NEPAL: TALKS WITH ARMED GROUPS IN TERAI UNLIKELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001162 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: TALKS WITH ARMED GROUPS IN TERAI UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) As of November 3, the Government of Nepal (GON) has made limited progress on peace negotiations between a three-member team of cabinet ministers and a collection of armed groups from the Terai. Prospects for a successful outcome are unpromising. The armed groups have struggled to form an alliance and select leadership; many of the groups are unwilling to consent to negotiations. Each armed group willing to participate has set forward a series of demands -- many unrealistic -- as preconditions to talks. In addition to the Terai groups being unable to reach consensus or unwilling to budge on demands, violence remains a major obstacle. GON Invites Armed Groups for Talks -------------- ¶2. (C) On October 3, the Maoist-led Government of Nepal (GON) for the first time formed a three-member team of cabinet ministers to address grievances -- including a demand for an autonomous Madhes state -- with armed groups from the Terai. Peace and Reconstruction Minister Janardan Sharma of the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist coordinates the GON team, which also consists of two Madhesi ministers: Local Development Minister Ram Chandra Jha of the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML) and Education Minister Renu Yadav of the Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF). The Peace and Reconstruction Minister in early October began hosting informal talks with members of various groups in the Terai and eastern hills in order to devise a plan for official talks. The Local Development Minister told the Ambassador on October 27 that the GON has invited nine groups to talks, and the talks would begin "within 15 to 20 days" (i.e., during the second week of November). The groups have accepted the invitation with the caveat that the GON meets their preconditions. (Note: Sharma declined to explain how his team selected nine out of a plethora of groups -- by some estimates, there are upwards of 40 armed organizations operating in the Terai. End note.) Prospects Unpromising: A Question of Leadership -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Few observers believe that negotiations will yield substantial, positive results. The inability of the groups to organize among themselves does not bode well for consensus 
with the GON. During the first week of October, 14 armed groups from the Terai met in Bihar, India to discuss an alliance. Nepalese media reported that the groups wanted to unite under one umbrella organization, but disagreements over leadership forced them to settle on forging a working unity. Prashant Jha, a prominent journalist with expertise on Madhesi issues, told Emboffs on October 22 that the Terai groups are only going through the motions to appear willing to compromise with the GON, and that the groups that have agreed to the talks have minimal influence in the Terai. This mirrors observations from contractors for USAID's Office of Transition Initiative (OTI) who are based in the eastern Terai, who told Emboffs the same day that the GON would have a challenging task in selecting members with clout from armed groups that matter. A Question of Compromise -------------- ¶4. (C) Further complicating matters, Home Minister Bam Dev Gautam announced during a speech in Bhairahawa on October 21 that the GON would use force if the armed groups were to ignore the call for dialogue. All of the armed groups have expressed dissatisfaction with the "threatening tone" of the GON, according to OTI sources. Hiramani Ghimire, a governance adviser with the British Department for International Development (DFID),told Emboffs on October 27 KATHMANDU 00001162 002 OF 002 that, contrary to the Peace and Reconstruction Minister's public claims, initial overtures for the talks have been poor. The DFID adviser said that insiders (further unspecified) had informed him that the talks were heading toward failure, largely because armed groups even willing to participate are making too many unrealistic demands. Unrealistic Demands -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Each of the Terai groups has insisted upon several demands as a precondition for talks. The Jwala Singh faction of the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) has demanded that the GON withdraw "false charges" against its cadres, declare a unilateral ceasefire, make adequate security arrangements for members of the JTMM's negotiation team, and withdraw all police presence from Terai villages within 30 days. The Rajan Mukti faction of the JTMM has demanded that the GON withdraw all court cases against its cadres and release those currently in jail. The Terai Samyukta Janakranti Party set forth a list of nine demands, including the declaration of martyrs and compensation to the families of cadres killed during the Madhesi agitation. Violence a Major Obstacle -------------- ¶6. (C) Another major obstacle to successful negotiations is the armed groups' refusal to halt violence. Daily reports of alleged murders, abductions and extortion continue unabated. On October 22, a bombing at the land reform office in the central Terai district of Dhanusa injured over a dozen people. Terai Rastriya Mukti Sena and the Terai Army both claimed responsibility for the incident. Terai-based OTI contractors told Emboffs that this bombing was particularly disturbing because it displayed a certain level of sophistication -- a mock fight distracted police in the vicinity before the bomb exploded -- and, employing a cylinder bomb filled with shrapnel, was a definite attempt to injure people rather than simply create commotion. Police remain ineffective in either preventing or responding to incidents. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Post is not optimistic that peace negotiations -- should they ever get off the ground -- will have a positive outcome at this time. The armed groups' demands appear to be a tactic to force a stalemate. Nevertheless, we will continue to press our contacts, including those within the legitimate, Madhesi political parties, particularly the MPRF, to use their influence with the armed groups. In our views, communication between the GON and the armed groups is preferable to no contact at all. POWELL