yusuf Abdullah Mohammedin, a PAE Staff member. The carjackers dumped the wounded Yusuf from the vehicle and drove north with Wadi in the car. SLA/Unity forces reportedly exchanged gunfire with the carjackers at a check point in Hashaba. The vehicle was later recovered by SLA/Unity in east Kutum with Wadi dead inside. The vehicle has since been handed over to AMIS, and as of December 31 Wadi's family was in El Fasher to make arrangements for the disposition of the body. The PAE staffer was medically evacuated to El Fasher, where he was treated at the hospital but died of his injuries that evening. His death was announced at the December 31 AMIS Morning Brief. ¶3. (SBU) SLA/Minawi representatives on December 31 and January 1 provided more details about the incident. They told FieldOff that the shooter was from Mellit (as was Wadi) and that both of the bandits were from the Berti tribe (both Wadi and Yusuf were Zaghawa). The reps report that the shooter, after having dropped Yusuf from the car, drove off with Wadi toward Umm Sidir and tried to bury him in a shallow hole when he was caught by locals and turned over to SLA/Unity reps in the area. The SLA/Unity forces, allegedly of Abdullah Yehia's faction and led by Commander Yusuf Norain, captured the shooter and have since refused to turn him over to authorities. [NOTE: One SLA/Minawi rep initially told FieldOff that Norain had summarily executed the shooter on the spot, which he considered "not a normal act." However there is no evidence yet that the perpetrator was in fact killed. END NOTE]. While no definitive information on the identity of the shooter is yet known, SLA/Minawi reps claim he is a soldier of Commander Jar al-Nabi of the G-19, which operates in this part of northern North Darfur but which has been relatively dormant over the past few months. A TEST TO UNAMID -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In their tendency to resort to conspiracy theories (Minni reps are quick to link the Mellit incident with the January 1 shootings of U.S. Embassy personnel in Khartoum) the movements consider the arrest of GEN Basher and the killing of Wadi to be GoS provocations, though as yet there is no link between the murder and the GoS. More importantly, the movements see these two events as an opportunity for the newly-inaugurated UNAMID mission to demonstrate its resolve in restoring order to Darfur. SLA/Minawi reps say they are anxious for UNAMID to deploy as quickly as possible so as to dispel the image that all it is doing is paying lip service and making empty statements regarding events unfolding on the ground. "The ball is now in the UN's court," one SLA rep declared. ¶5. (SBU) COMMENT: UNAMID must become more adept than AMIS at responding to events such as the arrest of GEN Basher and the murder of the SLA/Minawi CFC representative. Statements of condemnation for such events are just a start; UNAMID must begin to intervene in events unfolding around it and become more assertive with all actors if it hopes to restore order amidst the chaos. A major gripe across the board by rebel movements with regard to UNAMID deployment is that it has not been properly coordinated with rebel field commanders on the ground. Constructive engagement and coordination with the movements and the GoS security forces is the first step toward engaging rather than merely observing and reacting. POWERS