FM DENG ALOR ON ICC AND ABYEI INTRIGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001140 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: FM DENG ALOR ON ICC AND ABYEI INTRIGUE *********************** * Missing Section 001 * *********************** KHARTOUM 00001140 002 OF 003 -------------- BARGAINING ON ABYEI INTENSIFIES -------------- ¶5. (C) As Charge Fernandez entered the Foreign Ministry, he encountered the same ICC indictee Ahmed Haroun exiting Alor's office. As the NCP's pointman on Abyei, Haroun has been told to deal only with Alor on Abyei "because he cares more about Abyei than about the Foreign Ministry" (Alor chuckled quoting Al-Bashir saying this). Intense, back and forth negotiations between Alor and Haroun may have hammered out a solution to the oil-rich, contested region's interim administration. The NCP had wanted 3 out of the 5 leadership slots in the region's executive council but had agreed to accept two of the five. They had wanted 55 percent of the 20 seats in the region's legislative council, Alor had countered with 30 percent. They had gone back and forth and eventually Haroun had agreed to a 6-14 split (which could eventually be 7-13 split) with the SPLM getting the majority of the seats. Alor had refused to accept a Misseriyya as speaker of the Legislative Council. On the contentious Administrator/Deputy Administrator slotOq_4$(9Qy Administrator. ¶6. (C) Haroun suggested a former Abyei administrator from the late 1970s named Rahamtallah. He was from North Kordofan, formerly from Kordofan University, and was non-political. He knew the region well and was favorably known by VP Taha as a reasonable man. Alor said that he was intrigued by the idea and it could work. Haroun is to convince Al-Bashir on Rahamtallah while Alor will convince Kiir. If agreed, an announcement naming all the officials at once - Administrator, Deputy Administrator, Executive Committee, Legislative Council - would be made next week. Some of those named would be Misseriyya to seek to at least partially mollify them. Alor cautioned Haroun that Rahamtallah would be the only non-resident of Abyei named. Alor said that the Interim Administration desperately needed American help, "I know USAID doesn't like this but we need prefabs for the Administration and tents, not plastic sheeting, for other schools and buildings" (the region's Administrative Offices were burned down in the May 2008 fighting). He also asked for help in rebuilding the Abyei market. Charge promised to alert USAID about these requests. Alor thank Charge for his personal outreach to the Misseriyya Arabs and asked that this continue. ¶7. (C) Comment: With interim borders delineated, the almost complete withdrawal of military units from Abyei (including the withdrawal of SAF's notorious 31st Brigade from Abyei town) by July 30, this news of the tortuous but real political progress being made on Abyei is cause for hope. If there is an announcement next week on an interim administration and if the military withdrawal is finalized, we will be able to say that the June 8 Abyei road map between the SPLM and NCP is well on the way to being fulfilled. That would be a significant accomplishment on what has been the Comprehensive Peace Agreement's thorniest problem for the past three years. ¶8. (C) Comment continued: On the ICC, the non-paper handed over by the French is an interesting document in that the demands on UNAMID and Darfur are quite reasonable and doable for the regime (the NCP agreed in principle with SE Williamson on the Thais and Nepalese in late May 2008 discussions). In fact the regime, also already agreed to the items under "political process in Darfur" which are quite modest and which do not change the regime's ability to play out the diplomatic process to its advantage without changing the miserable situation on the ground much in Darfur. In any case, it is the rebels who are less eager to negotiate presently, not the regime. But, ultimately, it is the strictures on the ICC that will be quite hard for them to swallow. The regime has already trumpeted that "not one hair of one Sudanese will be handed over to a foreign court." The Khartoum regime has often combined incendiary rhetoric with concessions and reason behind the scenes but because this shift involves power at the center - the very survival of the regime - it will be harder to finesse. It is possible that the regime may try to split the difference, by being forthcoming on one basket of issues and not on another, for KHARTOUM 00001140 003 OF 003 example, accelerating cooperation on UNAMID, racheting up the peace process, engaging the Court but not handing over Haroun and Khosheyb (who one has to expect will immediately implicate their superiors). End comment. ¶9. (SBU) Begin text: Strategic Paper to Avoid the ICC Deadlock Context: On July 14, the Prosecutor to the International Criminal Court has applied for warrant of arrest against the President of the Republic of Sudan. It is now up to the ICC pre-trial chamber to decide the follow-up to be given to the Prosecutor's application. Its decision is likely to being released by two to three months. Issue: The issuance of a warrant of arrest would create an unprecedented crisis between Sudan and the international community but the expected consequence is isolation and high instability to be gained by Sudan from such escalation. Such an outcome is not certain because(1) the judges have not yet taken their decision and (2) the UN Security Council is allowed to suspend prosecution for a renewable period of 12 months by adopting a resolution under chapter seven of the UN Charter (Rome statute of the ICC - Article 16). Way forward: The Government of Sudan should be aware of the situation of emergency. Critical additional steps forward are to be taken within this very tight schedule to demonstrate concrete willingness to settle Darfur issues: ICC: to legally engage the Court against the Prosecutor's application in the case against the President. To dismiss Mr. Ahmed Haroun from any official duties. To hand over immediately to the ICC at least one of the two individuals already targeted by an ICC warrant of arrest and the second before the Court issues its decision on the warrant of arrest regarding President Bachir. UNAMID: The Government of Sudan should address the main two issues that are also most symbolic of Sudanese relations with the UNAMID: to call for the immediate deployment of the Thai and Nepalese. To confirm Sudanese commitment to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) notably by lifting any reservations on UNAMID access to the Darfur airports (free access 24 hours a day) and on UNAMID night flights. More broadly, the government of Sudan shall grant all authorizations requested by the UN and the AU to ease the deployment of UNAMID. Political process in Darfur: to fully cooperate with the new UN/AU chief mediator, Minister Bassole. To take the initiative to propose JEM/Khalil Ibrahim and SLM/Abdulwahid to start political negotiations under Mr. Bassole's mediation. The Government of Sudan is urged to take concrete actions. It is its own responsibility to initiate them. A strong public and diplomatic communication, within all international bodies (notably the UN, AU, Arab League and Islamic Conference Organization) and the bilateral dialogue with key western partners (US, UK, France, EU) is required to demonstrate Sudanese willingness for cooperation with the whole international community. It is expected to create legal and political conditions required to encourage the ICC not to follow the Prosecutor's application and, in case it decides to follow it, the UNSC to adopt an article 16 resolution. End text. FERNANDEZ