Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM1090
2008-07-20 12:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SUDANESE HARDLINER: "WE NEED AMERICA'S HELP IN UN

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL UN AU SU 
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VZCZCXRO1772
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1090/01 2021237
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201237Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1382
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001090 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NSC
FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE HARDLINER: "WE NEED AMERICA'S HELP IN UN
SECURITY COUNCIL"

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1088

B. KHARTOUM 1074

C. KHARTOUM 1072

D. KHARTOUM 1065

E. KHARTOUM 941

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001090 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: SUDANESE HARDLINER: "WE NEED AMERICA'S HELP IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL" REF: A. KHARTOUM 1088 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1074 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1072 ¶D. KHARTOUM 1065 ¶E. KHARTOUM 941 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: National Congress Party (NCP) hardliner Ali Karti said that Sudan feels let down by the United States not taking steps to prevent an ICC announcement of war crimes against President Al-Bashir, but seeks urgent American engagement on Darfur. Sudan is willing to entertain "any constructive American proposal" for Darfur but also wants American mediation in freezing a possible ICC indictment against the Sudanese ruler. End summary. ¶2. (C) CDA Fernandez met with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ali Karti on July 20. Karti, a regime hardliner with a dubious past, is the NCP's enforcer at the MFA, keeping an eye on the Minister (who belongs to the SPLM) and fellow State Minister, Al-Samani al-Wasila (who belongs to a splinter faction of the Democratic Unionist Party). Karti reportedly was also the regime insider who asked President Al-Bashir last month to hand over ICC indictees Ahmed Haroun and Ali Khoshayb to forestall additional indictments against the NCP leadership (reftel e). In contrast to past meetings, the usually toxic Karti was quite friendly even though his message was still relatively tough. -------------- WHERE'S THE LOVE, AMERICA? -------------- ¶3. (C) Karti began the meeting by complaining about SE Williamson's early June walkout from negotiations with Sudan. He said that many in the NCP leadership still don't believe that this walkout had anything to do with the Abyei question. "Some of us wonder if he had advance notice about what the ICC was going to do, " he added. He recalled that when he was briefed by some of the participants on progress in the May-June 2008 talks, he warned them "make sure that all the love isn't coming from one direction." Unfortunately, that seemed to be exactly the case and Sudan was actually implementing parts of a one-sided agreement it had received nothing for, "not just building your new embassy, but also facilitating UNAMID deployment and helping humanitarian access in Darfur. Just check
with them if you don't believe us." CDA Fernandez agreed that UNAMID JSR Adada had informed him last week that Sudan was implementing UNSCR 1769 and that he had no complaints (reftel c). ¶4. (C) Karti said that the Sudanese regime "feels we were let down" by the United States on the issue of the ICC prosecutor's indictment of President Al-Bashir. "Not only counter-terrorism cooperation, but also we are implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, implementing the Abyei Road Map, passed the electoral law, keeping our word on UNAMID. We are ready to negotiate in good faith with the Darfuri rebels anytime and any place." Surely all of that should have bought us a little credit with the Americans, "not because you like us or think well of this regime but because of your own policy interests in Sudan," he expounded. Describing the ICC announcement as an attempt to "intimidate and divide Sudan," he said that the Sudanese were hopeful that the United States would "talk sense to your friends France and the UK" on the Security Council in trying to get an ICC prosecution of Al-Bashir frozen. "This is not a threat but if you can't help us, we will draw our own conclusions about your intentions. CDA asked Karti about declarations by Minister of State for Information Kamal Obeid on June 20 "warning the US against using the ICC announcement against Sudan." Karti said that there was no cabinet decision to say such a thing to the Americans but Obeid is saying what many of us are thinking, "what are your intentions on this matter? You care about the CPA but not the person who approved the CPA (President Al-Bashir)?" He added that the 2005 decision by the Security Council to allow the ICC to proceed through UNSC Resolution 1593 "had been as a result of a French-American deal" so the regime will be looking to see if "that will be the case once again and what the deal will be. I am personally not very optimistic about you helping us, although you should." -------------- KHARTOUM 00001090 002 OF 002 ANY SUGGESTIONS WELCOMED -------------- ¶5. (C) The State Minister added that Sudan was ready to consider "any constructive American proposal on solving Darfur," just tell us what is it exactly that we should be doing that we are not? "But this has to be a two-way street," he continued, "you can't just take without giving." CDA said that there are many things Sudan could do. He noted that he is going to Darfur to talk to Presidential Assistant Minni Minnawi, "last time Army Intelligence wouldn't even let me go," and Minnawi's complaint is that the NCP has never implemented the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. CDA added that the regime has allowed the issue of Darfur's Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps to fester, "you've treated them as enemies and now they hate you." Sudan should be talking about and taking steps to address issues such as compensation, land, political reform, "if the rebels aren't interested maybe you should do right by the people of Darfur anyway." He noted that he had no special brief about what the USG's position on the UNSC will be but "you should think, at least, of showing remorse for the past and changing your behavior. Perhaps if you had done so in the past, this (Al-Bashir being named by the ICC prosecutor) would never have happened." ¶6. (C) Karti rejected the idea that the regime had done little to address compensation and other root issues in the conflict. He was a senior official in the Ministry of Justice for five years and there was an exhaustive investigation of the situation in Darfur which ended in 2005, "it was not a whitewash," and was headed by respected legal figures, not party stooges. Hundreds of people had been investigated, some had actually been jailed, hundreds of cases had been adjudicated and chosen for compensation. "If a women claimed she had lost a bag of sugar because of the unrest, the case was investigated." They had also provided a mechanism for settling disputes between farmers and nomads which is at the heart of much of the violence. CDA noted that this may well be the case but the regime has little credibility in the West now, whatever the regime did in the past was not good or transparent enough and "many will say that this is a dilemma of your own making" and pro-active action is urgently needed by the Sudanese Government to find a positive way to address the ICC issue and the larger issue of Darfur and there is little time to do so. ¶7. (C) Comment: Karti is an interesting figure in that he seems to have been one regime hardliner who saw the ICC trainwreck coming. His views confirm those of other senior NCP officials that the regime seeks a facing-saving way out of the ICC crisis, a problem which - in spite of Ocampo's grandstanding - is entirely of the regime's own making. In order to achieve a positive outcome, they are willing to entertain any suggestion on Darfur, assuming that they can water it down later. Unfortunately for them, the complex and volatile nature of today's Darfur -- again, as a result of past NCP policies -- means that it is not easy to solve. When and if the regime feels it has exhausted its efforts at overturning the ICC issue, it will be tempted to return to its default position and think of how it can lash out against its enemies while avoiding the consequences of such actions. As usual, the NCP fears a critical mass of its enemies uniting against it (SPLM plus Darfur rebels supported by the US with UN/ICC/EU political cover being their ultimate nightmare scenario) and will always have a combination of steps -- both concessions and escalation -- ready to go depending on its analysis of the correlation of forces arrayed against it. End comment. FERNANDEZ

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