Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KATHMANDU586
2008-05-27 11:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: MAJOR PARTIES DENY INTENT TO BLOCK

Tags:  PGOV PTER KDEM NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000586 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAJOR PARTIES DENY INTENT TO BLOCK
MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000586 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAJOR PARTIES DENY INTENT TO BLOCK MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate meetings on May 25 and 26 with South and Central Asia Deputy Assistant Secretary Feigenbaum, senior leaders of the second, third and fourth-largest parties in the Constituent Assembly (CA) disavowed the intent to deny the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) the right to form the next government. Former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML) General Secretary Jhalanath Khanal and Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) President Upendra Yadav claimed their conditions for supporting the CPN-M were reasonable given the Maoists' record. None of them expected agreement to be reached in time for the CA's first session on May 28. In general, the leaders were not overly concerned about violence occurring on May 28 in connection with the abolition of the monarchy. Outgoing Speaker of the Interim Parliament Subash Nemwang (UML) explained that his office had drafted interim procedures for the new Assembly, and the details were being finalized. No Intent To Block Maoists -------------- ¶2. (C) Senior leaders of the second, third and fourth-largest parties in the Constituent Assembly told Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Evan Feigenbaum and the Ambassador in separate meetings on May 25 and 26 that they did not intend to try to block the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) from forming Nepal's next government. Sher Bahadur Deuba, a former Prime and Home Minister, and the second-ranking Nepali Congress (NC) leader, was sharply critical of what he characterized as widespread Maoist intimidation leading up to the election, but conceded that the CPN-M was now the country's largest party. They had double the seats of the NC in the new Assembly (Note: 218 vs. ¶109. End note.). Jhalanath Khanal, the newly elected head of the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML), stressed that his party had accepted the results in spite of some irregularities. Khanal pointed out that Prime Minister G.P. Koirala had formally invited Maoist Chairman Pushpa Dahal (aka Prachanda) on May 24 to form the new government, partly at UML urging. Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) President Upendra Yadav
was explicit that the Maoists should be given the right to form the next government. His fellow MPRF Member of Parliament Tilak Rawal noted that Yadav had been the first major leader to call for PM Koirala to step down. Conditions Defended by NC and UML -------------- ¶3. (C) Deuba and Khanal were like-minded that the Maoists had to meet certain conditions in order to gain the support of their respective parties. These included approving amendments to the Interim Constitution to change the majority for bringing down (and forming) a government from two-thirds to a simple majority and to create a separate office of the president now that the monarchy was to be abolished. The Maoists also had to end the use of violence, particularly by their Young Communist League (YCL). Deuba defended the conditions as reasonable. He argued that, without a simple majority provision in place, the Maoists would not fulfill their agreements with the parties. The former Prime Minister was adamant that the YCL was not like the other parties' youth wings. None of the other parties housed their youth cadre in barracks -- in illegally seized buildings. The YCL was a paramilitary force, a parallel police structure. Khanal described the adoption of a simple majority as a hedge against Maoist authoritarian rule. If not disbanded, at a minimum the YCL's paramilitary character had to be transformed. Khanal admitted that Prachanda had assured him KATHMANDU 00000586 002.2 OF 003 the CPN-M was ready to create a new youth organization. When asked if he was still trying to make a revolution, Prachanda had responded that the Maoists would follow a constitutional path. He sounded sincere, but Khanal found him difficult to believe. And By MPRF -------------- ¶4. (C) Yadav spoke in similar terms. He said bluntly that the NC, UML and MPRF had no faith in the Maoists. They had not met their peace process commitments and Nepalis continued to wonder if they would deploy their People's Liberation Army and YCL against them. That was why the major non-Maoist parties were demanding the constitutional changes. He protested that it was undemocratic for the Maoists to reject the proposed amendments. The Maoists did not have a majority, they had a plurality of 40 percent. To gain the support they needed, they would have to make concessions. Rawal conceded that it would be counterproductive to prevent the Maoists from forming the next government. What was required was to discipline the Maoists. Yadav added that the Maoists did not seem at all concerned about specific Madhesi issues and were silent about implementation of prior Madhesi agreements with the Government of Nepal. A Deal Not Likely For A Week or More -------------- ¶5. (C) Former PM Deuba stated that amendments to the Interim Constitution could be made in two days -- if the CPN-M agreed. Other matters would take time. He remarked that PM Koirala frequently claimed a deal was imminent, but it seldom worked out that way. His own estimate was 7-10 days, with a decision about how to select the 26 appointed members of the CA among the most urgent orders of business. General Secretary Khanal emphasized the need for the Maoists to provide the other parties with detailed plans, to include a timetable, for how it intended to handle integration of the PLA and other difficult issues. If possible, consensus had to be reached not only among the four, but also among all of the 13 largest parties in the CA and the 25 total parliamentary parties. Khanal and Yadav mentioned the necessity of a common minimum program. Khanal predicted that talks on forming a government might last one or two weeks more. Deuba and Khanal both favored joining the government, assuming the conditions were met. Yadav emphasized that the MPRF would join if the conditions were met and there was agreement on how to handle key issues, including the Madhes. May 28 Expected To Be Peaceful -------------- ¶6. (C) Deuba was of the view that the Prime Minister should talk to King Gyanendra about the Assembly's plan to abolish the monarchy at its first meeting on May 28. The King deserved to have a graceful exit. Deuba noted that the King, who was reportedly at Nagarjun Palace just north of Kathmandu, often went back and forth from the main Narayanhiti Palace in Kathmandu. He noted the situation was fragile, but so far so good: "no socket bombs." (Note: There were 3 on May 26. End note.) Khanal emphasized that the 28th should be peaceful. Political differences among the parties on the government and other issues should not be allowed to obstruct the atmosphere. The UML General Secretary said that politicians were reluctant to speak openly to the King for fear of being seen as pro-King, but there were back channels. He thought the King's exit would go smoothly. Yadav seemed the least concerned. What mattered was that Nepal would become a republic. At that point, it would not matter what the King did. From his perspective, Gyanendra could even stay in Narayanhiti, at least until a future president moved in. Assembly Ready for the 28th KATHMANDU 00000586 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶7. (C) On May 25, the same day SCA DAS Feigenbaum and the Ambassador met Deuba and Khanal and the day before the Yadav meeting, they discussed the opening of the Assembly with the outgoing Speaker of the Interim Parliament Subash Nemwang. Nemwang explained that the Interim Parliament had been serving as the secretariat for the new Assembly. It had prepared the Birendra International Conference Center to house the eventual 601 Assembly members and had drafted interim procedures. He expected them to be approved by all 25 parliamentary parties in time for the swearing in of new members on May 27. Assuming no agreement was reached by the parties on who would serve as Chairman, the oldest member would chair the session. Nemwang said whether the vote on the republic would be by acclamation or recorded vote had not yet been decided, but he indicated the former was more likely. He did not anticipate a new government would be in place by then. He emphasized the importance of consensus. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) In all the meetings with party leaders, SCA DAS Feigenbaum stressed three points. The first was the need for the political process to continue and to lead soon to a new government that reflected the will of the people. The second was the need for an end to political violence, particularly by the Maoist YCL. The third was the importance that the declaration of the Nepal as a republic on May 28 proceed peacefully. While the NC, UML, and MPRF leaders acknowledged that the Maoists were the largest party and shared DAS Feigenbaum's serious concerns about YCL violence, they were insistent that the Maoists had to take other steps before they were prepared to vote the Maoists into government. They were prepared to risk Maoist and public ire for at least another week or two to hold out for Maoist concessions. They were also relatively unconcerned about the prospect of violence on May 28. ¶9. (U) SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum has cleared this message. POWELL

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