MORE OFFICIALS WITHDRAW FROM DARFUR STATE POSITIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001331 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, DRL NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: MORE OFFICIALS WITHDRAW FROM DARFUR STATE POSITIONS FOLLOWING ATTACK ON KALMA ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: On August 31, 18 SPLM officials formally withdrew from their posts in the state governments of North, South, and West Darfur in protest over the August 25 Kalma attack. Other opposition groups including SLM/MM may also withdraw, as Minni Minnawi vowed on August 30 that he will authorize the suspension of SLM/MM members following SPLM's decision. These moves follow the resignation of six NCP Fur leaders on August 27. They later told poloff that the Kalma camp attack may unite Darfur's many tribes and political parties against the NCP. END SUMMARY ¶2. (U) On August 30, the Minister of Agriculture for South Darfur, Omar Adam, contacted poloff stating that three ministers and 15 members of parliament had formally frozen their participation in the North, South, and West Darfur state governments. Adam announced that after days of speaking with SPLM General Secretary Pagan Amum and Foreign Minister Deng Alor, First Vice President Salva Kiir had finally approved the SPLM suspension from state government in Darfur. (Note: Adam previously told the press on August 27 that he would soon be resigning, an announcement that was misrepresented in press reports as his actual resignation. End Note.) Adam later sent poloff a press release of this announcement: "After consultation with the SPLM leadership in Sudan, the members of the SPLM participating in the Government of National Unity in the three Darfurian states have decided to freeze their participation and activity in the GNU. This is a result of the developments in Darfur that are becoming more and more complicated every day. [This decision has been made] after the latest events that occurred in the Kalma IDP camp [resulting in a large number of innocent victims killed and others wounded. [This attack was carried out] without our knowledge or consultation as members of the state government. We have decided not to be a part of these criminal acts committed by the Government of National Unity." (Note: The full text of this document will be translated and sent to AF/SPG and the office of the SE. End Note.) SPLM - - - ¶3. (SBU) On August 28 and 29, Adam previously told poloff about his decision to push his SPLM leaders on this. Adam emphasized that the NCP continues to act without consulting their partners in the GNU. Adam commented, "Anything related to security or money, they do in a dark secret place. When it comes to things like arming the janjaweed, paying for their mercenary work, or arming other militias or tribes - we never know what they are doing." Adam stated that as a member of the South Darfur cabinet, he previously confronted the Governor of South Darfur about the movement of military convoys, to which the Wali dismissively responded "these security issues should be left to NISS and the military." ¶4. (SBU) Adam labeled the South Darfur Governor's response to Kalma as "entirely unacceptable." Only hours after the attack, Adam went to the Wali's house and asked, "Why didn't you visit the hospital?" After the Wali jokingly responded "I'm not a doctor," Adam reported that he grew very angry saying, "That is right, but you are responsible for the doctors and the whole hospital, and you should be there." The next day, Adam again confronted the Wali, facetiously encouraging GoS forces to search for weapons at areas held by Government militias and paramilitary forces. "If you are going to search for weapons, you better go to Falluja (the area in Nyala occupied by the Border Intelligence Forces.) You'll find big weapons there," stated Adam. ¶5. (SBU) Adam reiterated that the SPLM has not been treated as an equal partner in the GNU in South Darfur, something "I know better than anyone else, as I am the highest ranking SPLM official in this state." Adam stated that although they are partners, the SPLM could take a more critical position of the NCP. Adam applauded the SPLM's decision not to sign a statement of condemnation against the ICC. Adam also boasted that he refused to meet President Bashir during his recent visit to Nyala as "my mother still resides in an IDP camp, and Bashir talks about peace, stability, and development?" Adam remarked that he is not concerned about losing his government position, as "I am more than a government minister. I am graduate of Al-Ahzar University, a leader of the SPLA, a Muslim, a soldier, and a commander." ¶6. (SBU) Adam stated that he has been in constant communication with SPLM leadership, along with the small Umma faction of Masar Abdallah Masar and the Democratic Unionist Party. According to Adam, coordination between the opposition movements is required, as "isolated personal resignations will do nothing at this point." Although he respects the NCP ministers' decision to resign, he believes that they should have coordinated better as "it just looks like an ethnic thing when six members of the same party and tribe KHARTOUM 00001331 002 OF 003 resign." Adam ended the August 30 conversation saying, "My people are suffering. I fought 21 years in the South and for what? The situation is worse here than it was there." SLM/MINNAWI - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) On August 30, SLM/MM chairman and Senior Assistant to the President, Minni Minnawi, called Adam via satellite phone to discuss the SPLM's withdrawal. Poloff overheard the conversation, where Adam made his pitch for a united opposition party suspension from the Darfur state governments. Adam told Minnawi, "If people from the NCP are resigning over this, what are we waiting for?" Later, Minnawi told poloff that he will encourage his representatives to resign, as long as the SPLM has a clear position on the issue. Minnawi reiterated that there must be one position for all opposition movements and emphasized that "this could change things in Darfur." Minnawi reiterated that things are "only secure and stable because the rains are limiting movement right now." (Note: Minnawi later told poloff that he had just received a UN delegation mandated by UNSC 1779 to monitor the weapons ban in Darfur. End Note.) ¶8. (SBU) Minnawi called poloff again on August 31 and stated that he had heard the news regarding the SPLM suspension in the Darfurian state governments, but that he was not yet able to announce a corresponding withdrawal of SLM/MM. Minnawi stated that internal division and NCP meddling in his movement could greatly complicate this potential move, specifically mentioning two prominent dissenters Mustafa Tirab and Rayah Mahmoud. "The SPLM is much better organized than we are, and I do not know if our movement can take this right now," stated Minnawi. Minnawi promised to contact Post on September 1 with an update. PREVIOUS FUR RESIGNATIONS FROM THE NCP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) On August 30, an NCP Fur leader who recently resigned from the NCP, Salah Fadul, explained to poloff why he resigned from the government. (Note: Fadul was appointed to his position as a tribal leader of the Fur by the NCP in order to weaken the Fur traditional leadership led by his relative Ahmed Adam Rajal, the Maqdoum of the Fur in Nyala) .) Fadul stated that he withdrew from the government along with the six others "to stand with the innocent in the face of this revolting incident." He claimed that his resignation has the support of all the people of Darfur, and that it is "a very rare thing for anyone in the government to resign." Fadul remarked that he expects other NCP leaders to follow his move, naming Jaafar Abd Al Halim, an NCP representative in the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) as one likely official who may resign. Fadul first told poloff that his resignation was final, but later retreated from this position stating, "I could return to my post if the people of Kalma insist that I return." ¶10. (SBU) Fadul showed a statement to poloff with signatures of resignation of the six NCP Fur officials. The statement calls for dialogue with the people of Kalma camp and Darfur as a whole, demands medical treatment for the victims, calls for an investigation into the incident, and declares that Darfur's tribal leaders will work with whatever parties seek stability, peace, and development in Darfur. (Note: A translation of this document will be sent to AF/SPG and the office of the Special Envoy. End Note.) Fadul separately stated that the wounded should also be compensated for their injuries, and blood money should be paid to families of the deceased. ¶11. (SBU) Like many other contacts, Fadul stated that the Kalma camp attack, should result in uniting Darfur's many tribes and opposition parties against the NCP. According to Fadul, although the Fur suffered the most casualties, the Dajo and Bergo were also killed and this common loss will help unite a diversity of ethnic groups. COMMENT - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) Although the state governments carry little real weight compared to Khartoum, this is a strong symbolic move on the part of the SPLM and any other opposition party that may follow. The fact that even some NCP collaborators resigned underscored the anger felt in Darfur. Whether Minnawi and his mostly Zaghawa movement will live up to his word and now withdraw remains to be seen but it would be an important step of solidarity with the victims. Most importantly, time will tell whether this incident will turn into the formative event that could unite the diverse people of Darfur. The GNU recognizes that it made a mistake in Kalma but is unlikely to take any substantive actions to publicly address the incident (it will KHARTOUM 00001331 003 OF 003 probably punish someone quietly at some point - too little, too late). This in turn, further estranges the regime from the West and from an already alienated population in Darfur at a time when it seeks support for an Article 16 resolution in the UNSC to postpone ICC action against Bashir. Unfortunately, as we have previously observed, the regime becomes paralyzed with indecision when it comes to redressing the wrongs of its security apparatus, even when it would be in its interest to do so. FERNANDEZ