SPLM LEADERS SEE "GOLDEN OPPORUNITY" TO DEAL ON ICC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001182 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: SPLM LEADERS SEE "GOLDEN OPPORUNITY" TO DEAL ON ICC REF: A. KHARTOUM 1140 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1126 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: SPLM leaders meeting in Khartoum on August 4 outlined a possible way forward on the disputed region of Abyei. They also pressed the US to see the potential ICC indictment of President Al-Bashir as "an opportunity for engagement, not isolation" with Khartoum and outlined what they hoped to see from Washington in the waning months of the Bush Administration. End summary. 2,. (C) CDA Fernandez met with GOSS Presidential Affairs Minister Luka Biong Deng, GOSS Presidential Advisor on Gender and Human Rights Awut Deng, and GNU Minister of Investment Kosti Manibe at SPLM HQ in Khartoum on August 4. Luka had asked for the meeting to coordinate SPLM policy on Abyei with American initiatives before the upcoming visit of SE Richard Williamson to Sudan. Luka said that the SPLM leadership (meaning Salva Kiir) was less than enthusiastic about a potential deal for an Abyei interim administration presented to them by FM Deng Alor earlier in the day (reftel a). The deal had been subsequently modified by the NCP on August 3 after being presented to Alor last week. Luka said that the SPLM still prefers an extremely narrow definition of Abyei's resident population, "this means essentially the Ngok Dinka" (both Alor and Biong Deng are Ngok Dinka) and no one else. ¶3. (C) Even though the NCP was proposing a non-Misseriyya, non-local technocrat for the NCP-named Deputy Administrator slot, the SPLM was deeply suspicious that this was a vieled attempt to expand or loosen the residency issue so that the NCP could bring in thousands of Misseriyya Arabs and others to affect the outcome of a future Abyei referendum. "We prefer that you stick to the position that both top jobs should be for the Ngok Dinka," even if the SPLM eventually has to compromise and accept a non-resident. If this eventually happens, the SPLM will try to make it explicit that the "single exception" of one or two technocrats can in no way be used as a precedent for residency requirements for the Abyei referendum, "you will have SAF occupiers claiming residency in Abyei as a result of their tour of duty there." 4, (C) Madame Awut asked that the US continue to keep the �0A;pressure on NCP compliance with the June 8 Abyei Road Map, "Abyei is your baby and you should see it through." She said that while some saw the road map as an SPLM concession (because it moved away from the Abyei Protocol - SPLM contrarian Lam Akol expressed that view to us),it is actually a victory. If Abyei had remained deadlocked, it sooner or later would have been appealed from the Presidency by the NCP to the Sudanese Constitutional Court. The SPLM would have lost there "because the court has been suborned by the regime," and so the SPLM preferred to take its chances with an international arbitration court, which should be more impartial. ¶5. (C) Biong Deng reviewed FVP Salva Kiir's agenda during his meetings with President Al-Bashir August 5-8. He said that progress on a National Electoral Commission (NEC),the Abyei question, and the ICC targeting of Al-Bashir were paramount on Kiir's agenda. The SPLM wanted the P-3 to work with it to use the potential ICC indictment of Al-Bashir as a "tool to pressure and influence" the regime towards definitive peace in Darfur and CPA implementation. This should be "an opportunity for engagement, not isolation." Luka scoffed about considerations of restorative justice, noting that Al-Bashir will sooner or later face human or divine justice. "How can we get the policies that we want on Darfur", for example. Luka would like to see Salva Kiir take over the Darfur portfolio from hardliner Nafie Ali Nafie and leverage the SPLM's relationship with the West and with rebels and marginalized people in Darfur into an early solution. He noted that "Nafie has told us that Al-Bashir will win the next elections, either by rallying the people against the ICC, or by outright theft" so the SPLM wants to be very practical about what can be acomplished. ¶6. (C) In addition to working with the P-3 on the ICC, the SPLM wants to do something to recognize President Bush's legacy in bringing about the CPA. "We want to name something after him, maybe in South Sudan", to commemorate this singular achievement of ending the longest running civil war in Africa. Biong Deng added that they also want to see a strong policy statement from the White House, before the end of the Administration, calling for full CPA implementation and highlighting its primacy and "this is the most important KHARTOUM 00001182 002 OF 002 part, that the outcome of the 2011 referendum should be respected" by the NCP. He mentioned the SPLA's continuing need to defend itself militarily, especially against the MIGs and Sukhois of the Sudanese Air Force. He also asked that the US look for ways to increase support for the urgent development of agriculture in South Sudan, "this is not just food security but survival for us" should oil revenues be cut off. ¶7. (C) Comment: Abyei remains the CPA's longest running soap opera with one NCP wag noting that "there is something new every day on Abyei, some days we are on the verge of a breakthrough and others on the edge of disaster." This is a crisis week (compared to last week). Luka Biong Deng seems to be taking a harder line on an interim administration than his cousin and fellow SPLM official Deng Alor. The refrain on the ICC is a common one for the SPLM, as it is for much of the political opposition inside Sudan and Darfuri civil society. All of them see it as less than some abstract legal notion of perfect justice and more as a new and possibly effective tool to pressure the regime towards taking certain practical steps on the ground in Darfur to bring about compensation for suffering people, political reform, and a real chance for peace and stability. We generally find the Sudanese much more practical (or cynical) about this issue than the international denizens of the rarefied halls of The Hague or New York. End comment. FERNANDEZ