AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH SENIOR NEPALI POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000781 DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NP SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH SENIOR NEPALI POLITICAL LEADERS Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES RANDY W. BERRY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Twelve weeks following Nepal's historic polls, political leaders remain locked in contentious negotiations to open the door to the formation of a new government. Ambassador urged senior Nepali leaders on July 2 & 3 to make the hard decisions and compromises necessary to move forward, lest they lose key opportunities to reinforce the country's peace process and squander the goodwill of the Nepali electorate. Ambassador also raised concerns over law, order, and security in the Terai, over the continued detention of Tibetan activists, and over the failure to communicate GON plans/desires regarding UNMIN with the UN. Leaders, for the most part, continued to point fingers at one another in blame for the impasse, registered little genuine concern over Terai violence, vaguely promised action to "look into" the Tibetans' plight, and pledged quick action on official notification to extend UNMIN,s mandate. End Summary. Range of Political Meetings on Key USG Concerns -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) In advance of her July 5 departure for the US, Ambassador met with senior Nepali political leaders July 2 & 3 to review the current political landscape and pass messages of concern on a number of issues. DCM accompanied the Ambassador on each call. Meetings included: --Prime Minister G.P. Koirala (July 3) at the PM Residence in Baluwatar, with Foreign Secretary Acharya also attending; --CPN-Maoist Chairman Pushpa Dahal (July 3),at the Ambassador's Residence, with Deputy Chair Baburam Bhattarai also attending; --CPN-United Marxist-Leninist (UML) Leader Jhala Nath Khanal (July 2),at his residence in Chauni; --Madhesi People,s Rights Forum (MPRF) Leader Upendra Yadav (July 2),at the Ambassador's Residence. ¶3. (C) In each meeting, Ambassador urged political leadership to make the hard choices and compromise necessary to allow a new government to emerge, noting that twelve weeks had now passed since the April 10 elections, with little movement to resolve the political impasse. Ambassador also urged attention/drew concern to the following issues: --Law, Order and Security in the Terai: Recent threats against international NGOs and their "pahadi" (people of hill origin) staff, and the grenade attacks on the International Organization for Migration (IOM) compound in Damak were but two indications that law and order in Madhesi regions was worsening. Action from political leadership on all sides needed to promote reconciliation, support security services, and address root causes of the Madhesi discontent. --Detention of Tibetan political leaders: The ongoing detention without charge of three Tibetan political leaders remained a violation of international norms and standards, and a violation of Nepal's own legal code. --Urgent need to communicate GON stance on UNMIN mandate: Understanding that an agreement on a continued, but limited, mandate for UNMIN, the need for a formal letter of request was necessary. The UN system could not take steps to extend UNMIN's mandate absent a formal request from the GON. Prime Minister G.P. Koirala -------------- ¶4. (C) On the continuing political impasse, the Prime Minister blithely acknowledged that talks were ongoing, and suggested that the Nepali Congress, UML, and Maoists had come to a common position on Madhesi demands, and were ready to table a supplemental bill in the Constituent Assembly to that effect. He indicated that the Madhesi parties would have the opportunity to express their views in debate and the vote in the CA, ignoring the reality that Madhesi parties have effectively blocked CA sittings repeatedly absent an agreement on their demands. (Note: On Monday, July 7, press reports indicated that the major parties had backed down on their plan to table the supplemental bill, and had reached agreement with the Madhesis on amended language. End note). A resolution to the Madhesi demands would allow action on the pressing issue of government formation and election of Nepal's first President (though Koirala remained mum on whether or not he still aspired to the job). ¶5. (C) Koirala listened to Ambassador,s points on degrading law and order in the Terai region, but responded mainly by indicating unconvincingly that "intelligence" and security forces would tackle the issue in the near term. On the Tibetan detentions, he characterized the arrests without charge "preventative" in nature, and said the three detained Tibetan exile leaders would be released "as soon as possible, in a couple of days." (Note: The Tibetans remain in custody as of Monday, July 7. End note.) Regarding the Nepali Cabinet's decision to request an extension of UNMIN,s mandate, the PM suggested that broad agreement between parties had been reached, and promised that communication would be sent to the UNSC "in two days" seeking a six month, limited-mandate extension. (Note: As of July 7, the letter remains to be sent. End Note.) CPN-Maoist Chairman Pushpa Dahal -------------- ¶6. (C) Dahal, in a 30-minute meeting on July 3, also informed Ambassador that the three largest parties had agreed on a common position, and that a solution to Madhesi demands was near. Dahal also suggested that the supplemental bill could be tabled in the CA, where Madhesi leaders would have the opportunity to debate and vote and voice their opposition should they disagree. With a resolution to the Madhesi issue, the assembly could turn to the election of a President and the formation of a new Nepali government. Rather unrealistically, Dahal opined that after an agreement, a new government could be formed in a matter of days, or one week. ¶7. (C) Dahal, singularly among the leaders, acknowledged that the USG,s concern over the deterioration of law and order in the Terai "was completely justifiable," and promised to focus attention on controlling the situation in the area. He lamented the threats against INGO staff and Pahadi employees, saying that Nepal and the Terai "needs the help of the international community, including the US" to succeed and prosper. Dahal condemned the IOM attack and vowed that YCL/Maoist elements were not involved/engaged any actions to undermine the Bhutanese resettlement activity. On the Tibetan detentions, he was significantly less specific, but vowed to speak to other Alliance members regarding the arrests. Regarding UNMIN, Dahal flatly said that there "was no question on UNMIN and its mandate," indicated that the parties and Cabinet had agreed, and vowed to press for a quick dispatch of the official GON letter requesting an extension. ¶8. (C) With Dahal and Bhattarai, Ambassador additionally presented the broad guidelines of USG military assistance and training to Nepal Army peacekeeping forces deployed by the United Nations. She outlined the scope of August's upcoming "Balanced Nail" training by Special Forces as part of USG support for continued Nepali peacekeeping assignments, and sought clarification that the CPN-M understood the capacity-building nature of the training to allow Nepal to fulfill international commitments. Dahal and Bhattarai did not respond conclusively on the views on the training deployment, but promised to provide some thoughts in the next few days. CPN-UML Leader Jhala Nath Khanal -------------- ¶9. (C) Jhala Nath Khanal, speaking on July 2, noted that "difficult negotiations" were ongoing on the Madhesi demands, and noted that the "Madhes Pradesh" autonomy demand was a greater challenge than Madhesi demands for greater, group-oriented intake into the Nepal Army. Khanal was not as direct in suggesting and common position among the three major parties, noting that some differences remained between the UML and the Nepal Congress, particularly. (Note: Those differences appear to have been resolved by the July 7 sitting of the Constituent Assembly. End note). Khanal offered that there had been no significant progress on the Presidency. He reiterated the UML's position that, given the assumption that the new Prime Minister would be Maoist, that the Presidency go to either the NC or UML. He categorically ruled out that former UML leader M.K. Nepal was in the running for the position. ¶10. (C) Khanal,s responses on Terai security were disappointing, barely managing to acknowledge the ramifications of the increasingly lawless situation prevailing there. While on the security issue, Ambassador handed Khanal a copy of the July 2 Kathmandu Post, which featured a picture of the UML's own student wing activists assaulting a locally-elected official and said that this type of development was disturbing and a very negative contribution to the current situation. Khanal, who most believe is directly involved in promoting the UML,s more "physical" youth activities, unconvincingly mentioned that he had given direction that such activity should not be undertaken, but also failed to answer a direct question about any punitive action against the perpetrators. On the Tibetan detentions, Khanal acknowledged that any arrests should be consistent with Nepali law and international human rights standards, though he did not promise any action or follow-up on the issue. On UNMIN, he concurred that the issue had already been decided in requesting an extension, and that he had just spoken with the Prime Minister on the issue. He suggested, though, that the delay in officially requesting the extension could be related to "significant pressure from the region," -- meaning from India -- to oppose it. MPRF Leader Upendra Yadav -------------- ¶11. (C) Unsurprisingly, Yadav,s stance on the political impasse, particularly as it affected Madhesi issues, stood in stark contrast to the other party leaders. He promised "continued agitation" in the House should the bill move forward for tabling without amended language addressing key Madhesi demands. He confirmed that the situation in the Terai was currently &very hot8 in responding to concerns about law and order there. He failed, however, to make any connection between increasing Madhesi violence and his role as perhaps the most prominent Madhesi politician in quelling it. Even confronted with some suggestions of the lost opportunities and programming resources that could result from an environment where INGOs could not safely operate, Yadav did not offer any acknowledgement or impression that he believed the situation was critical. Additionally, he registered no concern that increased violence had a direct impact on Madhesi political leaders. Yadav voiced full support on the Tibetan detention issue, saying that "Nepal is a democracy; they should have a full right to protest" but clearly had his mind more on the interests of Madhesis than Tibetans when pointing it out. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) The lack of urgency in moving along the political process is tangible; our interlocutors did little to dispel that impression. Political self-interest, jockeying for position between parties (and within parties),and lack of organization are all contributing to the current impasse, and the situation is not likely to change overnight. Dahal's suggestion that post-agreement, government formation would be accomplished in a week is wholly unrealistic. With Madhesi parties continuing to threaten strike action in the Terai unless demands are met, the UML student wing behaving more like YCL cadres, and frenzied debate over the (ceremonial) Presidency, little in Nepal appears to have changed since April 10. However, the clock is ticking -- and Nepal,s Constituent Assembly has already run out 12 percent of its calendar mandate with very little to show for it. BERRY