SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH EU AMBASSADORS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001239

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH EU AMBASSADORS

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On August 13 SE Williamson met with EU
Ambassadors in Khartoum, at their request, to brief them on
his latest visit to Sudan. Recounting details of his trip to
Abyei, SE Williamson noted that he was encouraged by progress
there, adding that a political solution there represented the
best chance for a sustainable peace. With regard to Darfur,
he stated that humanitarian relief on the ground remains a
top USG concern, and expressed cautious optimism that new
leadership at the United Nations in New York would improve
UNAMID's capabilities. He asserted that the USG had not made
a decision with regard to the ICC indictment of President
Bashir, but emphasized that such a decision would be made
without concern for the ICC as an institution. He concluded
that it was up to the GOS to take big, substantive steps on
Darfur and CPA implementation if they seek to influence a USG
decision. End Summary.


2. (U) White House Special Envoy for Sudan Richard Williamson
met with European Ambassadors in Khartoum on August 13. CDA
Fernandez, State/L Christine Sanford, and SE Staff Assistants
also attended; poloff served as notetaker.

ABYEI
--------------


3. (C) SE Williamson recounted details of his trip to Abyei,
noting that the USG remains concerned with the implementation
of the Abyei roadmap. He asserted that while the decision to
seek arbitration had alleviated the most recent crisis in
Abyei, the best path toward sustainable peace is a political
solution ahead of a court ruling, and he had encouraged both
sides to seek one. When asked by the Dutch Ambassador whether
such a solution would be exclusive to wealth sharing issues,
SE Williamson observed that there were a handful of
outstanding issues in the CPA, and given the North and the
South's mutual dependence, it would behoove both sides to
start discussing them. SE Williamson also expressed his
profound disappointment with the performance of UNMIS in
Abyei during the May 2008 violence there, noting that it was
not a question of bravery, but of preparedness. However, as a
result of appointments of new UN undersecretaries for both
field operations and peacekeeping, he stated that he fully
expects there will be improvements in DPKO, which may result
in improvements in the field.

DARFUR
--------------


4. (C) With respect to Darfur, SE Williamson stated that he
had urged GOS officials to curb bureaucratic impediments to
humanitarian relief efforts, noting that progress in this
area several months prior has been reversed. He lamented the
difficulty of obtaining a political solution in Darfur and
the failure of the DPA, acknowledging that mistakes had been
made and that the USG would not repeat them. "My position is
that I'm not going to force something to happen," he said. He
stated that the U.S. was encouraged by the appointment of new
Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole, and while Bassole alone
cannot solve the problems of Darfur, he did provide a fresh
face and renewed energy to the peace process. With regard to
UNAMID, SE Williamson noted that "there is no way I thought
we would have failed as miserably as we did by August," but
that he was cautiously optimistic of the effect that the new
UN leadership with have. "UNAMID is not 'the' answer, but it
is 'an' answer," he said.

ICC
--------------


5. (C) SE Williamson stated that he had not raised the issue
of the ICC indictment of President Bashir in any of his
meetings, but that it was predictably raised by all of his
Sudanese interlocutors. He noted that as a matter of
principle, the USG believes there should be no impunity for
atrocities committed in Darfur. But he emphasized that the
USG is not a party to the ICC, nor does it have any influence
over its chief prosecutor or pre-trial counsel proceedings.
SE Williamson declared that the USG has not made a decision
on how it will vote on the indictment at the UN Security
Council. He sought to clarify that "our equities and
interests with regard to the ICC are different than some,"
recognizing that other states had deep concerns about the
Article 16 of the Rome Treaty. But he stressed that such
considerations would play no role in the US decision. "Those
issues are not even on the table for us," he stated. "I want

KHARTOUM 00001239 002 OF 002


no confusion about this," adding that the USG was agnostic
institutionally with regard to the ICC.


6. (C) SE Williamson observed that the NCP regime is facing
stress created by numerous factors, not least of which is the
ICC. He cited the May 10 attack on Omdurman, the recent flare
up in Abyei, tensions with neighbors, inter-party struggles
and intra-party dynamics, and renewed contact between
disparate rebel movements in Darfur as among the challenges
the regime is struggling to deal with. While acknowledging
some degree of empathy for the NCP in that it did not control
all the variables, SE Williamson stated that their current
predicament was one of their own making, and it would be
their responsibility to resolve it. He stated that the GOS
needs to take big, substantive steps on Darfur and CPA
implementation if it seeks to influence a USG decision on the
ICC, though he questioned their capacity to do so. When asked
by the British Charge if the USG had specific, prescriptive
steps in mind, Williamson replied that we had some ideas, but
said he would avoid delineating them as a result of past
experiences in negotiating with the GOS. "I'll know a good
faith effort when I see it," he added.


7. (U) SE Williamson did not see this cable prior to
transmission.
FERNANDEZ