Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KATHMANDU586
2008-05-27 11:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: MAJOR PARTIES DENY INTENT TO BLOCK

Tags:  PGOV PTER KDEM NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHKT #0586/01 1481116
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271116Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8548
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6501
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 6817
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2110
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4854
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6069
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2435
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0136
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 4183
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 3872
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2071
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3225
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000586 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAJOR PARTIES DENY INTENT TO BLOCK
MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000586

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAJOR PARTIES DENY INTENT TO BLOCK
MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In separate meetings on May 25 and 26 with South and
Central Asia Deputy Assistant Secretary Feigenbaum, senior
leaders of the second, third and fourth-largest parties in
the Constituent Assembly (CA) disavowed the intent to deny
the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) the right to
form the next government. Former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur
Deuba of the Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal -
United Marxist Leninist (UML) General Secretary Jhalanath
Khanal and Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) President
Upendra Yadav claimed their conditions for supporting the
CPN-M were reasonable given the Maoists' record. None of
them expected agreement to be reached in time for the CA's
first session on May 28. In general, the leaders were not
overly concerned about violence occurring on May 28 in
connection with the abolition of the monarchy. Outgoing
Speaker of the Interim Parliament Subash Nemwang (UML)
explained that his office had drafted interim procedures for
the new Assembly, and the details were being finalized.

No Intent To Block Maoists
--------------


2. (C) Senior leaders of the second, third and fourth-largest
parties in the Constituent Assembly told Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Evan Feigenbaum
and the Ambassador in separate meetings on May 25 and 26 that
they did not intend to try to block the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) from forming Nepal's next government.
Sher Bahadur Deuba, a former Prime and Home Minister, and the
second-ranking Nepali Congress (NC) leader, was sharply
critical of what he characterized as widespread Maoist
intimidation leading up to the election, but conceded that
the CPN-M was now the country's largest party. They had
double the seats of the NC in the new Assembly (Note: 218 vs.

109. End note.). Jhalanath Khanal, the newly elected head of
the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML),
stressed that his party had accepted the results in spite of
some irregularities. Khanal pointed out that Prime Minister
G.P. Koirala had formally invited Maoist Chairman Pushpa

Dahal (aka Prachanda) on May 24 to form the new government,
partly at UML urging. Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF)
President Upendra Yadav was explicit that the Maoists should
be given the right to form the next government. His fellow
MPRF Member of Parliament Tilak Rawal noted that Yadav had
been the first major leader to call for PM Koirala to step
down.

Conditions Defended by NC and UML
--------------


3. (C) Deuba and Khanal were like-minded that the Maoists had
to meet certain conditions in order to gain the support of
their respective parties. These included approving
amendments to the Interim Constitution to change the majority
for bringing down (and forming) a government from two-thirds
to a simple majority and to create a separate office of the
president now that the monarchy was to be abolished. The
Maoists also had to end the use of violence, particularly by
their Young Communist League (YCL). Deuba defended the
conditions as reasonable. He argued that, without a simple
majority provision in place, the Maoists would not fulfill
their agreements with the parties. The former Prime Minister
was adamant that the YCL was not like the other parties'
youth wings. None of the other parties housed their youth
cadre in barracks -- in illegally seized buildings. The YCL
was a paramilitary force, a parallel police structure.
Khanal described the adoption of a simple majority as a hedge
against Maoist authoritarian rule. If not disbanded, at a
minimum the YCL's paramilitary character had to be
transformed. Khanal admitted that Prachanda had assured him

KATHMANDU 00000586 002.2 OF 003


the CPN-M was ready to create a new youth organization. When
asked if he was still trying to make a revolution, Prachanda
had responded that the Maoists would follow a constitutional
path. He sounded sincere, but Khanal found him difficult to
believe.

And By MPRF
--------------


4. (C) Yadav spoke in similar terms. He said bluntly that
the NC, UML and MPRF had no faith in the Maoists. They had
not met their peace process commitments and Nepalis continued
to wonder if they would deploy their People's Liberation Army
and YCL against them. That was why the major non-Maoist
parties were demanding the constitutional changes. He
protested that it was undemocratic for the Maoists to reject
the proposed amendments. The Maoists did not have a
majority, they had a plurality of 40 percent. To gain the
support they needed, they would have to make concessions.
Rawal conceded that it would be counterproductive to prevent
the Maoists from forming the next government. What was
required was to discipline the Maoists. Yadav added that the
Maoists did not seem at all concerned about specific Madhesi
issues and were silent about implementation of prior Madhesi
agreements with the Government of Nepal.

A Deal Not Likely For A Week or More
--------------


5. (C) Former PM Deuba stated that amendments to the Interim
Constitution could be made in two days -- if the CPN-M
agreed. Other matters would take time. He remarked that PM
Koirala frequently claimed a deal was imminent, but it seldom
worked out that way. His own estimate was 7-10 days, with a
decision about how to select the 26 appointed members of the
CA among the most urgent orders of business. General
Secretary Khanal emphasized the need for the Maoists to
provide the other parties with detailed plans, to include a
timetable, for how it intended to handle integration of the
PLA and other difficult issues. If possible, consensus had
to be reached not only among the four, but also among all of
the 13 largest parties in the CA and the 25 total
parliamentary parties. Khanal and Yadav mentioned the
necessity of a common minimum program. Khanal predicted that
talks on forming a government might last one or two weeks
more. Deuba and Khanal both favored joining the government,
assuming the conditions were met. Yadav emphasized that the
MPRF would join if the conditions were met and there was
agreement on how to handle key issues, including the Madhes.

May 28 Expected To Be Peaceful
--------------


6. (C) Deuba was of the view that the Prime Minister should
talk to King Gyanendra about the Assembly's plan to abolish
the monarchy at its first meeting on May 28. The King
deserved to have a graceful exit. Deuba noted that the King,
who was reportedly at Nagarjun Palace just north of
Kathmandu, often went back and forth from the main
Narayanhiti Palace in Kathmandu. He noted the situation was
fragile, but so far so good: "no socket bombs." (Note: There
were 3 on May 26. End note.) Khanal emphasized that the
28th should be peaceful. Political differences among the
parties on the government and other issues should not be
allowed to obstruct the atmosphere. The UML General
Secretary said that politicians were reluctant to speak
openly to the King for fear of being seen as pro-King, but
there were back channels. He thought the King's exit would
go smoothly. Yadav seemed the least concerned. What
mattered was that Nepal would become a republic. At that
point, it would not matter what the King did. From his
perspective, Gyanendra could even stay in Narayanhiti, at
least until a future president moved in.

Assembly Ready for the 28th

KATHMANDU 00000586 003 OF 003


--------------


7. (C) On May 25, the same day SCA DAS Feigenbaum and the
Ambassador met Deuba and Khanal and the day before the Yadav
meeting, they discussed the opening of the Assembly with the
outgoing Speaker of the Interim Parliament Subash Nemwang.
Nemwang explained that the Interim Parliament had been
serving as the secretariat for the new Assembly. It had
prepared the Birendra International Conference Center to
house the eventual 601 Assembly members and had drafted
interim procedures. He expected them to be approved by all
25 parliamentary parties in time for the swearing in of new
members on May 27. Assuming no agreement was reached by the
parties on who would serve as Chairman, the oldest member
would chair the session. Nemwang said whether the vote on
the republic would be by acclamation or recorded vote had not
yet been decided, but he indicated the former was more
likely. He did not anticipate a new government would be in
place by then. He emphasized the importance of consensus.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) In all the meetings with party leaders, SCA DAS
Feigenbaum stressed three points. The first was the need for
the political process to continue and to lead soon to a new
government that reflected the will of the people. The second
was the need for an end to political violence, particularly
by the Maoist YCL. The third was the importance that the
declaration of the Nepal as a republic on May 28 proceed
peacefully. While the NC, UML, and MPRF leaders acknowledged
that the Maoists were the largest party and shared DAS
Feigenbaum's serious concerns about YCL violence, they were
insistent that the Maoists had to take other steps before
they were prepared to vote the Maoists into government. They
were prepared to risk Maoist and public ire for at least
another week or two to hold out for Maoist concessions. They
were also relatively unconcerned about the prospect of
violence on May 28.


9. (U) SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum has cleared this message.
POWELL