UMMA HOPES FOR AN ALLIANCE WITH THE SPLM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001345 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, DRL NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: UMMA HOPES FOR AN ALLIANCE WITH THE SPLM REF: KHARTOUM 841 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) According to Dr. Balgees Badri, a Sudanese scholar and a powerful National Umma Party female figure, the elections will play out in one of two ways: (1) the National Congress Party (NCP) of President Bashir delays elections until 2010, at which point the SPLM is only interested in the referendum and national elections never occur, or (2) the SPLM reaches out to northern and southern opposition parties, as well as regional groups, to form an alliance to compete against the NCP and the NCP is defeated. Badri encouraged an SPLM-Umma alliance, claiming that together, the two parties could beat the NCP in areas such as Abyei, South Darfur, and Blue and White Nile states. She said that the West needs to teach the SPLM "tactics" so that it uses its upcoming shot at elections wisely. End summary. -------------- NEC MATERIAL? -------------- ¶2. (U) On 3 September, poloff spoke with Dr. Balgees Badri, professor of Women's Studies at Al Afad University for Women in Omdurman and National Umma Party politician. Badri was one of 29 candidates proposed by northern opposition parties to the GNU Presidency on 4 August as a preferred candidate for the National Electoral Commission (NEC). Although the Presidency has not yet chosen the nine NEC members, Badri laughed at the prospect of being selected by the NCP; she is a well-known critic of the current regime. ¶3. (U) Badri, who has traveled to Germany in order to study the implementation of a mixed electoral system, and to South Africa to study management of electoral logistics and the relationships among national, regional, and state electoral commissions, recommended that once identified, the NEC should immediately embark on a study tour to understand how a mixed electoral system should function. Badri suggested that party election committees also take part in these tours. ¶4. (U) Badri also stressed the need for domestic NGO capacity building before elections. "NGOs aren't aware of their roles and have little expertise with democracy," said Badri. This is problematic because the voting population will depend on NGOs for information and outreach on elections. -------------- ELECTORAL SCENARIOS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Dr. Badri said that she sees elections playing out in one of the two following ways: Scenario One: To the chagrin of the NCP, the SPLM refuses to join it in an electoral alliance. The NCP realizes that even if it is able to coalesce with the National Umma Party and the fragmented Democratic Unionist Party (DUP),it will not win a majority in the GNU. The NCP sees elections spiraling out of its control, and delays elections until 2010. In 2010, the SPLM is more concerned with conducting the referendum than the elections. At that point, neither the SPLM nor the NCP feel that there is a need for elections. The SPLM prepares for and conducts the referendum, seceding from Sudan. In this scenario, national elections never take place. Many observers see this as a very likely scenario in Sudan, made more likely by the looming shadow of an ICC indictment of President Bashir. Scenario Two: The SPLM makes a tactical decision to coalesce with opposition parties across the country (former NDA partners such as the Eastern Front, Umma, USAP, etc.) By doing this, the SPLM guarantees that no matter the breakdown of those elected to the GNU, it will have a significant number of friends in the GNU. In this scenario, national elections will occur and this grand coalition of opposition parties will defeat the NCP. -------------- A LESSON IN TACTICS FOR THE SPLM -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Badri, an active Umma party member herself, is a strong believer that an SPLM-Umma alliance would be a wise tactical move for the SPLM. If the NCP, Umma, and the SPLM all run against one another in the states of Blue Nile, White Nile, South Darfur, and Abyei, none can guarantee that they will win. If, however, the SPLM contests these areas in alliance with Umma, both parties will have a better shot of knocking the NCP out of the picture. Many in the KHARTOUM 00001345 002 OF 002 Umma Party still seem to harbor strong resentments against the SPLM and the SPLM remains suspicious of Sadiq al-Mahdi's intentions. ¶7. (SBU) The West, and the US in particular, remarked Badri, need to give advice to the SPLM on how to work more effectively with northern opposition parties and regional groups across Sudan, such as the Misseriya Arabs. The SPLM needs a lesson on "tactics" in order to minimize the hegemony of the NCP, said Badri. The elections are the SPLM's chance to rebuild an opposition party alliance. Alliance building can be conducted at low-levels, she explained, so as to avoid drawing attention to the process. By creating an alliance with other opposition parties before elections, the SPLM can guarantee relatively friendly national governments and friendly state governments. ¶8. (SBU) "We (the Umma Party) have a lot of hope that the SPLM will make wise decisions regarding elections," said Badri. The SPLM could really make elections happen. "It is more in their hands than in the hands of the NCP." -------------- WHICH WAY DOES UMMA SWING? -------------- ¶9. (U) Poloff questioned Badri on the May agreement between the NCP and the National Umma Party and the potential for an Umma-NCP alliance. Badri expressed disgust at the signing of the agreement, and said that she confronted Umma Party Leader Sadiq Al-Mahdi's about it. Al-Mahdi has publicly stated that the agreement is not a precursor to an NCP-Umma electoral alliance (reftel). Badri said that she suspended her membership in the Umma party when the agreement was signed and has not re-instated it. She also noted that a majority of Umma's constituencies are not happy with Al-Mahdi's decision. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (SBU) As elections edge closer, opposition parties in the north, the south, and the east have made it clear that their best hope is for an alliance with the SPLM. So far, the SPLM has been cagey on the subject of coalitions, keeping its options open. Other opposition parties, as well as the international community, remain uncertain whether the SPLM wants elections at all given the high possibility that the SPLM's share of power in the GNU may decline after the census results. While an SPLM-Umma coalition could bring the SPLM some gains over the NCP in a few northern states, the SPLM instinctively does not trust the Umma party. They fear the latter may try to "rewrite the CPA" following elections. In their view, when Umma leader Sadiq al Mahdi was Prime Minister in the 1980's, he was just as brutal as the NCP in the war against the South. While the SPLM would be wise to reach out to parties that could strategically enhance its ability to defeat the NCP on a national scale (the DUP, Eastern Front, and SLM are the obvious choices) an alliance with Umma is a long-shot at best despite the hopes of many in the North (and within the Umma party itself) for regime change. FERNANDEZ