DARFUR: THE PEACE PROCESS ON THE EVE OF THE AU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000112 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: THE PEACE PROCESS ON THE EVE OF THE AU SUMMIT REF: KHARTOUM 95 KHARTOUM 00000112 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Fifteen months after the Addis Ababa agreement of November 2006, the Darfur peace process has not advanced. Disarray within and among the rebel movements has confounded UN and AU mediators, alleviated any pressure on Khartoum to make political concessions, and stalled negotiations. No viable formula exists for including civilian voices in the peace process. Regional machinations exacerbate the difficulty of achieving a lasting political settlement. As political strife and insecurity endure, Darfur's chances of meeting the electoral timelines established in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) become more remote, which could leave the region on the sidelines of national transformation and deepen Darfuris' sense of marginalization. Please see para. 7 for a possible road ahead to energize the peace process on the eve of the AU Summit in Addis Ababa. -------------- The Rebels -------------- ¶2. (C) Despite the plethora of rebel movements, three drivers of the current insurgency have emerged from the pack: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA/M) led by Paris-based Fur demagogue Abdulwahid Al Nur; the predominantly Zaghawa Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by quasi-Islamist Khalil Ibrahim, who the USG has sanctioned; and SLA/Unity, a loose but militarily formidable confederation of largely Zaghawa fighters centered around rival power centers led by Abdullah Yehia, Suleiman Jamous, and Sharif Harir. ¶3. (C) Ahmed Abdulshafie currently lacks the popular support or the military strength to challenge Abdulwahid's dominance of the Fur. JEM/Collective Leadership, a break-away faction of JEM now joined in a fragile coalition with several minor rebel factions as the United Revolutionary Front (URF),was the only movement with military or political clout to attend UN/AU-sponsored talks in Libya in November. Only the militarily strong, politically weak, and Zaghawa-dominated SLA/Unity and the URF now express a willingness to join negotiations. The most potent rebel movements--Abdulwahid's SLA/M and Ibrahim's JEM--still remain largely disengaged from the peace process. The moribund 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) provides a cautionary tale against making a settlement with only one of Darfur's rebel groups. ¶4. (C) Many rebel leaders recognize that disunity and factionalism limit their ability to extract concessions from Khartoum through negotiations. Having observed the regime's successful efforts to marginalize and discredit the DPA's sole signatory, Minni Minawi, rebel leaders doubt that the NCP will fully implement any eventual political settlement. The movements also lack confidence that the UN/AU mediators have the leverage on Khartoum to force compromise or adherence to an agreement. Rebel leaders thus conclude that no viable political avenue exists to achieve their goals--whether personal political ambitions or loftier ideals of equitable wealth and power-sharing for Darfur--and turn instead to pressuring Khartoum through military confrontation. The relative weakness of the movements, however, means that a military stalemate between the rebels and Khartoum will persist. -------------- The Arabs -------------- ¶5. (C) The situation's complexity has increased in the last six to eight weeks as growing numbers of Arab militias--many formerly associated with the pro-Khartoum Janjaweed--have begun to cooperate, at varying levels, with the African rebel movements. Cut loose from the constraining influence of respected leadership and bitter at the Government's many unfulfilled commitments to compensate them for their participation in its counter-insurgency campaign, these Arab fighters are more predisposed to adjust their loyalties as it suits their needs. The Arabs are unlikely to be consistent allies for the African rebel movements, however, and deep distrust still pervades inter-tribal relations. Arab KHARTOUM 00000112 002.2 OF 003 opposition elements are likely to pursue a "flexible diplomatic approach:" the tribes keep a foot in the Government camp, a foot in the rebel camp, and throw their weight behind whichever side is obtaining the best deal during negotiations while seeking additional support and concessions from the Government. The recent appointment of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal exemplifies Khartoum's continued attempts to shore up support for its rule among Darfur's Arabs, although Hilal is not even fully accepted in his own Mahamid tribe. -------------- The Mediation -------------- ¶6. (C) The UN/AU have yet to articulate a strategic vision for the process or a framework for integrating the complex facets of the political situation--splintered rebel movements, highly politicized civil society and tribal groups, pragmatic Arab tribes with shifting allegiances, contentious regional relationships/rivalries, etc. In the absence of the execution of a concrete strategy, momentum in the process has dissipated. The mediation is even (rightly) reconsidering the two proposed "next steps"--a meeting of regional actors in N'djamena and an "Arusha II"--because it is unclear how they will move the process forward (reftel). Engagement with civilian voices such as tribal and IDP leaders is stymied by the lack of coordination between the UN/AU mediation, UNAMID civil affairs, and the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) and by Khartoum's paranoia about such contacts. As the UN/AU mediation limps forward, its credibility among both the Sudanese Government, rebel movements, the Darfuri public, and international actors declines, further limiting its ability to choreograph a successful strategy. -------------- Changing the Dynamic -------------- ¶7. (C) The task of the UN/AU mediation is to manage a process that changes the relationship between Khartoum and Darfur. So far the mediation has failed to articulate an overarching vision and marshal the resources to meet this challenge. Addressing the structural and organization problems within the UN/AU mediation and guiding it toward a constructive path falls on Western governments whose interests in Darfur remain purely humanitarian: --A single, strong UN/AU chief mediator is a prerequisite to moving toward substantive negotiations and coordinating the numerous elements of the process. The USG can be instrumental in making a chief negotiator a priority in both New York and Addis Ababa. A previous candidate for the post, highly respected UN SRSG in Georgia Jean Arnault, is reportedly again available. While the Government of Khartoum may object to a Western negotiator, we should press the UN/AU leadership to act quickly to appoint Arnault and not let Khartoum veto a viable negotiator because of nationality. --The international community must work with the UN/AU to create a nimble and effective "Contact Group" to provide oversight to the UN/AU mediation and re-enforce the mediators' waning credibility. The Contact Group must remain small enough to be effective and composed of countries that have leverage over Khartoum, the rebel movements, and the regional actors. A possible formulation could be the U.S., China, and the EU. Regular meetings of the Contact Group could occur at both the senior and Khartoum levels. Properly composed, the Contact Group can also form a credible monitoring mechanism for an eventual political settlement, which was lacking for the DPA. --The international community should demand that UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim provide monthly briefings to track progress and present solutions for meeting the challenges. --UNAMID, the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) that reports to Eliasson and Salim, and the DDDC must develop a formal coordination mechanism. At present, these entities do not harmonize their activities or use resources in a KHARTOUM 00000112 003.2 OF 003 collaborative manner. --The UN/AU mediation must define the end game of the process. The peace process has veered off track because the mediation has not, even internally, established precise, realistic, and consistent benchmarks for success. Such confusion has actually strengthened Khartoum's hand in managing a volatile situation in the troubled region and exploiting UN/AU fissures to its advantage. --The UN/AU team must have a formula for redefining the Khartoum-Darfur relationship. The rebel movements will not trade their one piece of leverage--armed insurgency--in exchange for nothing and already doubt Khartoum's sincerity in implementing a peace agreement. The Khartoum regime will seek, as in the past, to hollow out any agreement absent real and consistent international oversight. Once an effective chief mediator is in place and has assembled a senior team, the mediation should attempt to shuttle between the disparate rebel factions, the National Congress Party (NCP),and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)--which are spread throughout Sudan and abroad--to gain agreement on a cessation of hostilities in exchange for movement from Khartoum on a politically potent demand of Darfurians, such as compensation. Success on one issue could re-energize the process and lay the foundation for more complex negotiations. --The UN/AU mediation team, UNAMID civil affairs, and the DDDC must develop a written memorandum of understanding for developing and executing a plan to incorporate civilian voices, including Arabs and IDPs, in the peace process. Early and unambiguous acceptance of this plan by senior Khartoum officials must be secured. This MoU must specify a division of labor between the units, a chain of accountability accepted in both New York and Addis Ababa, and an organizational plan for sustained engagement on the ground. As the mediation works to draw the rebel movements into the process, action on civil society will restore much-needed momentum. In light of upcoming elections, workshops could also begin to explain the link between the CPA and the legitimate grievances of Darfurians, given that many in Darfur still feel excluded from what they perceive to be a "North-South" deal. ¶8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ