BLOODY ATTACK ON UNAMID PATROL AT SHANGIL TOBAYA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001025 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: BLOODY ATTACK ON UNAMID PATROL AT SHANGIL TOBAYA, NORTH DARFUR REF: A. 07 KHARTOUM 1535 ¶B. 07 KHARTOUM 1439 ¶C. 07 KHARTOUM 1389 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) According to reports from UNAMID, on July 8 at approximately 1530 armed fighters attacked a UNAMID joint patrol in a "forested and mountainous" area 65 kilometers south of Dare Salam, 6 kilometers from Gusajamatta, in North Darfur. The UNAMID joint military observer and police team from the Shangle Tobaya team site was escorted by a Rwandan protection force. According to a UNAMID report, two police advisors (one Ghanaian and one Ugandan) and five members of the Rwandan protection force were killed. Initial UNAMID reports indicated that 15 additional UNAMID staff were seriously injured (4 UNAMID police and 11 UNAMID protection forces). According to MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq, thirteen people in total were killed. According to Siddiq the armed group had 27 vehicles and stole 3 armored vehicles, 7 Landcruisers and destroyed 6 other vehicles in the attack. Both UNAMID and Siddiq credited SLM/MM with assisting the victims to return from the town of Wada to Shangle Tobaya, after they had escaped on foot 40 kilometers from the attack site to Wada. ¶2. (SBU) Although initial speculation cast blame on janjaweed militia, several observers point to SLA/Unity as the likely aggressor. Siddiq, not surprisingly, affirmed that SLA/Unity is the likely culprit, since they control the area in question. Siddiq claimed that several SLA/MM commanders may also have been involved. He speculated that they may have done so without Minni Minnawi's approval. An SLA/MM commander accused SLA/Unity and told CDA Fernandez that a specific commander "Kado" as likely being involved in the attack. Repeated calls to SLA/MM leader Minnawi by CDA and polchief have not yet been returned, Minnawi may be in far Northern Darfur, considerably removed from the area of the attack which is indeed rich in all sorts of armed groups including SLA/MM and other mostly Zagahwa rebel groups (in 2005, SAF bombers struck this same rebel-held area killing many civilians). The SLA/MM commander claimed that pro-regime SLA/Peace Wing may have also been involved, and noted that several janjaweed groups are also active in the area (from both the Berti and Gimr tribes). Neither SLA/Peace Wing nor the Berti/Gimr is likely to have been strong enough to have carried out this attack. ¶3. (SBU) An internal UNAMID police document detailing the attack also noted that the UNAMID patrol had initially been "stopped and confronted" in Shangle Tobaya by SAF soldiers who told them that they needed clearance to be in the area. After the UN troops explained themselves they were allowed unfettered access in the town where they spent about 90 minutes "interacting with members of the public and local Sudanese police. Under-Secretary Siddiq, a relatively straight-shooting regime stalwart, claimed that the "assistance" offered after the fact by Minnawi's forces to UNAMID was an attempt to cover up their own complicity. Some in the NCP are deeply worried that Minnawi could join forces with SLA/Unity and JEM in a powerful rebel alliance that could tip the balance of power in Darfur against the regime. Siddiq also said that he will be meeting with JSR Adada on July 10 to discuss greater steps the GOS can take to safeguard UNAMID. He said that, "as a response to a request by the Americans," the GOS had offered additional protection for UNAMID, including "intelligence-sharing of conditions on the ground" but UNAMID had not taken the Sudanese up on the offer. ¶4. (C) Comment: This is the most bloody attack on peacekeeping forces in Darfur since the presumed SLA/Unity attack on AMIS at Haskanita in October of 2007. This particular attack on UNAMID is different, in that the Haskanita attack was in direct reprisal for alleged AMIS acquiescence to the SAF in identifying rebel locations which were later attacked by SAF. UNAMID reported earlier this week that a janjaweed unit in military fatigues stopped and briefly detained a UNAMID patrol July 5 near Kebkabiya, and some observers speculate that the attack July 8 (this time in Zaghawa-controlled territory) could have actually been an incursion by an Arab militia. The truth will emerge over time, but in reality this latest bloody event demonstrates the enormous challenges faced by UNAMID. Rightly pushed by KHARTOUM 00001025 002 OF 002 the international community to be more active and patrol more frequently, well-regarded Rwandan protective forces are easily overpowered when ambushed by a column of unidentified militia - possibly anti-Khartoum Zaghawa rebels, possibly Arab militia. Outgunned and undermanned UNAMID has no choice but to continue sending out patrols, and must defend itself aggressively from militia (both rebel and janjaweed),but ultimately even a large UN/AU force cannot fully defend itself from ambushes by ferocious militia who know the terrain better that they do. As post has reported previously, Darfur has spun into a fragmented mosaic of competing and shifting factions and we face a reality in which attacks may come at any time by militia who are nearly impossible for UNAMID to identify. This shifting confusion was underscored recently when the GOS used SLA-Minnawi fighters to protect a bank in El Fasher from possible attack by janjaweed -- today, the GOS worries about Minnawi or SLA/Unity and perhaps tomorrow a different correlation of forces will emerge. End comment. FERNANDEZ