NCP SENSITIVE ABOUT IMAGE PROBLEM, EAGER TO ENGAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001088 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: NCP SENSITIVE ABOUT IMAGE PROBLEM, EAGER TO ENGAGE WITH US REF: A. KHARTOUM 1074 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1065 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Just a few days prior to the announcement of the ICC indictment against President Bashir, on July 11 CDA and polchief met with senior NCP officials at the party headquarters in Khartoum to sound them out on possible solutions to Darfur and their impressions of RELATIONS with the US. Although the impending ICC indictment was not discussed directly, the looming possibility of the indictment frustrated these officials and framed their comments on a desire to present a different image to the west. Striking a common theme in Sudan lately, the officials supported the need to find a "third way" to resolve the Darfur conflict. They also expressed clearly a desire for improved RELATIONS with the US and seemed pleasantly surprised that we would take the time to meet with them at their headquarters. End summary. ¶2. (C) The NCP is eager to find a solution to the Darfur crisis, and might be willing to announce significant steps toward solving the problem, according to NCP POLITICAL Bureau Chief Dr. Mohammed al Mahdi and POLITICAL Bureau member Dr. Faruq Ahmed Adam (who is a Fur from Darfur). While Mahdi was much more of a hardliner and an apologist for the regime's behavior than Adam, he did recognize a need to find a solution and said that the NCP is ready to negotiate with Darfur rebels. However Al-Mahdi complained about what he claimed is a false imagine of Darfur perpetuated by interest groups in the US and Europe. He also complained that a small minority (the Zaghawa, which he correctly noted accounts for less than ten percent of the population of Darfur) is perpetuating most of the insurgency in Darfur not to mention attacks on locations outside Darfur including Khartoum. The West continues to give Darfur rebel groups a pass even though they are now responsible for most of the banditry in Darfur including stealing WFP food trucks and selling them in the Chadian black market. Mahdi doubted that the UNAMID "hybrid" force would bring peace to Darfur and recognized the need for a POLITICAL solution. Adam was more forward leaning in this thinking on Darfur; he recognized the need for a shift in the perception of the regime and its actions in Darfur, and expressed support for a "Marshall Plan" for Darfur that would bring reconstruction and meet the demands of the people for development. He thought that compensation for IDPs might be unrealistic but expressed support for the right of return of IDPs to their lands. (Note: Both Mahdi and Adam attended the conference on Darfur held in Beijing several weeks ago. End note.) ¶3. (C) Dr. Adam expounded on his idea for a "third way" on Darfur, distinct from either SAF seeking a military solution or the current ad hoc agenda arrived at by both the international community and the Khartoum regime which focuses on rebel movements and on deploying UNAMID peacekeepers. Adam, whose ideas on this subject seem to be gaining traction among some in the regime (both Presidential Advisors Ghazi Salahudin and Mustafa Othman Ismail subsequently echoed them),sees an approach focusing on Darfur's civil society, especially the deeply alienated IDP, as one way to change the current image of Darfur in the West and reality on the ground. Under this scenario, the regime would push a tangible reconciliation agenda for Darfur -- without waiting for the eventual peace talks with rebels. Such a package would include the regime acknowledging that "mistakes were made" in Darfur in 2003-2005 and that innocent civilians had been hurt or killed by the government, coupled with offers of compensation and return of land as well as POLITICAL measures such as offering a "third vice-president for Darfur" and uniting the three Darfur states into one special region -- both long-standing demands by some rebel movements, especially the militarily aggressive JEM rebel group that attacked Omdurman in May 2008. ¶4. (C) Both NCP officials recognized the need for better relations with the US, although Mahdi felt that the onus should be on the west. In his view, the Sudanese regime had begun to do everything the West wanted and received nothing in return. He expressed frustration at the stalled talks with the Americans and expressed hope that they would resume as soon as possible. He noted that Sudan was implementing steps agreed upon with SE Williamson "even though the Americans couldn't bring themselves to take even a few symbolic steps to improve the relationship." He warned that KHARTOUM 00001088 002 OF 002 eventually the Sudanese people and regime will conclude that "the Americans never had any intention of improving RELATIONS with us, they just tricked us." He added that SE Williamson will find, when and if he returns, that the optimism that senior regime officials had about a path forward with the Americans in May has dissipated and has been replaced by skepticism, "can you actually do anything on Sudan?" he asked, "or are you paralyzed by your own internal debates and the coming U.S. elections?" ¶5. (C) A third NCP official present, a former intelligence general named Hassabulla, noted that lack of progress on bilateral issues will eventually cause counter-terrorism cooperation to end at the same time that an ICC confrontation with Sudan could increase the danger of anti-Western terrorism, even though this may not be directed at the United States. CDA Fernandez countered that the U.S. expects Sudan to fully abide by its international obligations to protect diplomatic staff and property in Sudan. As for the threat of terrorism, he noted, terrorists already attacked and killed American Embassy staff in January, "without the issue of the ICC." These terrorists may target Americans but eventually their target is the current Sudanese regime (and other regimes in the area like Egypt and Saudi Arabia) which is not radical enough against the West and against the SPLM, "so you have some very good reasons to confront them, regardless of your relationship with America." ¶6. (C) Comment: Al-Mahdi is an up and coming NCP POLITICAL operator while Dr. Adam is somewhat of an NCP intellectual who was asked to present at a recent NCP meeting of senior officials, a detailed analysis of former Special Envoy Natsios's "Foreign Affairs" article on Sudan. Certainly, if the NCP was to launch a bold effort to address the POLITICAL and economic grievances of alienated Darfuri civilians, it could radically alter the POLITICAL dynamic in the region and put the increasingly venal rebel movements on the defensive. It would also challenge the international advocacy community's rhetoric on Darfur. This rhetoric has lately not kept pace with the shifting reality on the ground in Darfur. Such a bold approach would be unusual (but not unprecedented, look at the CPA) by the NCP. So far they have preferred their usual tools of deception, delay and violence to win time and POLITICAL breathing space. If anything could get them to re-examine their complacency and calculating gradualism on Darfur, the ICC indictment of President Bashir may be it. End comment. FERNANDEZ