Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM1235
2008-08-15 08:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

Tags:  KPKO PGOV PREL SU 
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VZCZCXRO1473
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1235/01 2280818
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150818Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1617
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001235 

SIPDIS

AF FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2018
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL SU
SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR
SALAH EDDIN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4(b
) and (d).

------
SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001235 SIPDIS AF FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2018 TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL SU SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SALAH EDDIN Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4(b ) and (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Special Envoy Williamson and NCP strategist and presidential advisor Dr. Ghazi Salah Eddin sparred over Sudan's progress in implementing the CPA, cooperating on Darfur, and the future of bilateral relations. Ghazi implored SE Williamson to look past the details of visas and containers and focus instead on the "big picture" of Sudan's modest progress on Abyei, CPA implementation, and Darfur. SE Williamson responded that the details matter to the people on the ground and reiterated that the alleviation of human suffering in Darfur and the South are the USG's number one priority in Sudan. He warned Ghazi that the GoS must move beyond the half-hearted measures of the past and take concrete steps to improve the situation in Darfur and implement the CPA for the USG to take it seriously. The meeting ended on a hostile note, when Ghazi told SE Williamson, "we can live without you and we can continue to live without you." End Summary. -------------- SE WILLIAMSON ON ABYEI AND DARFUR -------------- ¶2. (U) Salah Eddin began the meeting by asking SE Williamson for his read on current situation in Sudan. On Abyei, the SE stated that the USG was pleased to see movement, albeit slow, on the implementation of the June 8 Roadmap, particularly joint training and deployment of Abyei Joint Integrated Units (JIUs),establishment of Joint Integrated Police Units (JIPUs) and the NCP/SPLM agreement in naming an administrator and deputy administrator for the Abyei interim administration. He cautioned that the May Abyei crisis demonstrated how fragile the situation is between the North and the South. Furthermore, he warned that pursuing international arbitration is not "the smartest way" to deal with the determination of Abyei's borders. SE Williamson proposed that the Naivasha peace partners should pursue a political settlement simultaneous to arbitration and encouraged the parties to work out an oil revenue-sharing mechanism for Abyei that can be used as a model for determining wealth-sharing arrangements post-2011. ¶3. (C) On Darfur, SE Williamson expressed disappointment that there has not been mor
e progress on achieving peace and security and making a good faith effort to find a political settlement with rebel groups, civil society, and other key actors on the ground. He stated that the alleviation of human suffering in Darfur is the USG's number one goal in Sudan. He expressed frustration over the slow deployment of UNAMID, as well as GoS impediments to allowing the international community to assist with establishing security and mitigating human suffering by restricting night flights and hardening the process of visa and travel permit acquisition. The SE told Salah Eddin that he had met with Chadian President Idris Deby before arriving and Sudan and expressed to Deby USG concern for Chadian government support to Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels. At the same time, SE Williamson said that it is not useful for the GoS to arm Chadian rebels in Darfur. SE Williamson expressed concern over Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader and DPA signatory Mini Minnawi's marginalization by the GoS and warned that if the GoS continues to ignore the DPA, it will be difficult for the international community to convince other rebel leaders to join a comprehensive peace agreement for Darfur. He emphasized that Darfur is Sudan's problem and only the GoS can solve it. -------------- -- GHAZI RESPONDS: LET US LOOK AT THE BIG PICTURE -------------- -- ¶4. (C) GoS Presidential Advisor Salah Eddin prefaced his remarks by telling the SE that his role in the regime is to assess the big picture and overall trends, answering questions such as "are we (the GoS) negotiating our obstacles?" "You have more details on Abyei than I do," remarked Ghazi. "Abyei has always been a difficult issue, and the (US brokered) Abyei Protocol made it worse," he said. "The Protocol was forced upon us (the Sudanese, and particularly the NCP)," by negotiators such as the US. However, Ghazi announced that he is one of the staunchest supporters in the NCP of sticking to the agreement and implementing it as it is written. He noted the complexity of KHARTOUM 00001235 002 OF 004 the issue, stating that decisions taken in the high-level negotiating environment of Khartoum may not be entirely accepted by people on the ground. What we (the SPLM and the NCP) have achieved with the Abyei Roadmap, said Ghazi, is a positive sign and demonstrates that the parties are serious in finding a solution. I believe we have made "considerable headway lately" on Abyei, he continued, and "the US should support this process until the end." Although he agreed with the SE that it may be difficult to enforce an arbitrated result on Abyei's borders, he insisted that the parties should accept the result. "As far as the NCP is concerned, I think we are going to abide by it," he said. ¶5. (C) Ghazi stated that he is known among his colleagues to be an internal critic of the GoS handling of Darfur. However, he acknowledged that "it is a difficult issue." He agreed with SE Williamson that security should be the number one priority, but requested that the SE look at the bigger picture. "It's not an issue of a few visas or a few containers here and there," he said. "We may have dragged our heels in the past and been skeptical of international demands" on Darfur, but "the GoS has shown good faith as of late" in implementing UNSC Resolution 1769, said Ghazi. He listed security, resettlement (and development as it relates to allowing people to resettle),and finding a political solution to Darfur as the most important issues to address. He stated that the GoS would like to find an inclusive solution to the Darfur crisis by involving other political factions, Chad, and players on the ground in Darfur. He explained that the GoS has embarked on a national initiative to allow political forces other than the NCP and the SPLM (such as Umma Party's Chairman Sadiq Al-Mahdi) to give input to finding a solution to the crisis. He complained that trying to negotiate with Darfurian rebel movements is difficult because the rebel groups, such as Minnawi's SLM, have not yet transformed into political movements and do not know how to play the political game. Still, he expressed hope that the GoS would be supported by the international community with regard to the national initiative, and asked that this process "be protected from the ICC." The ICC indictment, said Ghazi, "is a real threat to the future of this country, the North and the South, the CPA, and the DPA." How can our peace agreements be protected when the guarantor of these agreements, President Al-Bashir, is turned in as a criminal? The GoS has made some mistakes, said Ghazi, but that doesn't mean we should be "taken to the guillotine." ¶6. (C) "We have made great headway on elections," said Ghazi (who leads the NCP's parliamentary majority),citing the GNU's recent ratification of the electoral law and the establishment of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) which is in the process of forming. He asked for international support for Sudan on elections, claiming, "I don't care if NCP comes out on top, the important thing is that we reconstruct the political system through an electoral process." ¶7. (C) Ghazi told SE Williamson that the GoS is "committed to talking" to the US, but that it is interested in having discussions about the long-term, rather than immediate details. If our relationship focuses only on containers and visas, said Ghazi, I am not interested in it. My sincere advice, he continued, is that the US and Sudan should strive to work toward the unity of Sudan. "I do not want to see hell break loose, and hell will break loose if the South secedes in 2011," he said. We want long-term objectives to be discussed in our dialogue with the US, continued Ghazi, however the USG calls the shots. -------------- -------------- SE WILLIAMSON: THE GOS AND THE GOS ONLY DECIDES SUDAN'S FATE -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) In response, SE Williamson stated that only the GoS can decide what lies ahead for Sudan. "I am very disappointed in many things you have said," said Williamson. "If you want to talk long-term objectives, talk to your friends. We do not call the shots in Sudan, you make the decisions in Sudan." Responding to Salah Eddin's proposal for a national initiative to solve the Darfur crisis, Williamson remarked, "that dog won't hunt, because you won't follow through." Williamson observed that "buildings are built by details: one brick at a time." He emphasized the importance of details, particularly with regard to the situation in Abyei and Darfur, remarking that details are what matter to the people on the ground. KHARTOUM 00001235 003 OF 004 ¶9. (C) SE Williamson agreed with Salah Eddin that there are "unique pressures" on Sudan right now due to the ICC indictment and a potential arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir. The SE stated that the US is not a member of the ICC and has no official dialogue with the ICC. He explained that the US administration has not made a decision on how it will vote on an Article 16 resolution if brought before the UNSC. "We will make a decision," said Williamson, "based on what we think the merits are: practical progress on the ground in the implementation of the CPA and in Darfur." We don't want a political declaration without results, he continued. Williamson added that he thought it would be wise for the GoS to engage with the ICC. -------------- GHAZI FIRES BACK: "WE CAN LIVE WITHOUT YOU" -------------- ¶10. (C) Deeply offended by the SE's remarks, Ghazi said that he was not surprised by the SE's "diatribe" and incorrect stereotypes and characterizations of the GoS. "You have been trying to harangue us for the past 20 years," said Ghazi, "and you have failed miserably." "You attacked us with cruise missiles and yet you still have failed," he continued. Ghazi expressed deep disappointment of his meeting with the SE and said he had hoped that the two could "make new ground." The US has never been serious in its engagement with Sudan, claimed Ghazi, "and we have never gotten anything in exchange from you, regardless of the fact we let your containers through." "Do not lecture us on honesty. You are not honest," said Ghazi. "The CPA is holding whether you like it or not." If there is any meaning to our engagement and if there are going to be any results on our part, the USG must focus on big ideas. ¶11. (C) Williamson agreed with Ghazi that there has been some progress on implementation of the CPA. However, he clarified that it is it the GoS regime that makes the decisions on Darfur, Abyei, and CPA implementation, not the US. Williamson offered to take Ghazi's obstructionist attitude back to the US Administration, "or I can tell them you are willing to talk and cooperate." "I think we have a decision to make," said Williamson. "You don't like us, and we don't trust you." He continued, "If it is not going to be beneficial to talk, that's fine." Difficult times lie ahead for Sudan, but in those times may lie opportunities, said Williamson. However, "you are pre-determining your fate on some things." ¶12. (C) "I am aware of your cloaked threats," said an emotional Ghazi, "and they do not scare us. We've been getting them for the last 20 years. You don't control our destiny." If you want to scare us, he continued, tell the US Administration that we are unwilling to cooperate. If you want to write an honest report, tell the Administration that we don't hate the US, we are not against you, and we have been very constructive with you, especially on terrorism. Furthermore, we are willing to listen to you. If you have new ideas, present them to us. Ending on what Ghazi called a "positive note," Ghazi said "we believe we can live and continue to live without you." "The sun will rise without you, the day will dawn without you" said Ghazi, quoting "Audrey Hepburn in My Fair Lady". We see that a lot of good has been done in making progress on tough issues in Sudan, and we are ready to engage with you but only on honest and equal terms, nothing less than that. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Apparently frustrated that the regime has not received more credit for its recent actions, an emotional Presidential advisor Ghazi Salah Edin responded (unfortunately and inaccurately) that Sudan does not need the US, which is not the message the regime wants to communicate based on its engagement with us since the CPA and especially in the last 6 months. He seemed to miss the point (as the regime often does) that an accumulation of small things such as visas and containers make a difference, particularly on UNAMID deployment and the bilateral relationship. It is possible that this meeting was intended as a test in advance of meetings on the final day of SE Williamson's visit, such as with the more powerful presidential advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and Bashir confidante Minister of Finance Awad al Jaz August 14 (septels). It remains to be seen whether the regime is interested or even capable of taking dramatic steps to solve the crisis in Darfur, while also cooperating on KHARTOUM 00001235 004 OF 004 small but critical issues like visas. However the regime would like easy credit for recent progress in Abyei and on elections, despite its inability to make progress in Darfur, and Ghazi was frustrated by the realization that this certainly will not be enough to convince the US and the rest of the international community to help it with the ICC. ¶14. (U) SE Williamson cleared this cable prior to transmission. FERNANDEZ

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