Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM1152
2008-08-01 09:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

RIVAL FACTION DEVELOPING IN SLM/MM

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU 
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VZCZCXRO2354
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1152/01 2140936
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010936Z AUG 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1474
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001152 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA MARKINGS 3,7,8

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: RIVAL FACTION DEVELOPING IN SLM/MM

KHARTOUM 00001152 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001152 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA MARKINGS 3,7,8 E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU SUBJECT: RIVAL FACTION DEVELOPING IN SLM/MM KHARTOUM 00001152 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior leaders within the Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM) appear ready to break off from Minnawi and form their own parallel movement, according to senior SLM/MM loyalists in two separate meetings with poloff on July 31. These leaders, including the Deputy Chairman of SLM/MM, have formed a rival group within Minnawi's movement. Sources stated that NCP leaders, especially Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and Intelligence Director Salah Gosh, are responsible for creating this split, as they have pressured, bribed, and enticed Minnawi's rivals. Minnawi loyalists stated that they are aggressively combating this latest attempt to divide and conquer their movement, and will likely fire those disloyal to Minnawi in the coming weeks. One Minnawi loyalist threatened that this constant attack on their movement has forced senior SLM/MM leaders to begin the fight for an independent state of Darfur. END SUMMARY. PUBLIC SIGNS OF THE RIFT - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) On July 29, almost all Sudanese newspapers prominently featured a press release from Dr. Rayah Jumaa Mahmud, Deputy Chairman of SLM/MM who stated that the absence of Senior Presidential Assistant Minni Minnawi will not affect the Darfur Peace Agreement. He added that Minnawi's decision to remain in Darfur was personal and did not represent SLM's position. Mahmoud also told journalists separately that "If Minnawi comes back, he is welcome - but if not, the movement will not be affected." On the same day the extremist Arabic daily "Al-Intibaha" reported that well-informed sources in the SLM stated there are "intensive meetings being held among the leadership of SLM, revealing a powerful trend within the movement for the dismissal of Minnawi." (NOTE: Mahmoud is the second highest ranking official in SLM/MM. Prior to his May 2008 departure to the field, Minnawi personally told poloff that Mahmoud would represent him well in meetings with S/E Williamson. Mahmoud, from the Masalit tribe, is also the highest ranking non-Zaghawa in SLM/MM. END NOTE.) CONVERSATION WITH RA
YAH - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) On July 31, Rayah Mahmud told poloff that his statements reported in Sudanese media were accurate. Mahmud added that he has become frustrated with Minnawi, especially as the latter left for the field "without telling me or anybody else what his plans were." Mahmud said that the SLM should work with the mechanisms established by the DPA, rather than retreating to the field. Although he denied that there is an internal competition in SLM/MM, he acknowledged that there are problems in the movement, especially with the way decisions have been made. Mahmud said that poloff should focus his SLM/MM outreach with SLM/MM representatives such as Yaya An-Neel, Omar Dahia, Issa Baha' El-Deen and several others. DIVIDE AND CONQUER CONTINUES - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) SLM/MM spokesman Sayf Al-Haroun told poloff on July 30 that the presence of this rival and disloyal faction led by Rayah Mahmud and Mustafa Tirab has made SLM/MM even more fragile than it was several months ago. Haroun provided poloff with a list of military commanders and political leaders within SLM/MM who are aligned with Mahmud and constitute 6 out of 10 leaders of the movement's liberation council. (Note: see para 10 for a detailed list. This list corresponds closely with a separate list provided by Rayha above. End Note.) Haroun stated that Minnawi's absence from Khartoum, his lack of leadership, ethnic divisions within SLM/MM, and the attraction of rival rebel movements (i.e. especially JEM following their May 10 attack) are all reasons for SLM/MM's division and precarious state. "Minni has put his people in Khartoum in an awkward situation by leaving them here without clear instructions or support," stated Haroun. Haroun added that even Minnawi's bodyguard may be aligned with this rival faction, and spying on Minnawi's meetings, plans, and strategy. Haroun also noted that Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and Intelligence Chief Salah Al-Gosh take the NCP's lead in bribing, buying-off and promising power to Minnawi's competitors. POTENTIAL LOSS OF ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN SLM/MM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Haroun stated that if this group does splinter from SLM/MM that it will take much of SLM/MM's ethnic diversity with it, leaving SLM only with the Zaghawa of Minnawi's KHARTOUM 00001152 002.2 OF 003 particular clan and region (Wogi-Daqeen). Haroun stated that in this process of division, SLM leaders not closely aligned with either group are being slowly pushed out of SLM/MM. "Minnawi's clan of Daqeen have become an inner circle, and they are losing the small Masalit presence with Mahmud, the Fur with Tirab, and the Galay-Gargay Zaghawas," stated Haroun. Haroun said even though Dr. Raya Mahmud is the highest ranking member of this faction, the treacherous Mustafa Tirab is likely pulling the strings and working closely with NCP leaders. Sayf stated that Minni has been aware of Tirab's plot for a long time and that twice within the last year Minnawi ordered his followers to invade Tirab's home and accused him of collaborating with the NCP. "THE INSIDE THREAT" - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Minnawi loyalist and Head of SLM/MM Capacity and Party Building, Bushara Hassan, separately told poloff on July 30 that SLM/MM faces an "inside threat." Hassan also said that the problem rests primarily with Mustafa Tirab, Rayah Mahmud, and some of SLM/MM's Zaghawa-Gali Gargay commanders. He said those based in South Darfur, who felt that they have not been rewarded for their fighting, have been particularly difficult. Bushara claimed that the GoS has attempted to bribe many of these commanders. According to Bushara the coordination and planning between the rival movement in SLM/MM and the NCP is quite advanced. Bushara said that the rival leaders are planning a trip to Addis Ababa to argue to the African Union that they should be recognized as the sole legitimate leaders of SLM. LAST CHANCE FOR TRAITORS AND POSSIBLE RESHUFFLING - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Bushara added that these SLM leaders will be given a last chance to exhibit their loyalty to Minni. He sad that SLM intelligence has already started to purchase plane tickets and plan for the travel of these rival members to North Darfur. He observed that within weeks these members will be presented with tickets, and if they decline, they will automatically be kicked-out of SLM/MM. Bushara said that he and other Minnawi loyalists have already excluded some members of this rival movement from SLM/MM meetings. He also stated that Minnawi is strongly considering requesting a reshuffling for those SLM/MM members who hold positions in the GNU, which would mean the removal of many leaders from state and federal positions. RETURN TO WAR? - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Bushara noted that after re-organizing his field commanders and spending significant time in the field, Minnawi is "stronger than ever." He said that Minnawi is becoming increasingly frustrated by GoS's meddling in SLM/MM internal affairs, their lack of DPA implementation, and its attempt to obstruct his communication with the international community. (Bushara specifically mentioned that Minnawi has been frustrated by the GoS's repeated denial of CDA Fernandez's requests to see Minnawi in the field.) According to Bushara, Minnawi has been left with no other option but to "think about starting the fight for the Democratic Republic of Darfur." Upon hearing this poloff expressed surprise at this extreme language, to which Bushara responded, "we've tried to work with this government, so what other option is left for us?" As an example of SLM's readiness to return to combat, Bushara stated that when delivering a letter to President Bashir from Minni Minnawi, Senior Minnawi Advisor Mohammed El-Tijani stated, "You'll see that this is a handwritten letter from the field. It is written in the way that we used to write letters back when we started the war." CDA Fernandez spoke to Minnawi on July 30 and after perfunctory avowals about returning to Khartoum, he reiterated complaints about the NCP trying to divide his movement and eventually assassinate him. He added that "the door is still open to return or to resuming the armed struggle." COMMENT - - - - ¶9. (C) Combating the NCP's consistent strategy of 'divide and conquer' is a constant battle for all opposition political parties, rebel movements, and the SPLM and SLM. Division in Minnawi's camp is nothing new, as observers and insiders have often questioned Mustafa Tirab's loyalty to Minnawi for years. What is significant about these events is that Minnawi's absence from Khartoum may have provided room for this dissension, and that more importantly, his second in command appears ready to hijack the movement. Rayha was careful to temper his remarks when speaking to poloff, but his list of insiders, criticism of Minnawi, and his moderate KHARTOUM 00001152 003.2 OF 003 remarks on the NCP all signal that something is likely in the works. Although it is difficult to evaluate the long-term political or military significance of this fissure, it is clear that the GoS views Minni's absence as a threat and appears to be actively attempting to replace his movement with a more NCP-friendly alternative. The NCP's divide and conquer modus operandi continues. END COMMENT. ¶10. (C) List provided by Sayf Al-Haroun: MEMBERS OF COMPETING FACTION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1) Dr. Rayeh Jumaa Mahmoud, Deputy Chairman of SLM/MM, Member of Parliament, Head of Social Committee in National Assembly (Masalit) 2) Issa Baha' El-Deen - President of the Liberation Council, Deputy Wali, North Darfur State 3) Mustafa Tirab - General Secretary of the SLM (Fur) 4) Yaya Hassan An-Neel - SLM/MM Military Spokesman, S. Darfur Sector leader (Zaghawa, Galay Gargay clan) 5) Omar Suliman Dahia - Chief Security Commander SLM/MM (Zaghawa, Galay Gargay clan, related to individual above) 6) Arku Suliman Dahia - Deputy High Commander (Zaghawa, Galay Gargay clan, related to two individuals above) 7) Issa Musa Gerri Chief of Police (Zaghawa) 8) Abdalkareem El-Shek - Commissioner, North Darfur. FERNANDEZ

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