DPKO GUEHENNO's VISIT TO KHARTOUM AND ADDIS ABABA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000138 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU SUBJECT: DPKO GUEHENNO's VISIT TO KHARTOUM AND ADDIS ABABA REFTEL: KHARTOUM 111 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The GOS successfully avoided senior-level meetings with DPKO U/S Guehenno during his visit to Sudan and continues to drag its feet on finalizing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and other UNAMID-related issues. The AU Summit in Addis Ababa provides a good opportunity to pressure the GOS into finalizing the SOFA. The GOS sent a note verbale to UNAMID indicating that UNAMID Chief of Staff Davidson-Houston should leave the country immediately. End summary. -------------- Government Rejects Meetings with Guehenno -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Government of Sudan (GoS) rebuffed UN requests for senior-level meetings with visiting Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno during his recent trip to Sudan, two UN sources in Khartoum told Poloff on January 29. Khartoum granted Guehenno only one official meeting--with MFA State Minister Samani Al Wasila (who is not a regime insider). As a result, the only discussions on UNAMID deployment occurred during the preparatory discussions for the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, attended by Guehenno, Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rudolphe Adada, and the Sudanese Government's coordinator for UNAMID deployment, MFA Undersecretary Mutriff Siddiq. -------------- NOT MUCH DARFUR ACTION AT AU SUMMIT SO FAR -------------- ¶3. (SBU) AU Summit preparatory discussions are reportedly stalled over issues related to the UNAMID Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), troop-contributing countries, and Chief of Staff status. The Deputy UNAMID Force Commander told FieldOff on January 28 that the GoS "is not moving" on the SOFA and that this foot-dragging has drawn attention away from issues of equal priority that the FC had wanted to see addressed, including the status of the Joint Commission. "It's a bit unfortunate," lamented the Deputy FC, "that the Joint Commission just is not a priority." JSR Adada's Special Assistant, who accompanied Adada to Addis Ababa, confirmed in a conversation with Poloff in Khartoum on January 29 that GOS representative Siddiq had demurred in even discussing the SOFA or any other substantive issues affecting UNAMID deployment. She said that the Government continues to insist that night flights are not feasible, despite UNAMID's readiness to utilize emergency lights on the runways--which UNAMID now has in country--as an interim solution. ¶4. (SBU) On the potential expulsion of the UNAMID Chief of Staff, the Deputy FC told Fieldoff that the JSR received a letter from the MFA threatening to declare persona non grata British Brigadier General Patrick Davidson-Houston. The JSR reportedly wrote back to the MFA demanding an explanation for this decision and highlighting the fact that Davidson-Houston is in a staff officer position. According to the UK Embassy, the GoS responded with a note verbale on January 25 stating Davidson-Houston should depart Sudan "immediately." UNAMID has told us they plan to wait for a more explicit request from Sudan, specifying a date for Davidson-Houston's departure. -------------- UNAMID ASKS JANE HOLL LUTE FOR MORE TIME -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Deputy FC described recent visits to Darfur by senior UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) officials as "useful" insofar as they forced the visitors to appreciate "what we don't have in terms of logistics, communications and equipment." The Deputy FC, who accompanied DPKO Assistant-Secretary-General Jane Holl Lute on her itinerary, noted that both Holl Lute and Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guehenno were receptive to UNAMID's requests, often tasking their staffs in Darfur and in New York as soon as UNAMID officials described a problem that needed immediate attention. The Deputy FC expected that this level of concern would translate into more DPKO pressure on the GoS to confront issues still plaguing the mission, especially freedom of movement of its personnel and equipment. JSR Adada's Special Assistant anticipated that such pressure may encourage President Bashir to accept the SOFA during the upcoming AU Summit in order to avoid international embarrassment. ¶6. (SBU) In this regard, the Deputy FC recounted an awkward exchange between A/SYG Holl Lute and the Wali (governor) of South Darfur after the A/SYG was made to wait an hour to see him in his Nyala office. Alluding to the January 7 GoS attack on a UNAMID supply convoy, the Wali reprimanded UNAMID for not having done a better job of coordinating with the GoS on dispatching its convoys. The Wali tried to make a joke about UNAMID's mistaking speed for time: that KHARTOUM 00000138 002 OF 002 the GoS had been trying to enforce a speed limit on UNAMID rather than to restrict its movement through the area. A/SYG Holl Lute was reportedly not amused and stood firm on the need for the GoS to guarantee UNAMID's freedom of movement throughout Darfur. ¶7. (SBU) In briefing A/SYG Holl Lute on UNAMID challenges and problems (reported in reftel) the Deputy FC admitted that UNAMID officials had told her the peacekeeping operation was not ready to receive the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions being pushed to deploy as part of the Early Effects Package. The Deputy FC cited political and logistical concerns as reasons: local populations mistrusted both the Ethiopians and the Egyptians, as they are seen as being too friendly with the GoS; and there is simply no place to house or no way to feed those numbers of troops at this time. The Deputy FC further speculated that Eritrea would used the presence of Ethiopian troops in Sudan as a pretext for its own sort of military intervention through its ties to Darfur's rebel movements. Despite these reservations, UNAMID reported in its January 29 morning brief in El Fasher that the Egyptian battalions will arrive by April and that DPKO plans to airlift the entire contingent at a cost of approximately 7.5 million dollars, according to DPKO estimates. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: The AU summit provides a good opportunity to pressure the GOS into finalizing the SOFA agreement. The fact that the GOS refused to schedule meetings with DPKO U/S Guehenno reflects badly on the GOS and shows how obstructive the regime intends to be with regard to UNAMID deployment. As post has reportedly repeatedly, the GOS actually seems to be escalating its obstruction of UNAMID over last year's actions, with the case of the UNAMID COS as a major case in point. End comment. FERNANDEZ