PREVENTING A DOWNWARD SPIRAL: NCP LEADER ON A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001039 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: PREVENTING A DOWNWARD SPIRAL: NCP LEADER ON A THIRD WAY OUT OF THE ICC INDICTMENTS REF: A. KHARTOUM 1030 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1025 ¶C. KHARTOUM 982 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: CDA Fernandez met with Sudanese Presidential Advisor and NCP Parliamentary majority leader Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani July 10 to discuss the discomfiting possibility that a strong GOS response to ICC indictments will put CPA implementations on hold and affect US-Sudanese relations regardless of US ambivalence towards the ICC. Viewing the ICC as an issue that encompasses all UNSC members, NCP insiders hope that a deal at the UN will put the ICC indictments into abeyance pending a resolution of the Darfur conflict. Ghazi suggested a "third way" - neither outright compliance nor outright defiance - which would requires an African leaders, most likely Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, to propose the resolution through the South African PermRep, and generous assistance from permanent UNSC member U.S. and U.K. to ensure its passage. End summary. ¶2. (C) Meeting in the wake of the visit by UK Foreign Minister Miliband, CDA began by reminding Salahuddin that while the upcoming indictments by International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo have nothing to do with the U.S., the U.S. remains aware of what binds the ICC indictments to every other peace and humanitarian initiative in Sudan. Ghazi went further, calling "Ocampo's short-list" the single most important issue in Sudan at this time. The issue was forefront on the mind of NCP insiders during Miliband's visit, who insist that despite the independence of the prosecutor, the GOS regards the ICC as a political issue meant to force the regime's hand, which in turn may unravel the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Darfur Peace Agreement. Ghazi recalled telling Miliband, "This is a direct frontal assault against us. If it can start with Ahmed Haroun, it can end with Omar al-Bashir. You shouldn't expect us to react positively." Ghazi acknowledged that Ocampo's intentions represent "his own volition, his own thinking," and recognized that the ICC causes embarrassment for actors within the international community trying to nurture progress, especially US efforts within Sudan. ¶3. (C) Ghazi was critical of Ocampo, saying he is increasingly becoming a political activist instead of a lawyer, and while the GOS regards the UN Security Council as ultimately responsible for the actions of the ICC, this may leave an option for the Sudanese to approach the issue constructively: "This whole business started in the Security Council, so our approach should be through the Security Council. And to rein in Ocampo, you need to do something through the Security Council." Ghazi plans to suggest that African states could push to adopt a UNSC resolution suspending the ICC process "until the Darfur issue is resolved." Ghazi suggested that Omar al-Bashir may call South African President Thabo Mbeki along with other African leaders - in addition to approaching the U.S. and the U.K., whom Ghazi recognizes as having different priorities in Sudan. CDA remarked that holding the ICC indictments in abeyance is something the UN Security Council may want to look at but how the GOS reacts in the interim is equally vital. Ghazi noted that not much is being done on the Darfur political process, and something urgent to "prevent a downward spiral" in Darfur is required. CDA responded that Sudan needs to change its actions in Darfur as soon as possible no matter what happens with the ICC next week. ¶4. (C) CDA encouraged the GOS to seize opportunities to take positive initiatives on Darfur - such as compensation for Darfuris, reuniting the three states of Darfur into one region, and land rights of internally displaced people (IDPs). Calling them "acceptable ideas," Ghazi added, "The nagging question of Darfur makes our internal position uncertain." Ghazi thanked CDA for the Department's positive message on the new elections law, confidently praising it: "It is a good law, with lots of checks and balances. The political parties focus on the marginal issues, and they are not focusing on the essence of the law." He added that the NCP knew that they are going to have loosen up things considerably with the Media and Security Laws if credible elections are to be held. With the law now passed, the elections themselves have become inevitable. Somewhat ominously, Ghazi claimed the issue of the 2011 North-South referendum requires an elected legislature. CDA cautioned KHARTOUM 00001039 002.2 OF 002 Ghazi on rumblings out of Khartoum that the regime may marginalize Darfur and the South at the ballot box in 2009. Holding elections without Darfuris is a step towards Darfur becoming an independent country, and the GOS can ill afford to give the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) anything less than a fair shake, which could cause them to cease cooperation, as they did in October 2007, or worse, declare independence prior to the 2011 referendum. ¶5. (C) "The legacy of our past with the SPLM, the ICC, - those issues distract us from the issues in Darfur," Ghazi said. "We need allies in the international community and in the region to help us." Ghazi suggested the Emir of Qatar as a figure who proved his worth in Lebanon recently, "as all parties were on the verge of Hell," and could possibly bring the regime and Darfur rebels back to the negotiating table. He would be interested in helping to contribute to funding compensation for Darfuri IDPs and refugees. With the Darfur political process a failure, the Arab League dormant, Ghazi (who has recently made several trips to Doha) hopes the Emir of Qatar can arrive as a catalyst to create a new dynamic in Sudan appealing to both the GOS and the more practical members of the international community. CDA responded that it was an intriguing idea but Sudan would have to overcome the deep suspicion of the people of Darfur and of the West "that this is one more Arab ruler giving Khartoum money to use against the Sudanese people." ¶6. (C) "We need fresh ideas in the NCP. Darfur is becoming a trap." Ghazi summed up the threats facing the NCP as grave, and alleged that Chad's Idriss Deby is rearming the Darfur rebels and attempting to unite Abdulwahid Al-Nur and Minni Minawi. A united rebel front backed by Chad could threaten to attack the Merowe Dam or Omdurman, which could open up a new era of conflict in the region. Ghazi claimed that Deby is now training troops within the borders of the Central African Republic, with permission from Bangui, and suggested that the July 8 attacks on UNAMID west of El Fasher (ref. A) "could very well be Minni Minawi." CDA insisted to Ghazi that the US has no evidence, although some in the West are quick to point the finger at the GOS. "I can assure you the Government of Sudan has no interest in picking a fight with the international community," Ghazi said. ¶7. (C) Comment: The NCP feels cornered in advance of the anticipated ICC indictment, and regime moderates such as Dr. Ghazi (and Presidential Advisor Mustafa - ref C - as well as other NCP officials) have reached out to us (and the UK and the SPLM) over the last week to seek our assistance with the ICC. Regime moderates who seek to improve relations with the West and who seek progress on Darfur and the CPA know that the indictments could set back everything the West is trying to achieve in Sudan, and need our help to minimize the tendency of the regime to lash out brutally when cornered. As we have pointed out repeatedly, the best way for the regime to respond to all these challenges is to change its conduct and moderate its own atrocious behavior. End comment. FERNANDEZ