SPLM FORGES A STRATEGY ON ICC AND DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001129 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: SPLM FORGES A STRATEGY ON ICC AND DARFUR REF: KHARTOUM 1117 KHARTOUM 00001129 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) In advance of the SPLM Political Bureau meeting in Juba July 26 and 27, CDA, DCM, and polchief met with SPLM D/SG Yasir Arman in Khartoum July 25. Arman said the Political Bureau would finalize a plan on Darfur that he and fellow SPLM Darfur Task Force leader Abdelaziz Helou had already discuswed with NCP hardliner and PbesidEn4ia, adri{or Nafhu @di`Jbfie& Thu sw cadgd$#Da2nwb$g`DmP,8m.gf5*a@p/~g8#Y dfQUQI`X\iyndri]#Q"QQhlxb,tQusyE&ane(z4Qv*hnN hzc."-Quny of which the President had already touched upon in his speeches in Darfur (reftel). ¶2. (C) Specifically, the SPLM's Darfur Roadmap is for President Bashir to acknowledge that Darfur represents a problem of political marginalization that must be resolved through negotiation. The President should immediately announce his plans for a comprehensive ceasefire, as well as plans for discussions leading to a "consensus" among civil society groups (including the all-important IDP population). The plan would also include negotiations with rebel groups, and would empower VP Kiir to travel to Darfur to discuss GNU power sharing options directly with the rebels. After these meetings Kiir would travel to Chad to meet with President Deby, and then possibly to Washington accompanied by (NCP) Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail to meet with President Bush, if possible, to discuss his meetings in Darfur and Chad and his proposals for ending the Darfur crisis. Regarding the military and security aspects of the plan, Arman said that since the SAF has been discredited in Darfur, the GNU should deploy Joint Integrated Units with the support and assistance of the international community. UNAMID would be used for peacekeeping, but the JIUs should be deployed as an aggressive military force that would attack rebel forces who refused to reach an agreement with the GNU in negotiations, once a fair deal had been offered to them. (Comment: Notably absent from this plan is a "consensus" among political parties. Arman said this is because the SPLM does not trust the agreement struck between the NCP and Umma party leader Sadiq al Mahdi. Arman said the Darfur roadmap proposed by Mahdi is fine in and of itself, but the Umma party has an agenda of undermining the CPA - or rewriting it to make it more inclusive - so the SPLM's objective is to gain the upper hand on Darfur initiatives. The SPLM views the Umma party as still essentially hostile to the CPA, despite Al-Mahdi's protestations to the contrary, because it is not comfortable with the secular nature of the agreement and wishes to see sharia law imposed once again in the South. End note.) ¶3. (C) Yasir said the SPLM is concerned about the "end game" that will be pursued by the NCP if the ICC issues arrest wa+9Q QQkQQresT9QQM!\QQQ"Q SPQs Hetings with Nafie and other NCP advisors, according to Arman, the NCP has told the SPLM that they "are ready for the whole state to fail, ready for the collapse of all of Sudan" and of course the CPA along with it. When and if Kiir travels to Washington, Yasir hopes that a discussion of the "end game" will occur so that Washington may reassure the SPLM that their interests will be protected if the NCP takes radical action. ¶4. (C) In separate meetings with DCM and polchief, other SPLM officials have told us that they are extremely concerned about NCP intentions if the ICC issues the warrant against President Bashir. Newly-appointed GNU Deputy Permrep to the United Nations Lumumba S-K Di-Aping (according to other souraes a close confidant of Kiir) told polchief July 25 that Kiar would like to discuss in greater detail with Washington what support the SPLM can expect from the United StateS if the NCP abrogates the CPA and the SPLM is forced to make a unilateral declaration of independence. Lumumba also said that serious policy divisions within the SPLM have been exacerbated by the ICC indictment. He said northerners such as Yasir Arman (a former "Garang Boy" who supports a vision mf national unity and does not support independence for the South, as he would be "abandoned" in such a scenario) are KHARTOUM 00001129 002 OF 002 more agitated by the ICC indictment than southern SPLM members, who would be content to see the South secede sooner than 2011 as long as their interests can be secured. Lumumba said that official SPLM policy (and Kiir's own personal view),contrary to the SPLM statement that Arman issued in the North without the approval of the party (according to Lumumba) was not to condemn the ICC indictment, but rather to say that the timing of the indictments is wrong, even though the SPLM does support justice. Lumumba pointed out that when the previous ICC indictments were issued against Kushayb and Haroun, the SPLM had welcomed them. Lumumba claimed that Kiir himself preferred to remain silent in public without issuing a statement, but show his support for unity and regime stability by heading the GNU task force on the ICC indictments (Kiir did personally make a strong show of support with Al-Bashir the day the announcement was made). ¶5. (C) GNU State Minister of International Cooperation Elias Wokoson (SPLM),also a southerner from Equatoria like Lumumba, told DCM and polchief July 25 that "Kiir is in a delicate position" since the SPLM supported the ICC indictments against Haroun and Kushayb, but that Kiir's primary concern is to ensure the stability of the GNU and CPA implementation. Wokoson said the ICC Task Force Committee is essentially inactive and has not met at all since it was formed, and shared the observation of emboffs that the committee was formed "as window dressing to show GNU solidarity" and would not serve any other useful function unless Kiir takes advantage of the opportunity to present some proposals to President Bashir. Wokoson pointed out that all of the regime's actions thus far had been to line up political and diplomatic support for Bashir, but said that much more must be done on Darfur to solve the root causes of the crisis. (Note: Wokoson, also a member of the SPLM Darfur Task Force, had just emerged from a meeting with Arman and Helou to discuss the plan outlined by Arman. Wokoson's description of the plan was much less detailed, but he did describe the diplomatic initiatives that Kiir could take in Darfur, Chad, and in Washington. End note.) ¶6. (C) Comment: Greater SPLM involvement in helping resolve the Darfur crisis can be constructive, if they use it for more than just narrow partisan concessions from the NCP. However it remains to be seen whether the NCP will allow the SPLM to become closely involved in Darfur - our feeling is that Kiir might be allowed to make a trip to Darfur, but that the NCP will not want the SPLM to fully take the lead in mediating among Darfuris. As part of the GNU, the SPLM has their own interests in the outcome of these discussions, not to mention building political alliances in advance of elections, and the NCP's greatest fear is that the SPLM will use the opportunity to build a grand alliance with Darfur rebels of the periphery against the center. Arman's idea of using the JIUs as a fighting force in Darfur to subdue intransigent rebels is interesting but insane; the NCP would not allow it unless in an emergency (as in the case of the JEM attack on Omdurman) and it's not clear that the SPLA would be successful against the fast-moving, predatory Zaghawa on their home turf. The Zaghawa (JEM, SLA/U, and SLA/MM) are desert raiders, while the SPLM are primarily guerrilla fighters who can hold and take positions in the jungle, swamps and mountains of the South but are not used to fighting long-range skirmishes with "technicals" across the desert. Overall, Yasir's plan reveals his personal interests in keeping Kiir engaged on issues of national unity, while Kiir himself is more comfortable remaining in the South. It remains to be seen whether Kiir will take on the Darfur Roadmap; we do expect some engagement by Kiir on the issue but not to the extent proposed by Arman. The SPLM, like the NCP now, is stretched thin by Sudan's multiplicity of constant crises. End comment. FERNANDEZ