Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM1236
2008-08-15 09:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

UNAMID PLANS TO ELIMINATE CONTAINER BACKLOG

Tags:  ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU 
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VZCZCXRO1503
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1236/01 2280902
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 150902Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1621
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001236 

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID PLANS TO ELIMINATE CONTAINER BACKLOG

REF: A) KHARTOUM 1223
B) KHARTOUM 1137
C) KHARTOUM 966

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001236 DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: UNAMID PLANS TO ELIMINATE CONTAINER BACKLOG REF: A) KHARTOUM 1223 B) KHARTOUM 1137 C) KHARTOUM 966 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID estimates that it requires significantly enhanced cargo-transport capacity if it is to deploy planned, additional military and police personnel before the end of the year. UNAMID's ambitious goals, including additional cargo aircraft and material handling equipment, appear to be based on wishful thinking. Reaching them may already be unrealistic within the time required. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) To meet its goal of deploying an additional 3,538 military and police before the end of the year, Chief of Integrated Support Services Ian Divers told poloff that UNAMID plans to enhance its container-cargo transport operations, beginning by eliminating a 5,310 Twenty-foot container Equivalent Units (TEU) backlog. (Note: There are over 3,000 actual containers as previously reported, but a more useful figure to show the scope of the problem is the 5,310 "container equivalents" calculation. End note.) The initial priority will be transporting 2,055 Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) TEUs currently at Port Sudan, El-Obeid and Nyala depots to their final destinations. Of the 2,055 COE TEUs, 601 are TEU containers. Another 1062 TEUs represent "wheeled" goods, such as trucks, wheeled trailers, containers with their own wheels or large items such as generators. The remaining 393 are palletized bulk-good TEUs. The following chart summarizes types of COE by location. CONTINGENT-OWNED CONTAINER LOCATIONS -------------- TEU WHEELED BULK PORT SUDAN 180 217 158 EL OBEID 421 805 234 NYALA 40 01 0 TOTAL 601 1062 393 ¶3. (SBU) Of the remaining 3,255 UN Owned Equipment (UNOE) TEUs, the majority are priority items for ongoing support of UNAMID. Some of the cargo represents items that, while important, cannot be absorbed by UNAMID for lack of warehouse space. The chart below summarizes types of UNOE by location. UN-OWNED CONTAINER LOCATIONS -------------- TEU WHEELED BULK PORT SUDAN 1259 92 58 EL OBEID 1636 189 20 TOTAL 2895 281 78 &#
x000A; ¶3. (SBU) UNAMID's current air capacity is 18 TEU flights per week or three TEU flights a day in a six-day workweek. Part of UNAMID's plan to eliminate the COE backlog by the end of the year is to increase air capacity to 66 flights per week. Given that one IL-76 aircraft can accommodate one TEU and the L-100 can accommodate two TEUs, UNAMID calculates that it needs three additional IL-76s and one additional L-100 to provide eleven TEU flights a day for six days. These aircraft need to be in use by September 30, 2008 to meet the end-of-year goal. ¶4. (SBU) UNAMID will also use ground transport. Currently UNAMID delivers a total of 23 TEUs a day using a combination of rail, air and road. UNAMID plans to deliver 58 TEUs a day by enhancing their use of these assets. These enhancements require significant new resource and acquisition initiatives in addition to the planes mentioned above. These include an additional MI-26 helicopter by August 2008, increased use of rail transport and movement contractors, use of anticipated TCC military transport vehicles as well as UN trucks, increased use of individual small contractors to move 2,000 individual items in the greater Darfur region, and expanded use of UNMIS movement contracts to delivery goods to Nyala. UNAMID plans also assume Friends of UNAMID (FOU) will provide unspecified airlift of priority COE including Armored Personnel Carriers (APC),ammunition, medical equipment and supplies, and KHARTOUM 00001236 002 OF 002 self-sustainment stores. ¶5. (SBU) According to transport contractors, sufficient Material Handling Equipment (MHE) is available in Sudan, given proper planning and funds for rentals. In general, transport contractors, even those that UNAMID uses, stated that there are no MHE obstacles regarding loading and off-loading containers at ports, storage sites or at remote locations. The Port of Sudan has sufficient modern equipment to off-load containers of any size and weight directly to trucks for transport to onward rail or air links. Rail heads such as Nyala have cranes suitable for offloading containers to and from rail or truck with sufficient personnel to efficiently move cargo to the onward mode of transport. More remote locations often have MHE and experienced personnel for rent but require advance planning. Most transport companies have their own MHE and move their equipment along with containers. However, despite apparently widely available MHE, UNAMID says that to meet its year-end objectives it will require additional MHE equipment such as six 15 ton telescopic forklifts, three K-Loaders, 12 Pallet Dollies and 12 Baggage Trailers of unspecified capacities. ¶6. (SBU) Comment: We will continue to press for additional detail on the locations of containers and especially a prioritized list of what could usefully be moved immediately with outside assistance. This is still one more example of how major impediments to the accelerated deployment of UNAMID are generated, not by an obstructionist Khartoum regime, but by lack of capacity and planning by the UN. It is possible that changes in leadership in New York and El Fasher may make UNAMID logistics more effective in the coming months. Additional air cargo flights and convoys will require close coordination with the Sudanese authorities, especially the military and intelligence apparatus of the regime. End comment. FERNANDEZ

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