Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KATHMANDU1016
2008-09-11 12:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: PM DAHAL AFFIRMS DESIRE TO WORK WITH U.S.

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM PTER PREF ECON EAID ENRG SNAR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001016 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER PREF ECON EAID ENRG SNAR
CH, BT, IN, NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM DAHAL AFFIRMS DESIRE TO WORK WITH U.S.

REF: A. KATHMANDU 972

B. KATHMANDU 997

Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001016 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER PREF ECON EAID ENRG SNAR CH, BT, IN, NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM DAHAL AFFIRMS DESIRE TO WORK WITH U.S. REF: A. KATHMANDU 972 ¶B. KATHMANDU 997 Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On September 9, in her first meeting with Prime Minister Pushpa Dahal since he took office, the Ambassador reviewed a range of bilateral issues between the United States and Nepal and sought his support. These ran the spectrum from stopping human rights violations by the Maoists' Young Communist League, assisting refugees -- Bhutanese and Tibetans -- addressing economic concerns (including the concerns of U.S. businesses in hydropower and carpets),and the handling of health issues and the Koshi flood to discharging children from the cantonments, cooperating with the UN Mission in Nepal and restoring law and order. The Prime Minister affirmed his desire to work with the United States. He remarked that the coalition cabinet had adopted its policies and programs earlier that day and that Finance Minister Bhattarai would present the budget to the Constituent Assembly shortly. Dahal indicated he was greatly looking forward to traveling to New York to attend the UN General Assembly. Young Communist League Must Stop Abuses -------------- ¶2. (C) On September 9, the Ambassador took advantage of her first formal meeting with Prime Minister Pushpa Dahal (aka Prachanda) since he took office in mid-August to review a number of the bilateral issues between the United States and Nepal and to seek his support. One of the issues she stressed was the need for the Maoists' Young Communist League (YCL) to immediately stop detaining Nepali drug users in so-called YCL "rehabilitation centers" in Kathmandu and torturing them (Ref A). The Ambassador noted that she had spoken to one of the victims, who had testified to her mistreatment. While the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights had since confirmed that the one center in question was now closed, there were unconfirmed reports of more such centers and perhaps hundreds of victims. The Ambassador informed the Prime Minister that this issue would be raised during any meetings Dahal had with senior U.S. government officials in New York during the UN General Assembly, and he should be prepared to have answers. Dahal Expresses Concern Over YCL --------------
¶3. (C) The Prime Minister expressed surprise and concern at the news and asked for details. He stated -- referring to the YCL -- that his government was trying to control all these illegal activities. He also assured the Ambassador that these "remaining" activities would be dealt with. Continued Assistance To Refugees Sought -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador informed the PM that the Danish Ambassador would be taking over the chairmanship in Kathmandu from the U.S. of the Core Group for Bhutanese refugees. She voiced her appreciation for the support that the Home Ministry had been providing to ensure that the resettlement process proceeded quickly and safely and for Dahal's own intervention after threats by the Bhutanese Communist Party. She explained that by the end of September some 5,000 Bhutanese would have been resettled in the U.S.; the target was an additional 15,000 by the end of Fiscal Year 2009. The Ambassador noted that Foreign Minister Yadav had apparently met with his Bhutanese counterpart during the recent Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation summit in New Delhi, which represented a step forward. She urged the Government of Nepal (GON) to keep the KATHMANDU 00001016 002 OF 004 country's borders open for Tibetan refugees. Economic/Commercial Issues: Hydropower, Carpets -------------- -- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador welcomed the PM's statement that the new government wanted to create a conducive atmosphere for business and investment and the push to dramatically increase the country's economic growth rate. She pointed out that she was prepared to work with the U.S. Department of Commerce office in New Delhi to encourage U.S. businesses in India to look at Nepal, but that she had to be credible. There had to be a more friendly atmosphere and an improvement in the law and order situation first. She cited the example of a potential U.S. hydropower investor who currently faced a wait of two years before the Ministry of Water Resources planned to review his application for a survey license for a 500 megawatt project. Under Nepali law, he was supposed to get an answer in 120 days. The Ambassador mentioned that Nepal already had a significant market in the U.S. for high-end, hand-knotted carpets that were certified as child labor free. Ongoing labor unrest and other problems, however, threatened that market. ... And Garments -------------- ¶6. (C) Nepal had no comparative advantage in ready-made garments, the Ambassador explained. It made no sense for the GON to push for duty-free access for these products since they could be produced much cheaper elsewhere, notably in China. Pashmina and cashmere products, on the other hand, offered large potential profits. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative had made these same points to Nepal's Chief Secretary during the latter's visit to Washington in August. Textile issues generally were sensitive politically. PM Dahal responded that he understood. Push For Progress on Health -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the Ministry of Health's poor performance in meeting the required conditions meant that the GON was missing out in two instances where Nepal was slated to receive large amounts of assistance (in the millions of dollars) under the Global Fund To Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The USAID Mission's Health Office was prepared to help the ministry, but it needed cooperation. In addition, she alerted the PM that some district health facilities were purchasing medicines at grossly inflated prices. This fraud left much less money to provide public health services. U.S. Wants to Help Koshi Flood Victims -------------- ¶8. (C) At the outset of the meeting, the Prime Minister spoke of his trip in August to the Terai to see how relief efforts were progressing for the Koshi flood victims (Ref B). The Ambassador described U.S. concerns about the conditions under which victims are living, encouraged the PM to work closely with the relevant UN agencies and assured him of U.S. support. Dahal said that the challenges were enormous and that the relief efforts would take perhaps more than nine months. He stated that the Koshi situation would be an agenda item for his upcoming trip to New Delhi. Children Out of Cantonments; Weapons Destroyed -------------- - ¶9. (C) The Ambassador was emphatic that the children in the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) cantonments needed to be discharged right away. Dahal (note: who apparently stepped down as supreme commander of the PLA on September 3) replied: "We have decided." What was left was to work out a practical way to do that. He promised to work with UNICEF KATHMANDU 00001016 003 OF 004 and the UN Mission in Nepal on the issue once the UNMIN chief, Ian Martin, returned to Nepal. The Ambassador added that the U.S. also wanted to see the PLA's weapons -- which were currently in containers at the seven main cantonments and one other site -- consolidated and, preferably, destroyed. The Future of UNMIN -------------- ¶10. (C) Ian Martin and a few key Ambassadors plan to work on developing an action agenda for the roughly four months remaining in UNMIN's current mandate. What, the Ambassador asked, did the GON think it could accomplish in that time? She advised that the need for an extension, if required, would fall only days before the U.S. presidential inaugural, so it would be important to know the GON's wishes well in advance. PM Dahal responded that he hoped to form the special committee on integration and rehabilitation (note: mandated by Article 146 of the Interim Constitution) after the budget speech and to complete the process within 6 months, as previously agreed. He conceded, however, that it could take significantly longer. If the government could not settle these issues by December, it would need to extend UNMIN. Restoring Law and Order -------------- ¶11. (C) Dahal stated that he had met that same morning with Home Minister Bamdev Gautam and encouraged him to take strong measures to restore law and order. The PM said that the situation in the Terai was particularly delicate and complicated. It was difficult to separate political and criminal activities. The Ambassador remarked that all parties would need to assist the government if the rule of law was to be enforced. Government Making Progress; India and China Trips -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) The Prime Minister informed the Ambassador at the beginning that the coalition cabinet had adopted its policies and programs earlier that day -- unanimously -- in time for the President to present them on September 10. He claimed the coalition was working together well. Finance Minister Baburam Bhattarai, he said, would present the budget to the Constituent Assembly the week of September 15, either before or after the PM's (and Bhattarai's) trip to India. He elaborated that the trip to India would be his first formal foreign visit. The 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty and trade and transit regulations would be among the topics. He had held meetings with the Chinese President and Prime Minister during his trip to Beijing for the closing ceremony of the Olympics, but those meetings, while important, had been very brief. (Note: The Indian Ambassador commented to the Ambassador on September 10 that the Indian trip preparations are in total disarray: no delegation list, no agenda and no itinerary. End note.) Travel to U.S. For UNGA -------------- ¶13. (C) Dahal was enthusiastic about his planned trip to New York for the UN General Assembly (UNGA). He indicated that he would transit Thailand (Bangkok) and Germany on the way. The PM mentioned that he was greatly looking forward to hearing President Bush's speech to the UNGA on September 23. He noted as well that he hoped to address the Asia Society while he was in New York. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Nepal's newly elected Maoist Prime Minister was largely in listening mode during his September 9 meeting with the Ambassador, but one message was clear: he wants to work KATHMANDU 00001016 004 OF 004 with the United States. One of his final comments was an appeal to the U.S. for assistance. The PM spoke frequently of the challenges he faced, but his demeanor conveyed confidence. Whether he will be able to deliver on his many promises -- to the U.S., to the rest of the international community, and, most importantly, to the Nepalis -- has yet to be seen. Even leaving aside all of the inherent difficulties of managing a coalition, an immature democratic culture, and the deep-rooted inequities of Nepal's economy and society, Dahal must face his party's own internal inconsistencies. The Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist is now the leading party in Nepal's government, but it has yet to shed all the trappings of its violent, revolutionary past. Some observers continue to question if it even desires to do so as evidenced by the ongoing activities of its Young Communist League. The Prime Minister continues to say the right things, but we will need to judge his government by what it does. POWELL

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