UN PREPARES FOR THE WORST IN DARFUR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001052 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG AND AF/C NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: UN PREPARES FOR THE WORST IN DARFUR REF: A. KHARTOUM 1049 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1025 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) The UN is preparing for the worst in Darfur and has drawn up evacuation plans for all of UNAMID, should that be required based on the actions Khartoum takes in response to the ICC indictments. Special assistants to JSR Adada and SRSG Qazi told polchief July 12 that JSR Adada and FC Agwai chaired a meeting earlier that day planning for all contingencies including a full evacuation to Entebbe, Uganda. Qazi's assistant noted that A/S Jane Holl-Lute arrived in Khartoum June 12 to assist with evacuation plans for either UNAMID or UNMIS should that become necessary. ¶2. (S/NF) Adada's assistant noted "there is no way that UNAMID is going to come close to eighty percent deployment by the end of the year if we are on level IV security." The assistant stated that contrary to reports coming from the media and DPKO U/S Guehenno, the GOS has been cooperating fully with UNAMID deployment (something that Adada himself has told us on several occasions). The problem is entirely a result of DPKO planning problems and logistical and management challenges on the ground in Darfur (some of these caused by UNAMID administration). Adada meets with NISS chief Salah Ghosh, Senior Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq on a weekly basis to review deployment and discuss any obstacles. The assistants also noted that Adada had personally negotiated the 60-day PAE extension himself with AU Chairman Ping (a close personal friend of Adada) and President Bashir at the AU summit in Sharm el Sheikh. (Note: They said that Adada worked a similar deal for the extension of former UNAMID chief of Staff, UK BG General Patrick, six months ago when the GOS threatened to expel him. They said Adada and Ping together plotted to select the new Chief Mediator, Djibril Bassole, who is a mutual friend of both. End note.) ¶3. (S/NF) However, the staff assistants said the leadership at both peacekeeping missions expects the GOS to crack down on UNAMID and possibly UNMIS following the announcement of the ICC indictments, due to UNSCR 1593 which requests that the ICC investigate war crimes committed in Darfur. They said UN leadership in Sudan anticipates a "freeze" in UNAMID operations following the announcements. They also anticipate that the UK and French Ambassadors will be PNG'd. UNAMID is also bracing for increased rebel attacks on the government to take advantage of the situation and exploit any potential weaknesses in the regime. (Note: UNDSS told DLO July 13 that a column of 300 JEM vehicles crossed the border from Chad into Sudan, though this information has not yet been corroborated. End note.) ¶4. (S/NF) Regarding the savage attack on UNAMID forces in North Darfur last week (Ref B),Adada's assistant complained that U/S Guehenno had "once again" leaked preliminary and possibly incorrect information to the press about the attack. The assistant noted that the attack had occurred in SLA/Unity rebel-controlled territory (not janjaweed territory, as reported by Guehenno) and it was by no means a foregone conclusion that the janjaweed carried out this attack, as stated by Ghehenno. In the phone call the day after the attack, Adada had shared with Guehenno some of the initial information about that attack, such as reports from the field that fighting had lasted two hours and not all of the weapons and vehicles had been looted by the attackers. This led some UNAMID staff to conclude that the attackers must have been janjaweed or GOS forces based on the assumption that only a regularized military force would sustain an attack for two hours, and rebels normally steal everything they can as a source of supply. While these observations are valid, the assistants noted that SLA/Unity's attack on AMIS at Haskanita in October 2007 was also a sustained attack and not everything was looted in that attack either. (Note: JMST contacts who attended the CHD meetings in Rome over the weekend (septel) reported that SLA/Unity representatives at the meeting including Suleiman Jamous were "sheepish" when asked about the attack but denied that it was carried about by their fighters. End note.) ¶5. (C) Comment: The UN is preparing for the worst in order to reduce their numbers to the extent possible. The number of civilians working at both missions and other UN agencies dwarf the size of all western diplomatic missions combined, KHARTOUM 00001052 002 OF 002 and the UN is particularly concerned about logistical capacity in the event of an evacuation. Although these UN staff expect an evacuation, they nonetheless though it prudent that senior UN staff is considering all possible scenarios. The jury is not in on the attack on UNAMID peacekeepers in North Darfur. Some observers note that SLA/Unity may have staged the attack to look like it was janjaweed, to exploit the timing of the ICC indictments and put the regime on the defensive. Others believe that the janjaweed has been itching for a fight with UNAMID peacekeepers and wants to finally drive the UN away from Darfur. UNAMID will continue to investigate the facts on the ground but has become increasingly tightlipped about the matter, given the sensitivity of the issue coinciding with the ICC indictments. Unfortunately time may not help solve the riddle, since nine months after the bloody attacks on AMIS at Haskanita most observers assume that SLA/Unity carried out the attack, but it has not been confirmed conclusively. FERNANDEZ