MINAWI OUTLINES OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. TRIP, BRIEFS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000101 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CD LY SUBJECT: MINAWI OUTLINES OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. TRIP, BRIEFS ON LIBYA VISIT KHARTOUM 00000101 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Senior Assistant to the President and Chairman of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) Minni Minawi is enthusiastic about a visit to Washington in the near future and has requested that the trip focus on four themes: concrete support for the military wing of the SLM and broadening the perspective of the SLM's senior military commanders; expanding political party capacity building programs in preparation for the 2009 elections; developing a plan for transforming the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) into a legitimate body; and structuring the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF) so it can become operational. Minawi is available to travel to the U.S. in mid-February, and his delegation can remain outside Sudan for a maximum of one week. He will weigh the potential risks of visiting rival SLM leader Abdulwahid al Nur in Paris en route to Washington. Recently returned from a trip to Libya, Minawi characterized his meetings in Tripoli as "meaningless" and reported that Libya holds President Deby responsible for the escalating confrontation between Chad and Sudan. End summary. -------------- Military Wing -------------- ¶2. (S) The SLM's top priority is securing financial support for the movement's armed wing to stem the defection of commanders and shore up the chain of command and control, Senior Assistant to the President and SLM Chairman Minni Minawi told Poloff on December 22. Beyond such support, Minawi hopes to use a Washington visit to "educate" his senior commanders. "I want to show them that Washington is our friend, to open their mind to the future so that they know that the military is not the only way." He said the visit would provide the opportunity to underscore to the commanders their "responsibilities" within the international system and that the international community will support SLM efforts toward a better future for Darfur if they fulfill those responsibilities. He also said that it would be important to conduct some public outreach activities to give him and his commanders the opportunity to explain their vision for Darfur and address their critics. Minawi proposed that approximately 10 representatives from the military wing of the SLM accompany him, including chief commander Jumah Hagar. -------------- Political Party Training -------------- ¶3. (C) Predicting that the National Congress Party (NCP) will never allow real elections that could remove it from power and somewhat doubtful that the 2009 elections will be held, particularly in Darfur, Minawi said that it is still important to continue preparing as if the elections will occur. The SLM is enthusiastic about an expansion of political party training for the movement. However, Minawi and two members of SLM's senior leadership who attended his meeting with Poloff asserted that it would not/not be appropriate for the SLM delegation to remain outside Sudan for more than one week or to participate in actual training seminars. Their objective is to engage in discussions with relevant USG officials and representatives from NGOs, such as the International Republican Institute, to develop a plan for executing a comprehensive training program for the party in Sudan. "If we stay in Washington for too long or participate in direct training, the National Congress Party will use propaganda against us," said one of the senior SLM officials. Minawi proposed that two representatives from the capacity building office of the SLM participate in the delegation to the U.S. ¶4. (C) Minawi said that he still hoped for a collaborative political relationship with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) leading up to 2009 but that it was difficult to do so in the absence of a coherent SPLM position on the elections. "Any slowness in the cooperation with the SPLM is not from the SLM side," said Minawi, who explained that "the main SPLM" remains undecided on whether elections are in its interest and on whether to join in a coalition with the National Congress Party (NCP),which would preclude KHARTOUM 00000101 002.2 OF 003 cooperation with the SLM. A Minawi advisor who attended the recent celebration of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Wau noted that First Vice President and SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir had said that Sudan should avoid the "Kenyan experience." "Salva wants elections but is afraid of what could happen," speculated Minawi. -------------- TDRA and DRDF -------------- ¶5. (C) Overcoming the perception in Darfur that the TDRA is a tool of Zaghawa patronage and converting it into a "legitimate governing body" remains critical to the SLM, as does operationalizing the DRDF, according to Minawi. He was adamant that TDRA Secretary General Mohammed Soliman and DRDF head Abduljabar Dousa participate in the Washington visit. Minawi suggested that the TDRA needs the capacity to implement "projects" in Darfur to demonstrate to the public that it serves their interests. He also requested that the visit to Washington include meetings at the World Bank, including with Robert Zoellick. (Note: Poloff will follow up directly with Soliman and Dousa within the next few days on more specific areas of potential USG support for their institutions within the context of a Washington visit and report septel. End note.) -------------- Abdulwahid Layover -------------- ¶6. (C) Minawi was open to the suggestion of visiting rival SLM leader Abdulwahid al Nur in Paris en route to Washington but wanted to weigh the potential risks of an attempted meeting given Abdulwahid's unpredictability. Minawi said that he could not risk traveling to Paris only to have Abdulwahid refuse to see him. Minawi recalled that Abdulwahid ceased contact with him in early 2007 after Minawi refused to join him in Europe. He attempted to contact Abdulwahid in early December using a mobile number provided by a French diplomat. After reaching him, Abdulwahid claimed that "it was too loud on the street" and he would call back. After receiving no return phone call, Minawi later found the number disconnected. He said that he would attempt to reach Abdulwahid again and gauge his state of mind before deciding on whether to travel to Paris. -------------- Libya Trip Disappointing -------------- ¶7. (C) Disappointed that his January 14-20 visit to Tripoli did not result in any tangible expression of support for the SLM, Minawi characterized his meetings with Libyan officials, including MFA Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki and Deputy External Security Organization Chief Abdullah Sanousi, as "meaningless." Minawi did not meet with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, who was outside the country during most of the visit. In addition to requesting financial support for his movement, Minawi said that he had protested the detention of "hundreds" of Darfurians in Libyan jails. Acknowledging that they were residing in Libya illegally--primarily in Benghazi and Tripoli--Minawi said they should be returned to Darfur rather than held incommunicado. Not finding a receptive audience among his Libyan interlocutors on this issue, Minawi pledged to put it on the agenda of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. -------------- - Tripoli Backs Chad in Confrontation with Sudan -------------- - ¶8. (C) Tripoli was preoccupied with the growing confrontation between Sudan and Chad, said Minawi, and Libya held President Deby responsible for escalating tensions. Minawi disputed the Libyan analysis, however, noting that while Chadian opposition elements continued to find safe quarter inside Sudan, none of the major Sudanese rebel groups were currently in Chad. Sanousi admitted, according to Minawi, that Khartoum in fact paid many of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory rebel factions to remain outside of the peace process because it was not interested in genuine negotiations. Minawi plans to travel to N'djamena in the near future. The focus of his trip will be to see Deby--to seek financial assistance, he intimated--though he downplayed this fact in his travel request to President Bashir. KHARTOUM 00000101 003.2 OF 003 -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Irrespective of Minawi's weak political position in Khartoum and Darfur, he holds the fourth highest post in the national government and had a very public meeting with President Bush during his last visit to Washington in 2006. While Minawi does not expect a White House visit (or even a meeting with the Secretary),the public profile of his trip must be commensurate with that of a visiting dignitary and not of an international visitors program participant or we risk weakening rather than strengthening his position. Post will forward suggestions for the structure of a Washington visit to AF/SPG. End comment. ¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ