UNAMID RECEIVES "FULL COOPERATION" FROM GOS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001072 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: UNAMID RECEIVES "FULL COOPERATION" FROM GOS, BELIEVES SLA/UNITY RESPONSIBLE FOR JULY 8 ATTACK REF: A. KHARTOUM 1052 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1025 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UNAMID Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada told CDA Fernandez that the GOS has been providing and pledged to continue to provide full cooperation on UNAMID deployment, despite the recent ICC indictment of President Bashir. With regard to the July 8 attack on UNAMID forces in Darfur, Adada stated that a comprehensive investigation is necessary, though he noted the emergence of several signs pointing to the culpability of the SLA/Unity rebel group. Adada lamented the need to temporarily relocate UNAMID staff from Darfur due to security precautions, but noted that a reassessment on the security level will be made in two to four weeks. END SUMMARY. Adada Reports &Full Cooperation8 from GOS -------------- ¶2. (C) CDA Fernandez called on Joint Special Representative for the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Rodolphe Adada July 15 to discuss UNAMID,s interactions with the GOS following the ICC indictment of President Bashir. Adada stated that despite the commotion caused by the indictment, he has received full assurances from GOS officials to uphold their commitments and provide full cooperation on UNAMID deployment. Adada pointed out that he met with President Bashir at the AU Summit in Sharm el Sheikh to ask for a 60-day extension for engineering firm PAE to continue work on camp construction in Darfur. Bashir responded favorably, granting PAE the time necessary to complete the camps without a hard deadline (though PAE will try to limit its work to 60 days). Adada said he met with President Bashir just after the announcement of the indictment on June 14, and noted that the President appeared calm and had outlined a clear view of GOS strategy to fight it, both legally and diplomatically. The President said he intended to pursue the issue at the African Union Peace and Security Commission as well as through the Arab League. Attack on UNAMID Patrol - Likely SLA/U -------------- ¶3. (C) With regard to the July 8 attack on the UNAMID patrol in North Darfur, Adada stated that when UNAMID polchief Abdul �0A;Mohammed met with Sharif Harir of SLA/U, Harir did not deny responsibility for the attacks, noting that SLA/U is not in control of all of its young commanders. Adada observed it is &very unfortunate8 that UN Headquarters stated that the government was behind the attacks, as this is far from a foregone conclusion. Adada noted that UNAMID is still gathering information from the wounded; among the observations to date were that the attackers used recoilless rifles and some rode on horseback. Adada and CDA agreed that these were hardly distinguishing characteristics of any rebel or militia group in Darfur. Adada stated the need for a full investigation and noted that although the attack occurred in SLA/U territory, Minni Minnawi,s headquarters is not far away and therefore Minnawi,s commanders would seem to know who was responsible. (Note: As reported reftel, one of Minawi,s commanders told us that SLA/U was likely responsible for the attack. End note.) Adada said MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq provided UNAMID with the names of several SLA/U Commanders under suspicion (including commander Kado, which Minnawi,s commander also mentioned to us). Even further damning given the nascent cooperation between the two rebel groups, Adada said that Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) contacts also alleged SLA/U culpability. UNAMID Temporarily Relocates Staff -------------- ¶4. (C) Following the ICC indictment, UNAMID declared a Phase 4 security level in Darfur, resulting in the temporary downsizing of UNAMID civilian staff in Darfur. Adada lamented the need to temporarily relocate UNAMID staff as &contradictory8 with UNAMID,s desire to increase deployment, but noted that a reassessment on the security level will be made in two to four weeks. Adada said that some civilian police had been evacuated from Darfur, but only the detachment of fifty whose colleagues were killed in the attack on the UNAMID patrol in North Darfur last week. (Note: KHARTOUM 00001072 002 OF 002 According to UNAMID,s Peter Iskandar, UNAMID relocated 1,300 people to Entebbe, Uganda and 700 to El-Obeid. Speaking to Poloff, Iskandar noted that the repositioning affects only international civilian personnel including military observers, civilian police and other civilians - in other words, &those unable to defend themselves.8 End note.) Adada stated that news of the UNAMID staff relocation had been initially misinterpreted by the GOS as news that UNAMID was closing its mission, which caused grave concern on the part of GOS. To dispel this erroneous notion, Adada said UNAMID made clear to the GOS that it seeks to increase the size of its mission in accordance with its two priorities: full deployment of the peacekeeping force, and the enabling of humanitarian efforts. GOS Leadership in North Darfur -------------- ¶5. (C) CDA Fernandez and Adada also discussed recent protests against the ICC in Geneina, West Darfur, and recent inflammatory comments made by the notorious Wali of North Darfur, Osman Mohammad Kibir about Darfur becoming the &graveyard of foreign troops8 because of the ICC announcement. They both agreed that the Wali is a liability for the regime, and it would behoove Khartoum to remove Kibir from office. The Wali made his remarks before the actual announcement when the regime seemed poised to take drastic action against the UN. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) This meeting cast in striking relief the difference in message between DPKO and UNAMID. While Guehenno and others at the UN are eager to vilify the Sudanese regime to distract from UN deficiencies (and pander to the Darfur lobbies) the head of UNAMID is more interested in working constructively with the regime to make some tangible progress on the ground. The good cop/bad cop routine of course has its advantages, as Adada would no doubt prefer that New York deliver the tough messages. However, Adada has consistently told us that he has received increasingly good support from the regime, that there are few visa or customs clearance delays, and that he meets on a regular basis with regime heavyweights such as Nafie and Ghosh. Most of the delays in deployment are caused by the incapacity of DPKO and UNAMID itself, which Adada's senior staff has also acknowledged. While the final verdict on responsibility for the July 8 attack on the UNAMID patrol is still out, it appears increasingly likely that SLA/U was responsible, though enough evidence may never be collected to prove this decisively, and like the rebel attack on AMIS peacekeepers in Haskanita of October 2007, SLA/U will likely never fully acknowledge its responsibility. FERNANDEZ