NHIAL DENG NHIAL: SPLM POSITION REMAINS WAIT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001060 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: NHIAL DENG NHIAL: SPLM POSITION REMAINS WAIT AND SEE REF: KHARTOUM 1056 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) CG officers met with SPLM National Liberation Council member and ex-Regional Cooperation Minister Nhial Deng Nhial July 13 to hear his perspective on SPLM preparations in response of an ICC indictment against President Bashir. Nhial had extensive one-on-one discussions with Kiir over the weekend and shared many of the observations that passed to CDA Fernandez July 13 (reftel). ¶2. (C) Despite Nhial,s assertions in May that he would not return to Sudanese politics and that he was not prepared to forgive Kiir for what he considers &significant mismanagement8 within the GOSS, he reluctantly admitted to CG officers that &local constituents8 were pressing for his return to government. Foreign Minister Deng Alor told PolOff July 12 that Nhial &has been reactivated8 and will be accepting a ministerial slot in either the GOSS or in Khartoum, though Juba is far more probable. ¶3. (C) Nhial believes the current &wait and see strategy8 adopted by Kiir and the SPLM leadership in advance of the indictment will likely evolve into the party's tacit support for its beleaguered CPA partner - President Al-Bashir's NCP. The ex-Regional Cooperation Minister, evoking the party's complex internal deliberations prior to Kiir,s decision to commit SPLA troops to the defense of Khartoum this past May against the Darfuri rebels of JEM, believes the SPLM,s bottom-line will continue to be the preservation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ) and Nhial in particular believes that Tripoli and N'djamena are attempting to install Darfur rebel movements, in Khartoum that are hostile to the CPA. While Nhial believes the SPLM is unlikely to speak out publicly against the ICC verdict, practicalities will force the party to stand with the NCP against any Chad or Libyan-backed insurgency. ¶4. (C) In contrast with earlier discussions with SPLM officials, Nhial implied that the SPLM could tolerate even moderate infringements on the Interim National Constitution, but in his estimate the party had two tripwires against which they would sever any temporary NCP/SPLM alliance: renewal of an egregious campaign against the Darfuri civilian population and cancellation of elections in 2009. &In such instances we would most definitely reassess, and most definitely walk away,8 noting that to not do so would erase the SPLM,s political credibility in Sudan and in the international community. While not the intended consequence of the forthcoming indictment, Nhial emphasized that the CPA,s survival is now tied to that of Bashir,s survival ) &the international community is powerless to act in a fashion that would give us any other options,8 he said. ¶5. (C) While never on the SPLM,s &Darfur account,8 Nhial expressed a degree of remorse about the party's handling of the Darfur portfolio to date. He and others believed the SPLM,s strategy on Darfur would have been strengthened by Abdelaziz el Helou,s return to Sudan, but Nhial cast Kiir,s deliberative decision-making style as an impediment to a revived Darfur strategy. &Perhaps had we engaged more actively we could have prevented this (ICC) scenario from unfolding.8 In line with others in the party, Nhial emphasized that the current level of pressure on Bashir ) the threat of a forthcoming ICC indictment rather than actually indicting him ) is the best means through which to pressure the NCP to abandon its campaign in Darfur and achieve meaningful CPA implementation. &Right now Bashir is scared ) and if this could continue indefinitely, I think we would see change,8 Nhial noted, &however, once the indictment is issued, the pressure will disappear. Bashir will be handed a gift ) external condemnation through which he can persuade the Sudanese people and the Arab world that he has been wrongly vilified.8 ¶6. (C) Nhial expressed his strong view that the CPA was the only path to peaceful change in Sudan, and so the SPLM must try to preserve if at all possible. The NCP and Bashir have been in control so long, and have so centralized power in their own hands, that if forcibly removed at this point the likely outcome will be the violent collapse of Sudan as a nation state, resulting in the disintegration of the country into several unstable states. The ICC indictments were likely to reduce the SPLM,s political options as they seek to prevent this outcome. KHARTOUM 00001060 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Comment: It is a little late for the SPLM to finally recognize that they should have pushed the NCP harder to resolve Darfur. The most intensive engagement by the SPLM on Darfur came only in November 2007 when the party had withdrawn its ministers from the GNU and gathered some Darfur rebels in Juba ostensibly for unification talks though this was intended by the SPLM (and perceived by the NCP) as a means of putting pressure on the regime to make concessions to their southern partners. However Nhial and others now see that the indictment of Bashir could have serious consequences for the stability of the Sudan (especially if others in the regime now seek to unseat him) and they have no choice but to work with Bashir on the CPA issues that matter to them most. One can only hope the SPLM will now engage more pro-actively on Darfur in proposing solutions to the regime and pushing the rebels toward negotiation rather than using the Darfur rebels to their short-term advantage. FERNANDEZ