United Nations Africa Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Deployment

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001386 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, IO/PSC NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: United Nations Africa Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Deployment Update REF: KHARTOUM 1312 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Self-sufficiency is a key component for Troop-Contributing Country (TCC) deployment success as 3,900 UNAMID-shepherded containers continue to be held up in Port Sudan and El Obeid by both internal factors and by the regime. An emphasis on local procurement could decrease expenses and increase UNAMID progress. The possibility of International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments continues to weigh heavily as the possibility of reprisals against UNAMID could render an already difficult job impossible. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On September 9, Poloff met with Abdul Aziz "Peter" Iskander, Deputy Director UNAMID Liaison Office to discuss ongoing UNAMID deployment challenges and compare the Khartoum perspective to those of field officers on these issues. Missing Deployment Goals - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Iskander agreed with reports from the field (reftel) that UNAMID will be unable to reach its end-of-2008 80 percent deployment goal, but declined to speculate when that goal would be reached. Iskander remarked TCCs lack the capacity or will to put forth more troops which will push back deployment goals further. On a positive note, some police forces are deploying with much less difficulty. The lack of firearms deems them more acceptable to the GOS and they have less equipment to move. Material and Personnel Movement Problems - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) Experience now demonstrates that countries that provide their own equipment and manage movement into Sudan are the most successful, according to Iskander, "UNAMID has no capacity to bring in equipment." His suggested deployment method is that each TCC fly all equipment via IL76 to the airfield nearest to the deployment site and conduct in-processing and Component Owned Equipment count at that location. Iskander posits that the more the U.N. tries to implement a standardized process the more the GOS impedes processing. Standardizing the system has worked for the U.N. in countries with welcoming and permissive environments, but this is not the case in Sudan and the U.N. does not appear to be able to adapt. ¶5. (SBU) The container back-log continues. Iskander reported that there are 3,900 20-foot ISO shipping containers divided between Port Sudan and El Obeid. At El Obeid, officials arbitrarily request cleared shipments to undergo a second clearance process and local governors use the process to demonstrate their power at the expense of the shipments (Note: This is a common Sudanese bureaucratic procedure - diplomats need special permission to travel to Darfur and even with a permit can be denied. Material or commercial goods which have already cleared customs can be made "to clear customs again," NGOs can be and are made to pay special taxes for goods intended for IDPs in South Darfur but not in other states. This behavior, which extends far beyond UNAMID, is equal parts corruption, incompetence and intentional obstructionism. End note). Personnel in-processing at Port Sudan also continues to provide challenges. ¶6. (SBU) According to Iskander, a third-party contractor, Agility, is successfully moving TCC equipment via rail all the way to Nyala in South Darfur, an option UNAMID has not yet considered. These shipments allegedly avoid the Port Sudan customs process and are cheaper and faster. (Note: While it is true that Agility ships overland equipment by rail, it still must be landed at Port Sudan, so it is unclear how it avoids the customs process there. Agility could not be reached for confirmation. End note.) ¶7. (SBU) Iskander said that a bright spot in the UNAMID process is Major General Saeifeidin Omer Suliman, the new Director of Customs, who has intervened with rapid clearances when requested by UNAMID. Three shipments in Port Sudan remain stranded, however. These consist of PAE heavy equipment including tractors and graders. No written documentation spells out PAE's formal status since it lost its official standing July 14, so even Major General Suliman cannot yet authorize the release (MFA U/S Siddiq, who oversees the UNAMID deployment file for the GOS, told CDA that even though PAE's formal status ended on July 14, the GOS would give them additional time - two months, now ended - to complete their projects. Without the equipment PAE hass fallen behind on their promise to complete projects before the 60-day grace period is concluded. Iskander advises PAE to consign the equipment directly to UNAMID, but PAE reportedly is reluctant to transfer ownership. KHARTOUM 00001386 002 OF 002 ¶8. (SBU) Iskander feels of the 18 companies which bid on the PAE's contract PAE, DynCorp and Agility appear to be the frontrunners, with PAE the clear favorite as it would not incur start up or deployment costs. ¶9. (SBU) Visas continue to remain problematic for U.S., Canadian, Danish and other Western military petitioners as GOS representatives provide "sweet talk" but no constructive action. Procurement: A Better Way - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) Iskander also recommends UNAMID change its attitude towards procurement. Tires currently procured from Kuwait at (USD) $400 each can be acquired locally for half the price without compromising standards or incurring shipping and customs times. The financial benefit would make more funding available for other programs. Eliminating some third party contractors is another procurement strategy which would provide financial benefits. A well qualified Quality Assurance team could provide oversight. Bureaucracy and Morale - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) According to Iskander, internal bureaucratic impediments also hinder the UNAMID Human Resources and financial processes. Human Resources actions are slow to process and slow payment for contacts and hotels in Port Sudan (some dating form 2005-6) have strained relationships between UNAMID and the resources required for mission success. ¶12. (SBU) U.N. bureaucracy has also had a negative impact on retention and recruitment, as promotions are slow and many individuals have been in multiple "stretch" positions for years without the benefit of appropriate pay. Iskander complained that nepotism and favoritism plague UN recruitment. Both of these factors have depleted morale and a loss of incentive to remain with the U.N. ICC Indictment and Security - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (SBU) While UNAMID has no official source, Iskander said that wishful thinking by some in the UN persists that the ICC will hold off on indicting President Bashir under U.N. pressure. Others, however, expect ICC action in October, and anticipate an unspecified GOS response aimed at UNAMID. In the mean time, U.N. personnel in Sudan remain at a Phase IV security level and do not expect to lessen that posture. Iskander also expressed concern that the security level may continue indefinitely as there is no U.N. policy on how to scale back to a lower posture. Comment - - - - ¶14. (SBU) UNAMID leadership in Khartoum agrees with the opinion of those in the field that deployment goals will not be met and UNAMID management of equipment movement continues to be painfully slow and confused. UNAMID will have to demonstrate previously unseen flexibility and initiative as it forays into new territories of material management and procurement. Relaxing its focus on the most strict reading of regulations and concentrating on practical methods of mission accomplishment will be crucial for UNAMID success. In the interim, the U.N. should encourage TCCs to provide their own material and handle deployment until such time UNAMID is able to revamp its own procedures. FERNANDEZ