GOVERNANCE CAPACITY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001323 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: GOVERNANCE CAPACITY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) was created with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in ¶2005. No government of its kind existed before it in Southern Sudan -- the earlier Executive Council that resulted from the 1972 Addis Ababa Accords did not have anywhere near the mandate for governance provided for the GOSS in the CPA. That the GOSS functions as well as it does is a tribute to the resilience and determination of the southern people. Yet it faces enormous difficulties and suffers from a lack of capacity and managerial talent most outside of Sudan simply cannot grasp, a deficiency that explains its frequent missteps and reactive tendencies, often making it the pawn of events rather than the master of them. This often is successfully exploited by its opponents/partners in the National Congress Party (NCP) against the GOSS.. End Summary ¶2. (SBU) After over four decades of the South's conflict with the government in Khartoum, it is hard for most to comprehend how the South lacks the most basic physical and social infrastructure, including roads, schools, hospitals, and established social institutions other than religious organizations and the SPLA. During the almost 50 years from independence to the signing of the CPA in 2005, the central government in Khartoum made little to no investment in Southern Sudan. Roads and other transportation systems deteriorated to the point where travel between cities is in many cases best accomplished by air, and even then many airstrips (which are dirt except in Juba) are unusable in the wet season. Public education was intentionally neglected and missionary schools closed or harrassed, resulting in an overall illiteracy rate in the South at close to 80 percent (UN sources estimate 63% illiteracy for men and 88% for women). Those who do have an education got it almost exclusively outside the country, including in Europe and the US, as well as in neighboring nations. Agriculture suffered as large scale farming collapsed due to the conflict, and even small subsistence farmers found it difficult to raise crops in an unstable environment that often forced them to abandon their fields. The lack of even the most basic medical facilities not only means that large numbers of people die from normally treatable causes, but also that such conditions discourage the return of educated expatriates who will not bring their families to an environment that cannot provide basic health care and educational opportunities for their children. ¶3. (SBU) In 2005, with the creation of the semi-autonomous GOSS, infrastructure, social institutions and governing traditions that normally unite and bind a modern nation state had to be built almost entirely from the ground up. Given where it started from, that the GOSS has come as far as it has in just three years is nothing short of miraculous, yet it still has barely scratched the surface of what needs to be accomplished. ¶4. (SBU) The biggest challenge facing the GOSS is the dire shortage of a managerial class that can direct the massive reconstruction effort needed to transform Southern Sudan into a modern state that can educate, care for, and develop its human and natural resources, but most especially its human resources. No where else in the world are so few educated managers spread so thinly in both the private and public sectors. ConGen Juba consistently finds itself dealing directly with a Minister or his or her number two on any issue of importance to the American government because we find that lower down there is a profound lack of qualified personnel capable of properly managing their jobs. There is also a problem of senior GOSS and SPLM figures holding onto aspects of their portfolios that should be delegated in order to develop the second tier of managers/leaders. ¶5. (SBU) This is true even at the most basic level of office management. In one of the most influential ministries in the GOSS the ConGen was asked to send two important letters, which the minister needed right away. The letters were delivered within 5 hours. Ten days later the ConGen visited a visibly agitated minister who complained bitterly that the letters had never been sent. Informed that they had been immediately sent, he went through his office manager's desk and found them. Although a minor example, it highlights that even at this basic support level the GOSS has serious operational obstacles that undermine even routine functions. ¶6. (SBU) The GOSS management of the census crisis presents an even more telling example. First, the minister in charge of negotiating the structure of the census for the South became overwhelmed by his job. In his confusion, he agreed in writing to a seriously flawed census format that did not reflect the concerns of the South. Once the mistake was discovered, the GOSS vacillated for months over what to do about it, unable to develop a clear strategy for how to respond to the problem. Finally, two days before the census was to KHARTOUM 00001323 002 OF 003 start, and after tens of millions of donor dollars had been spent (money that would be wasted if the census was delayed or canceled), the GOSS announced it would not participate because of these problems it had known about for months, problems that could have been fixed earlier if the proper amount of attention had been focused upon them. Then, finally realizing that it was too late to back away from a project it had specifically agreed to in writing months before, the GOSS found itself in the embarrassing position of having to backtrack on its decision, allowing the NCP to gleefully portray it to the international community as an unreliable and unpredictable partner. ¶7. (SBU) The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) is another arm of the GOSS where a glaring lack of capacity has demonstrably handicapped its operations. In the last three years, the SSLA has only been able to pass a handful of laws. Its members often complain of lacking the legal expertise to properly understand the legislation they are asked to consider. There are reported to be only four lawyers in the whole of the legislative body. This bottleneck to passing critically needed new laws, including such things as an anti-corruption law and a media law, means that in many cases the Presidency has been forced to promulgate legislation through executive decree, circumventing the legislature and potentially seriously undermining its constitutional role. ¶8. (SBU) US military advisors report that in the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),senior generals lack staffs capable of properly supporting their functions. The numbers of educated soldiers needed to act in that capacity simply do not exist, often crippling SPLA operations. One American military advisor found a senior general in the SPLA to be more concerned about his headquarters building than he was about the force structure he was commanding, the maintenance of his equipment or the training of his soldiers. It will take a generation to fully educate the new upcoming lieutenants and captains in conventional warfare. Then they will need to rise to the levels of responsibility that will allow them to replace their aging guerrilla leaders, which is essential to the SPLA's having the leadership capacity needed to run a modern conventional army. ConGen Juba American military advisors report that the very first graduate of an IMET Basic Course will have more operational and tactical knowledge relevant to a conventional army than any of the current SPLA general officers, other than those few who originally spent their early careers as regular officers in the Sudanese Armed Forces of the Government of Sudan (before the SPLA was formed in 1983). ¶9. (SBU) Other examples abound. The GOSS is a government in the making, with poor mechanisms for communicating and a lack of qualified support staff to implement programs. ¶10. (SBU) The consequence of this is that the GOSS is severely handicapped in dealing with the affairs of state. Important decisions are often made late because decision makers are overwhelmed by the demands placed upon them. This inability to properly focus upon and manage its most important affairs puts the GOSS at a severe disadvantage when dealing with an able and ruthless National Congress Party (NCP) and others. The NCP does have considerable human resources at its disposal, and is masterful at manipulating the GOSS into making mistakes - though often the GOSS makes the mistakes on its own. As a result, the GOSS winds up almost always reacting to events on the ground rather than framing or steering them. This is a problem that is sure to persist over at least the next few years, and has the potential to lead to conflict where conflict might have been avoided. ¶11. (SBU) Comment: The damage done to Southern Sudan during its long struggle against Khartoum has cost it dearly, and it will take a generation or longer for the South to fully recover from these many years of not just neglect, but active efforts to undermine its development. The GOSS will continue to suffer from a lack of capacity for years to come, which will make dealing with it time consuming and often exasperating, not because that is the way those running the government want it to be, but because it is going to lack structural coherence and capacity in the short and medium term. Decision-making will continue to be disorganized and uncoordinated. This can have the appearance of the GOSS saying one thing and doing another in an attempt to play donors off against each other, though in our opinion this is seldom the case. Rather, it reflects the difficulty the GOSS has in reaching decisions and speaking with one voice because of its lack of bureaucratic coordination. One of the most important things that the GOSS currently has going for it is the leadership of Salva Kiir. As GOSS President, he is untainted by corruption, his political instincts are strong, and his e consensus style of governance gives hope for a democratic future for Southern Sudan, Kiir is a unifying force in a culture deeply susceptible to KHARTOUM 00001323 003 OF 003 and threatened by tribal and ethnic divisions. ¶12. (SBU) Comment Continued: If the South does vote to break away in 2011, capacity will become an even greater issue as the GOSS becomes a national government that must then deal with even greater administrative burdens, without excuses, including such things as creating and managing its own currency and banking system. Should the SPLM win national elections in 2009 and find itself in control of the National Government (Note: we view this as a long-shot, but it is a scenario worth considering. End note) it will also be very hard-pressed to find the managerial talent needed to govern all of Sudan, given the problems it now has in just managing its affairs in the South. Whatever the South does in 2011 concerning unity versus independence, it will continue to need massive donor assistance for at least the next 15 to 25 years to help it recover from almost two generations of warfare. Such aid is essential as it struggles to create the social and physical infrastructure needed to create good governance, modernize, and lift its people out of poverty. A continued effort to tackle corruption is desperately needed with guidance and leadership from the US while other economic opportunities, aside from government service, develop in South Sudan. FERNANDEZ