NORTHERN UGANDA: KONY DANCES AWAY AGAIN FROM PEACE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000521 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU CG SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: KONY DANCES AWAY AGAIN FROM PEACE AGREEMENT KAMPALA 00000521 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: For the Government of Uganda, Kony's rejection of peace was disappointing, but not unexpected. President Museveni will meet with his Southern Sudanese counterpart Salva Kiir on April 14 to determine the way forward. International criticism of Kony's movements, kidnappings, and forced military training of abductees from Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),was muted during the negotiations. Kony's rejection of the peace process could deepen disaffection within the LRA, create splits, and increase his reliance on external allies. The international community should begin exploring other ways to increase corral Kony. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - SITUATION UPDATE - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Kony did not sign the peace agreement nor did he meet with northern elders, traditional, and religious leaders at Rikwangba between April 10 and 13. On April 9, LRA fighters reported to us that Kony told them he would not sign the peace agreement because he reportedly feared becoming another Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, or Jonas Savimbi. Kony also sacked his negotiating team, including its leader David Matsanga, on April 9. Matsanga announced that he resigned on April 10. After his departure, Matsanga admitted to journalists and diplomats that he had had not met Kony in the past as he had claimed. Matsanga said he had little contact with Kony even via telephone and had last spoken to him in March. Government of Southern Sudan mediator Riek Machar waited for Kony at Rikwangba until April 13. He claimed that Kony was coming back toward Rikwangba to meet him. U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano traveled to Rikwangba on April 13. The GOU's chief negotiators, Ruhakana Rugunda and Henry Okello Oryem, told P/E Chief on April 12 and 13 that they supported any last ditch efforts by Chissano and Machar to establish direct contact with Kony, but were not hopeful as they believed Kony was moving westward. ¶3. (SBU) For the GOU, the formal negotiating phase of the peace process has likely ended. The Ugandan Government negotiating team returned from southern Sudan on April 11 and announced that it would not renew the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA). Upon return, the team met with �00A;various government elements on April 12 to debate next steps. President Museveni maintained his travel plans to go to Juba on April 14. Instead of signing the peace deal, Museveni will hold a regular bilateral meeting with Government of Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir. Oryem told P/E Chief that Museveni and Kiir would discuss the future of the peace process. - - - - - - - IMPLICATIONS - - - - - - - ¶4. (U) Kony's refusal to sign the agreement takes the process of resolving the LRA conflict into a new phase. - - - - FOR GOU - - - - ¶5. (SBU) The apparent demise of the negotiations means that the GOU's hands are no longer tied and it can openly pursue other options to resolve the conflict. Formally, the end of the negotiation should be called by the GOSS, and Museveni may be discussing this with Kiir on April 14. Government patience throughout the peace process yielded significant domestic benefits, including a changed dynamic in northern Uganda. The peace process unified Ugandans, highlighted the extent of northern marginalization to the Government, and demonstrated the need for national reconciliation, according to Oryem. ¶6. (SBU) Plans for a military option (Plan B) need revision given that the LRA leader has re-located and spread his forces between DRC and CAR. The GOU's chief negotiator, Minister of Internal Affairs Ruhakana Rugunda, has said that it might not be worth the GOU's effort to go after Kony militarily if he continued to move in CAR and toward Chad. Rugunda stated that it "was always Khartoum's plan to use Kony's rebels as a mercenary force" and that the GOU would act to prevent any destabilization of southern Sudan. If Kony proceeded to Darfur, it might not be worth Ugandan resources to chase him. If he was in DRC, he could be accessed. UN Special Envoy Chissano also has misgivings about a unilateral Ugandan military operation to capture KAMPALA 00000521 002.2 OF 003 Kony. According to Chissano, not all the governments in the region accept a military option because a failed operation could unleash unintended consequences. The region had experienced two years without war and the prospect that the LRA conflict could be re-ignited was worrisome. If Museveni went after Kony without knowing where he was and the operation failed, Uganda would be held responsible for startign a cycle of retaliatory violence. The LRA's confidence would be boosted and civilians in the region would be terrified. Chissano argued that a coordinated international action sanctioned by the UNSC would ameliorate the negative conseqences of a failed Ugandan operation. He believes an international force executing the ICC warrants would have credibility and more of a chance for success. ¶7. (SBU) The GOU will encourage defections from the LRA and formed a task force to devise plans to assist LRA wishing to leave LRA encampments. Exposure of LRA movements, abductions, and crimes and increased GOU diplomatic contacts with DRC and CAR to deny safe haven for Kony could increase pressure on the LRA. Domestically, the GOU will continue encouraging internally-displaced persons (IDPs) to return home and may commit additional resources, to accelerate the Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP). A recently signed USD 750,000 agreement between USAID and the International Office for Migration (IOM) will provide Uganda,s Amnesty Commission the resources necessary to provide re-insertion packages for returnees and facilitate their return to their home communities. - - - - - - - - - - - FOR NORTHERN UGANDANS - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) Kony's refusal to sign the agreement dashed the hopes of many IDPs, but may solify public opinion in the LRA-affected areas of the north that the LRA was not serious about negotiations. At the beginning of the peace process in July 2006, the Government was viewed negatively in the north and often cited as causing and perpetuating the war. The composition of the diaspora-based LRA delegation, its extreme demands, and its foot-dragging for more allowances alienated northern Ugandan leaders. The LRA negotiators' antics and Kony's aloofness from the process damaged the credibility of the LRA in the eyes of the northerners. The primary beneficiary of the change in public mood was the Government, which was praised in the media for having demonstrated that it was committed to peace even if the LRA was not. Gulu District officials and parliamentarians said that in the aftermath of the failed process, it would be critical for the Government to encourage northerners to return home and to protect them from the LRA. - - - - - - FOR THE LRA - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) Kony's rejection of the peace process, his execution of Vincent Otti in October 2007, and recent abductions most likely will fuel additional internal turmoil in the LRA. Kony's failure to sign means that there is no way out of the bush for disaffected LRA members except through defection. The peace process had been viewed as an honorable way out for many, according to former LRA negotiator Martin Ojul. Kony's movements indicate that he understands the real possibility of military attack now that he has repudiated peace. ¶10. (SBU) LRA abductions in CAR and DRC and movement to CAR are indications that Kony was using the peace process to buy time and shield his activities. According to two recent escapees, at least 300 newly abducted children are being forced into military training. Oryem described as "heartbreaking" the plight of the child soldiers who had been sent to protect the newly donated food for the LRA at Rikwangba. Oryem said the children had expected to go home with the GOU team and began crying when they were left behind. Kony had told them they were International Criminal Court (ICC) indictees. Col. Walter Ochora said the child soldiers had cried when the previous delegations left Rikwangba. Kony's isolation could make him more dependent on external patrons in Khartoum and within the diaspora. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) Many in the donor and non-governmental community took Kony seriously as a negotiating party, and some will be KAMPALA 00000521 003.2 OF 003 reluctant to see the Juba process end. However, donor monetary support for the peace process will almost certainly end. There could be increased scrutiny of the donor fund for the peace process as former delegation leaders Matsanga and Ojul explain their role and how donor funds were used. ¶12. (SBU) A number of local diplomatic missions agree with us that now is the time to accelerate aid to the North, but as basket-funders, their disbursements are tied to the PRDP and the GOU's speed. Well-publicized U.S. expenditures could help shame the EU and others into faster action. ¶13. (SBU) The international community may become more vocal about the LRA's continued holding of women and children and violations of human rights. Many governments may come under pressure from non-governmental and human rights groups to take a tougher public stand against the LRA. There could be calls, particularly from the Ugandan Government, to rein in negative diaspora elements. Chissano suggested that in the event Kony failed to sign the agreement, some members of the international community might be called upon to lend assistance in apprehending Kony and the other commanders indicted by the ICC. Additional warrants against the LRA for its recent abductions and enslavement of children in CAR and DRC could be another form of pressure on the LRA. - - - - - - - - - - - FOR THE UNITED STATES - - - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (SBU) Our role in the Juba Peace Process helped focus and accelerate the negotiating phase of the peace process to a final conclusion. The process had dragged on without a demonstrable commitment by Kony for 20 months. We should continue to take our lead from the Ugandan Government in our public stance, and be ready to condemn ongoing LRA atrocities on the ground in DRC and CAR. We should be prepared to share information as needed, if requested, to assist the Ugandans and others in operations against the LRA. Finally, our continued diplomatic, development, and defense assistance is vital to the recovery, reconciliation, and recovery in northern Uganda. BROWNING