BASSOLE: SUDAN SHOULD NOW MAKE THE FIRST MOVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001361 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY CLASSIFIED BY STATEMENT AND REASON DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND AF/C NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: BASSOLE: SUDAN SHOULD NOW MAKE THE FIRST MOVE REF: KHARTOUM 1352 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 4, the UN/AU's Chief Mediator to Darfur, Djibril Bassole told CDA Fernandez that the Government of Sudan (GoS) should take the first step to solve the Darfur crisis. According to Bassole, a positive unilateral move by the government on any number of security and humanitarian issues (i.e. compensation, voluntary return, development, political concessions, etc.) would jolt rebel movements from their "strategy of waiting to do anything until the ICC has made a decision." Largely in listening mode, Bassole appeared receptive to CDA Fernandez's analysis of the rebel movements' strategy, their relative strength, and the relationship between Darfur crisis and the 2009 national elections. END SUMMARY. CONTACT WITH LEADERS IN DARFUR AND ABROAD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On September 4, Bassole visited the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum accompanied by DPKO Political Affairs Officer Laura Sitea. He began by saying that he is "trying to put order to ideas" and that he is formulating a national action plan. Since arriving in Sudan, Bassole stated he has met with a broad spectrum of rebel, IDP, and civil society groups in Darfur. He emphasized that he sees "security and humanitarian aid as the main issues in Darfur." He noted that he had a good meeting with JEM leaders in New York and two positive meetings with Abdul Wahid Al-Nur in Paris although he has not yet caught up with SLA-MM leader Minnawi and SLA/Unity commanders, who remain in the field in North Darfur. ICC AND GOS IMPETUS TO ACT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) With respect to the ICC, Bassole noted that "I do not want to interfere," but that he met lead prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo recently. "He has to do his job and I have to do mine." Bassole reflected, "I can not tell him to stop, but if there are good results on the ground, any decision will have to come from Secretary General Ban ki Moon." Bassole stated that since Ocampo's request for an indictment, Khartoum has shown that it "wants to do something positive, but it does not know how." Meanwhile, the rebel movements, according to Bassole, will "wait and see" what decision will be made at the ICC and if they can gain some advantage from it. ¶4. (C) Bassole stressed that a concrete, positive, unilateral action by the GoS could change this dynamic. For example, he said, declaring Darfur to be one region (instead of divided into three states as it is now) could send a good signal to Darfurians and rebel movements and indicate that the GoS is sincere in its desire to solve Darfur. Compensation, voluntary resettlement, or the creation of the position of the Vice President reserved for a Darfurian would all build good-will for the GoS in Darfur, he said. Bassole stated that although this must come from the GoS, his team is also trying to create a plan which would incorporate these ideas. Increased security remains a priority but may be more difficult to achieve than some of these other steps. REBEL STRENGTH AND IMPOSSIBILITY OF UNIFICATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Bassole inquired about the strength of rebel movements and the possibility of another JEM attack. CDA Fernandez described the position of Minni Minnawi, the GoS's fear of a potential Zaghawa JEM/Minnawi/Unity coalition, and JEM's strength following the May 10 Omdurman attack. The CDA also discussed ongoing rivalry within the GoS security apparatus in Darfur (reftel) and the possibility that Khartoum may not have total control over its forces in Darfur. The CDA warned that following the rainy season, rebel movements will compete to demonstrate their power and relative strength while Khartoum may well try to undermine the Chadian Government using its own rebel proxies. ¶6. (C) Bassole responded that it is clear that Khalil Ibrahim wants to prove that he is the strongest leader on the ground. He said that uniting the rebels is "impossible" and that "unification before talks will never succeed." Bassole noted that he told First Vice President Salva Kiir (who is trying to unite the Darfuri movements) this same message on September 3, and "while it is good to gather everyone together (alluding to a possible Juba II meeting,) what I really need to know is what each of the different groups wants." Bassole also emphasized that the August 25 attack on Kalma camp has already had a very negative and immediate impact on the ground in Darfur. The CDA agreed, calling the attack a massacre and noting that officials in the GoS have attempted to shift the blame for this incident on local state players. ELECTIONS - - - - - ¶7. (C) Bassole inquired how Sudanese national elections scheduled for July 2009 will impact the Darfur peace process. CDA Fernandez described the complex SPLM and NCP struggle for power, the possibility of postponing elections, and the background of Salva Kiir's potential nomination for the presidency. Bassole emphasized that he sees the elections timeline as another pressure point of the GoS. Bassole said that the election date can be used to push forward another census in Darfur, to help transform rebel movements into political parties, and to put more pressure on the obstinate Abdul Wahid. He asked the Charge about outreach to Darfur's Arab tribes and CDA strongly encouraged this outreach. He also recommended to Bassole the respected multi-ethnic group of Darfuri civil society leaders that gathered recently in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, for talks. COMMENT - - - - ¶8. (C) Although Bassole was largely in listening mode, the few ideas that he did share track very much with our own analysis. Rather than trump a master "Darfur People's Plan," the GoS could achieve much by unilaterally offering (and implementing) a tangible and substantive concessions package to the people of Darfur. Notably, Bassole did not mention a cease-fire, one of the few talking points repeated in his limited engagement with the Sudanese and international press. Although we appreciate that Bassole faces a steep learning curve and his desire to listen, he needs to act quickly to establish his credibility and authority. Rebel leaders such as JEM's Ahmed Hussein told us this week, that they question Bassole's competence. While this judgment may be premature, the new Chief Mediator will need to quickly and decisively act if he is to set himself apart from his failed predecessors. FERNANDEZ