KALMA IDP CAMP UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001303 DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, PRM, AND S/CRS NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS GENEVA FOR NKYLOH ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU BRUSSELS FOR JADDLETON USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID KPKO AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: KALMA IDP CAMP UPDATE REF: Khartoum 1300 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - COUNTING THE COST IN KALMA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶1. (SBU) UNAMID sources confirmed that 33 IDPs were killed on August 25, with 31 buried inside the camp following the fighting, and two dying at the hospital in Nyala. The embassy received an unconfirmed report from Fur tribal leaders that of the 33 dead, 11 women were killed, two of whom were pregnant; and seven children were killed, two of whom were infants. Witnesses report that army forces have withdrawn, and UNAMID has taken up posts surrounding the camp. ¶2. (SBU) On August 27, Deputy UNSRSG Amina Haq briefed the monthly UN-Donors Principals meeting on her visit to Nyala the previous day. UNICEF had been allowed access to the camp and had evacuated 51 wounded to Nyala General Hospital, of whom two later died. 14 of the surviving injured are children, she said, and 19 female. Haq reported that DPKO had briefed the UNSC on the Kalma situation the previous day. ¶3. (SBU) Haq was unable to enter the camp itself, but did meet with South Darfur-state authorities, including the Deputy Wali. According to Haq, the Deputy Wali defended the GoS actions, saying that "Kalma is out of control" and posed a credible threat to security, but added that he regretted the loss of civilian life. The UN delegation had responded that the civilian deaths were "unacceptable," and that there are better ways to establish security in the IDP camps than periodic incursions, such as a permanent police presence or joint patrols with UNAMID. The Deputy Wali agreed that in the short-run the government must work with humanitarian agencies to protect civilians and in the longer-term must establish a mechanism for working with the UN and humanitarian NGOs. - - - - - - - - - POLITICAL FALLOUT - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) Political repercussions from the events in Kalma camp spread across Darfur, as seven Fur leaders who held posts within the government of South Darfur announced their resignations Wednesday, and authoritative sources conjectured that the governor of West Darfur would resign as well. Salah Mohamed Fadil, Fur sultan and advisor to the Wali of South Darfur on IDP affairs, told Pol FSN he tendered his resignation because the GOS is directly responsible for the use of excessive force. ¶5. (SBU) Denying that it was a local decision on which he was consulted, Fadil said it was most likely an order handed down from Khartoum, as he had received word that the Wali of West Darfur was similarly advised to depopulate the camps, but had refused the order. Maqdoom Ahmed Adam Rijal confirmed that the Wali of West Darfur had refused a similar order, and suggested that the assault on Kalma camp was "part of a larger plan" delivered to Darfur when Ali Osman Taha, an NCP insider and Vice President of Sudan, visited Nyala secretly several days before. Al-Fadil Kaya, force commander of SLM/Free Will, expressed his anger by withdrawing Free Will integrated forces from GOS police and military units, and reiterated that the GOS is not seriously interested in peace. A signatory to the post-DPA Declaration of Commitment (DOC),Kaya announced that Free Will intends to pull out of the DOC. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - POLICE DEFICIENCIES EXPOSED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) During a meeting attended by Poloffs at UNAMID headquarters in El Fasher, UNAMID's civilian police unit emphasized that the GOS's handling of the events at Kalma camp this week had exposed deficiencies in the capabilities of Sudanese police in dealing with angry mobs. Sudanese police officers, including those sent in to deal with riots, are armed only with AK-47s; they generally respond to angry demonstrators by shooting into crowds. Should donors prioritize improving Sudanese riot-control capabilities, UNAMID is prepared to reformulate what kind of training and commitments are needed to equip Sudanese police to avoid such violent resolutions in the future. KHARTOUM 00001303 002.2 OF 002 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SLM/MM ADVISER: "EXCESSIVE FORCE" USED BY GOS AT KALMA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Poloffs met with Mohammed Basheer Abdalla, chief of staff to Senior Presidential Assistant Minni Minnawi, on August 27 at his office on the grounds of the Republican Palace to discuss his insider's perspective on the August 25 fighting at Kalma camp. Blaming the GOS for using what he called "excessive force," Basheer was quick to dismiss the official GOS line that Kalma camp was a militarized haven for rebel agitators intent on fomenting rebellion. "It is not true to say that Kalma camp is armed. It is normal to have arms and drugs inside an IDP camp, but the GOS has always been concerned that they know too little about what is going on inside the camp." A university classmate of the Wali of South Darfur, Basheer was skeptical that the Wali himself commanded the forces that surrounded, then fired on human shields and shooters inside the camp. "Anything he does is ordered by my neighbors here," he said, tilting his head in the direction of the Republic Palace, across the palace grounds from his office. ASQUINO