SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001241

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR
NAFIE ALI NAFIE

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: SE Williamson and Presidential Advisor Nafie
Ali Nafie agreed to consider a resumption in bilateral
discussions, possibly with a "re-calibrated" focus.
Williamson stated several times during the meeting that
President Bush's primary concern in Sudan is humanitarian,
stating that "humanitarian relief is the foundation of US
policy in Sudan, and if we make progress there, other issues
can be dealt with." Regarding the ICC, Williamson stated
that although the US is against impunity and has taken a
leading role supporting international war crimes tribunals,
the US is not a member of the ICC and has not yet taken a
decision on how it would vote if an article 16 resolution is
tabled at the UNSC. Williamson urged that the DPA be used as
a starting point for further progress on a peace agreement in
Darfur, to which Nafie responded that SLM leader Minni Minawi
has unrealistic expectations. Nafie railed against members
of the SPLM whose only interest is in regime change in Sudan,
and accused the SPLA of training Darfur rebels in Bahr al
Ghazal near Wau. He also claimed that the SPLM had harbored
JEM fighters, who after their attack on Omdurman in May, had
escaped to the South. End summary.


2. (U) White House Special Envoy for Sudan Richard Williamson
met with Presidential Advisor Nafie ali Nafie August 14 in
Khartoum. SPG Director Shortley, CDA Fernandez, State/L
Sanford, and SE Staff Assistants also attended; polchief
served as notetaker.

Bilateral Discussions
--------------


2. (C) SE Williamson explained that "given the way events
unfolded" with regard to Abyei talks during his last visit in
June, he was forced to leave, but it had nothing to do with
the bilateral discussions. In fact, President Bush had asked
about progress in the latter. Williamson suggested that the
Sudanese consider whether they would like to re-initiate
talks, and if so the US would be receptive. "We can pick up
where we left off, or we can re-calibrate" the focus of the
discussions, he added. SE Williamson stated that the US
would rather have a constructive relationship with Sudan than
none at all, and recognized that both sides feel that
promises have been broken in the past. Williamson stated
several times during the meeting that the US government's
primary concern in Sudan is humanitarian relief "which is our
primary concern in Darfur." Williamson stated that
"humanitarian relief is the foundation of US policy in Sudan,
and if we make progress there, other issues can be dealt
with." Williamson also pointed out that CPA implementation
is also at the top of the US agenda.


3. (C) Nafie responded "we have no illusions about the need
for improved relations - no one is saying we will not benefit
from dialogue." The only difference is that some in the
regime are more skeptical than others about the possibility
for real improvement. Nafie pointed out that when SE
Williamson suggested during his last visit that he wanted to
assist with negotiations on Abyei, Nafie himself had
suggested that it would be difficult to make progress on this
very complicated issue during a short visit. Nafie said he
assumed that Washington had cut off the bilateral talks, but
that he didn't know if that was the case. Nafie also
acknowledged that public pressure in the US may have played a
role in the suspension of talks. "Was it this, or all of
this? It was so sudden, we felt hurt about it. It was going
so smoothly, better than we expected actually." Nonetheless,
Nafie said "we believe you if you say you want to engage,
because it's good for all of us, and we have an interest in
improved relations." Nafie said the GOS could restart
negotiations immediately if desired, but Williamson and Nafie
agreed that they would consult over the next few weeks about
how and when to restart discussions. The GOS will inform CDA
Fernandez in early September on the details of a possible
resumption.

ICC
---


4. (C) Nafie expressed frustration at the US abstention on
the UNAMID mandate resolution at the UNSC (which included a
reference to UNSC consideration of a deferment of the ICC
indictment of President Bashir),a move which Nafie

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characterized as "unfriendly" toward Sudan. The explanation
(by USUN Deputy PermRep Wolf) was even worse than the
abstention. SE Williamson pointed out that the language on
the ICC had been added to the resolution at the last moment,
and warned that some countries like to claim they can
"deliver" the US, but this was a miscalculation. Moreover,
Williamson pointed out that the US is against impunity and
played a leading role in establishing tribunals for
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. However, Williamson
emphasized that the US is not a member of the ICC and
therefore has different interests at stake. He noted that
other countries are concerned that Ocampo's actions will
affect the strength and integrity of the ICC, "however those
are not our concerns." Williamson said that "most
importantly the US has made no decision" on how it would vote
if a resolution on an article 16 deferment of the ICC process
against President Bashir is tabled at USUN. He added that
the controversy on the vote had more to do with the
procedures of "the country that had the pen" than the regime
in Khartoum.


5. (C) Nafie expressed hope that the US will be sensitive to
the impact of the ICC process on the implementation of the
CPA and resolution of the crisis in Darfur. "We hope that
your interests in Sudan will influence your decision," said
Nafie. He also warned against a strategy of using the ICC to
put pressure on Sudan to take certain political actions. "If
there is something we can do for peace. we will do it," said
Nafie. "We know our red lines. If something is not
acceptable, we will not accept it in spite of sticks and
carrots." Nafie stated that the ICC is interpreted by the
regime as a political instrument of the EU "as a means of
re-colonizing us." He pointed out that "your friend
President Kagame has a problem and so does Uganda's Museveni
(who has praised the ICC) because now they want his generals
too." In closing on this point, Nafie encouraged the US to
calculate its options carefully with regard to the ICC.

Darfur
--------------


6. (C) SE Williamson reported that he had met with Chadian
President Deby and had encouraged him to cease support for
JEM and other Darfur rebels. He stated that the US believes
that a de-escalation of support to rebels on both sides in
critical, and this has been a principal point of his
discussions with both sides. Williamson said that the US
agrees that the JEM assault on Omdurman in May 2008 was
undesirable, but pointed out that the Chadian rebel assault
on Ndjamena in February 2008 and their attacks on towns in
eastern Chad in June were equally undesirable. Williamson
noted that JEM is supported by countries other than Chad and
also acknowledged that it appeared that JEM had been
resupplied by Chad with vehicles Deby had taken from defeated
Chadian rebels that had been supplied by the GOS.


7. (C) Nafie stated that the GOS is taking steps to improve
security in Darfur, but pointed out that at this point most
of the rebels are turning into "gangs of thieves." In order
to bring some willing rebel groups in South Darfur under
control, the government has begun assigning them military
ranks and integrating them into the armed forces, or
demobilizing them. Nafie said that this "DDR effort" will
have a positive effect on security in Darfur. Nafie also
said the GOS has recruited "Popular Police Forces (PPF)" from
within the IDP communities and has trained them to serve as
police. He claimed that in Kalma camp in South Darfur the
GOS had recruited and trained 200 police. Finally, Nafie
said the GOS is cooperating fully with UNAMID so that it can
deploy rapidly. Nafie claimed that UNAMID is sending out
patrols that are too small to defend themselves, and offered
that the SAF could provide security and escort UNAMID patrols
if needed. Nafie said that DPA non-signatories such as
SLA/Unity were contributing directly to insecurity in Darfur.


8. (C) Williamson suggested that the GOS could use the DPA as
a starting point and a foundation for further peace talks on
Darfur. Nafie replied that SLM leader Minni Minawi is
unrealistic in his expectations for the DPA "and wants the
DPA to be like the CPA so he can be governor of Darfur."
Nafie claimed that the GOS is ready to reconcile with Minawi
since he is the sole signatory, but complained that Minawi
doesn't understand how to interact with the government, and
has not followed through on his own commitments. He claimed

KHARTOUM 00001241 003 OF 004


that Minawi had agreed to security arrangements toward the
end of last year but had failed to implement them. Nafie
pointed out that Minawi's own leadership is against him, not
just non-Zaghawa such as Mustafa Tirab but also Zaghawa
commanders such as Arko Daheib. "I'm not bluffing," said
Nafie, "I know this for a fact." He noted that the GOS
committee to oversee DPA implementation is headed by Minawi
himself and never meets. "He can accomplish much if he wanted
to, but he is limited and has illusions about his ability."

(C) CPA and Accusations of SPLA Training Darfur rebels
-------------- --------------


9. (C) SE Williamson urged that the CPA parties continue to
negotiate on the long-term Abyei borders rather than allowing
this to be decided by the PCA in the Hague. In response to
Williamson's urging that the Sudanese work to implement the
CPA, Nafie questioned what is meant by "CPA implementation"
and requested that someone "un-code those words for me."
Nafie pointed out that "democratic transformation" is code
for regime change in many places, and implicitly expressed
concern that "CPA implementation" is now being used to mean
the same thing. Nafie then launched into a tirade against
those in the SPLM "who are not running the show," that have a
problem with the NCP, and are now "messing around with Darfur
and complicating life." Singling out SPLM deputy SG for the
northern sector Yasir Arman and SPLM SG Pagan Amun, Nafie
crowed that these members of the SPLM "don't have the means
to achieve their dreams" of overthrowing the NCP so they are
"complicating life instead." Nafie complained that Pagan and
Yasir are going to the US "tonight" and questioned
rhetorically "who is advising them?" Nafie also complained
that although much of the CPA had in fact been implemented,
the most serious violations were on the part of the SPLA,
which still has not disarmed or redeployed all its troops in
the north. Nafie also expressed concern about the SPLA
Defense White Paper "which you must have a copy of." Nafie
accused the SPLA of training Darfur rebels in Bahr al Ghazal
near Wau and suggested that the Embassy follow up directly
with NISS director Salah Ghosh for additional details.
Finally, Nafie accused the SPLA of harboring JEM fighters who
had attacked Omdurman in May, and had managed to slip past
the SAF into the South. Nafie claimed the JEM rebels had
been holed up in Renk at one point. Nafie concluded this
rant by mockingly observing "they have big dreams by Yasir
Arman that New Sudan will come through Darfur," but
discounted Yasir by adding, "he is not a tough competitor
politically" because he has no constituency in the North.
Nafie asked that the U.S. "talk sense" to an SPLM which he
claimed is the real problem "not CPA implementation, which is
happening."

Comment
--------------


10. (C) With regard to bilateral talks, the clear message
from the regime during this visit by the SE is that it is in
the regime's interests to continue talking to us even if
there is no result, perhaps in hopes that they can persuade
the US to support them at the UNSC on an article 16 ICC
resolution, or at least secure a US abstention. From our
perspective, continued discussions with the Sudanese may
deliver additional concessions on UNAMID deployment, an
easing of bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian
assistance, a more constructive approach to negotiations with
the rebels, and maybe even GOS guarantees of land rights and
compensation to IDPs. The Sudanese have learned not to
expect too much in return, but benefit merely from the
visibility of continued discussions and the hope of a
marginal improvement in US-Sudan relations.


11. (C) Nafie reserved his greatest venom for members of the
SPLM such as Yasir Arman because Arman is a northerner (from
the same area as President Bashir and reported to be a
distant relative of the president,) and is viewed by the NCP
as an opportunist turncoat and agitator. The most insidious
thing about Nafie is that virtually all of his points are
true, including his observations about Minawi's inability to
manage his movement, control his forces, and implement
agreements with the regime for his own part. However, while
Dr. Nafie may be a brilliant tactician, he misses the larger
point that the regime must find a way to make peace with
Darfur rebels despite their inadequacies, and must take major
steps on Darfur and the CPA in order to truly advance the

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US-Sudan relationship.


12. (U) SE Williamson did not clear this cable prior to his
departure.
FERNANDEZ