SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH EU AMBASSADORS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001239 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH EU AMBASSADORS Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On August 13 SE Williamson met with EU Ambassadors in Khartoum, at their request, to brief them on his latest visit to Sudan. Recounting details of his trip to Abyei, SE Williamson noted that he was encouraged by progress there, adding that a political solution there represented the best chance for a sustainable peace. With regard to Darfur, he stated that humanitarian relief on the ground remains a top USG concern, and expressed cautious optimism that new leadership at the United Nations in New York would improve UNAMID's capabilities. He asserted that the USG had not made a decision with regard to the ICC indictment of President Bashir, but emphasized that such a decision would be made without concern for the ICC as an institution. He concluded that it was up to the GOS to take big, substantive steps on Darfur and CPA implementation if they seek to influence a USG decision. End Summary. ¶2. (U) White House Special Envoy for Sudan Richard Williamson met with European Ambassadors in Khartoum on August 13. CDA Fernandez, State/L Christine Sanford, and SE Staff Assistants also attended; POLOFF served as notetaker. ABYEI -------------- ¶3. (C) SE Williamson recounted details of his trip to Abyei, noting that the USG remains concerned with the implementation of the Abyei roadmap. He asserted that while the decision to seek arbitration had alleviated the most recent crisis in Abyei, the best path toward sustainable peace is a political solution ahead of a court ruling, and he had encouraged both sides to seek one. When asked by the Dutch Ambassador whether such a solution would be exclusive to wealth sharing issues, SE Williamson observed that there were a handful of outstanding issues in the CPA, and given the North and the South's mutual dependence, it would behoove both sides to start discussing them. SE Williamson also expressed his profound disappointment with the performance of UNMIS in Abyei during the May 2008 violence there, noting that it was not a question of bravery, but of preparedness. However, as a result of appointments of new UN undersecretaries for both field operations and peacekeeping, he stated that he fully expects there will be improvements in DPKO, which may result in improvements in the field. DARFUR -------------- ¶4. (C) With respect to Darfur, SE Williamson stated that he had urged GOS officials to curb bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian relief efforts, noting that progress in this area several months prior has been reversed. He lamented the difficulty of obtaining a political solution in Darfur and the failure of the DPA, acknowledging that mistakes had been made and that the USG would not repeat them. "My position is that I'm not going to force something to happen," he said. He stated that the U.S. was encouraged by the appointment of new Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole, and while Bassole alone cannot solve the problems of Darfur, he did provide a fresh face and renewed energy to the peace process. With regard to UNAMID, SE Williamson noted that "there is no way I thought we would have failed as miserably as we did by August," but that he was cautiously optimistic of the effect that the new UN leadership with have. "UNAMID is not 'the' answer, but it is 'an' answer," he said. ICC -------------- ¶5. (C) SE Williamson stated that he had not raised the issue of the ICC indictment of President Bashir in any of his meetings, but that it was predictably raised by all of his Sudanese interlocutors. He noted that as a matter of principle, the USG believes there should be no impunity for atrocities committed in Darfur. But he emphasized that the USG is not a party to the ICC, nor does it have any influence over its chief prosecutor or pre-trial counsel proceedings. SE Williamson declared that the USG has not made a decision on how it will vote on the indictment at the UN Security Council. He sought to clarify that "our equities and interests with regard to the ICC are different than some," recognizing that other states had deep concerns about the Article 16 of the Rome Treaty. But he stressed that such considerations would play no role in the US decision. "Those issues are not even on the table for us," he stated. "I want KHARTOUM 00001239 002 OF 002 no confusion about this," adding that the USG was agnostic institutionally with regard to the ICC. ¶6. (C) SE Williamson observed that the NCP regime is facing stress created by numerous factors, not least of which is the ICC. He cited the May 10 attack on Omdurman, the recent flare up in Abyei, tensions with neighbors, inter-party struggles and intra-party dynamics, and renewed contact between disparate rebel movements in Darfur as among the challenges the regime is struggling to deal with. While acknowledging some degree of empathy for the NCP in that it did not control all the variables, SE Williamson stated that their current predicament was one of their own making, and it would be their responsibility to resolve it. He stated that the GOS needs to take big, substantive steps on Darfur and CPA implementation if it seeks to influence a USG decision on the ICC, though he questioned their capacity to do so. When asked by the British Charge if the USG had specific, prescriptive steps in mind, Williamson replied that we had some ideas, but said he would avoid delineating them as a result of past experiences in negotiating with the GOS. "I'll know a good faith effort when I see it," he added. ¶7. (U) SE Williamson did not see this cable prior to transmission. FERNANDEZ