U.N. ENVOY CHISSANO ON UGANDA-LRA PEACE DEAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000481 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018 TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU CG SUBJECT: U.N. ENVOY CHISSANO ON UGANDA-LRA PEACE DEAL Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: U.N. Special Envoy Joachim Chissano shared his views on the Juba peace process and potential military operations against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) with Ambassador Browning on April 4. Chissano has requested that LRA leader Joseph Kony designate another individual to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) if Kony did not want to sign himself for security reasons. Chissano could not predict if Kony would sign. He believes that it is important to remove any excuses that would prevent Kony from signing. If the peace process fails, Chissano said that military operations should be multi-lateral in character and have the full backing of the U.N. Security Council. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On April 4, Ambassador Browning and P/E Chief met with U.N. Special Envoy Joachim Chissano, at Chissano's request. Chissano was in Kampala after visiting Juba to assess the status of the preparations for the signing of the FPA. He said he requested the meeting to get an update on LRA activities and share views on the next steps in the process. - - - - - - - - - - - KONY NEEDS TO COMMIT - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Chissano expressed his concern about splits within the LRA and the potential impact on the integrity of the peace agreement. He believed that LRA leader Joseph Kony feared being trapped at the signing ceremony and possibly taken to The Hague for trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC). If Kony was too afraid to sign the agreement himself, then Chissano demanded that he designate, in writing, another individual to sign. This would enable Chissano to present a peace agreement to the UNSC that Kony could not disavow because he had not signed it. Chissano said that it was imperative to take away all of Kony's excuses not to sign and implement the deal. Chissano informed the Ambassador that he would not be at the signing because the date changes for the signing ceremonies conflicted with previous commitments. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked Chissano whether or not the signing ceremony would take place. Chissano replied it was difficult to know, even though he wanted to believe Kony would sign. Chissano stated that we were in a period in which everything was supposition. Another problem was that the international observers, facilitator, and mediator were forced to rely on LRA delegation leader David Matsanga for information about Kony's intentions. ¶5. (C) Chissano speculated that Kony may come near Rikwangba and have someone else sign. Kony could come and sign himself. Chissano said that all of the observers wanted indications that that LRA was serious about the peace deal. One such indication would be assembly of LRA forces at Rikwangba. Chissano said that the release of women and children should not be one of the indicators. For Kony, releasing women and children represented the removal of his human shields, which would make him more vulnerable to an attack. This demand, made by some donors and non-governmental organizations, undermines Kony's confidence that he will survive the process. - - - - - - - - - - DANGERS OF PLAN B - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) The Ugandan Government's "Plan B," the military option, was not accepted by all the governments in the region and could unleash unintended consequences, according to Chissano. He explained that because the region had experienced two years without war, the prospect that the LRA conflict could be re-ignited was worrisome. During the negotiations, Uganda's Plan B was not justified. If the peace process failed now because of LRA's actions, then Plan B would be justified. Chissano expressed his concern that if Museveni launched a military operation against the LRA, Uganda would be held responsible for starting a cycle of retaliatory violence. ¶8. (C) Chissano was worried that if President Museveni obtained permission from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for Plan B, and then went after Kony without knowing exactly where he was, the consequences of a failed operation could be disastrous. Chissano argued that the LRA's confidence would be bolstered and civilians in the region and in northern Uganda would be terrified. ¶9. (C) If the peace process failed, Chissano stated that the KAMPALA 00000481 002 OF 002 United Nations should undertake operations to "grab Kony." He explained that between April 10 and 14, Kony's intentions should become more clear. A key question was whether the mediator and Government of Uganda would accept another change of date for the signature. If the process ended this month without an LRA signature on the agreement, then the international community would need to design a multi-lateral operation against the LRA. Chissano argued that a coordinated international action sanctioned by the UNSC would ameliorate the negative consequences of a failed Ugandan operation. He believes that an international force executing the ICC warrants would have credibility and more of a chance of success. Chissano added that Khartoum's cooperation would be needed to capture Kony. - - - - - - - - - - - UNSC AND ICC WARRANTS - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Chissano felt that, for now, persuasion was still the best tactic with Kony. The GOU knows it needs to find a peaceful solution to the LRA problem for domestic reasons. Chissano was willing to take the LRA leader at his word in order to keep Kony "on the hook." He continued his fishing analogy and said that patience was needed to reel in a big fish. Chissano said that the suspension of the ICC warrants was a tool of persuasion. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador asked Chissano his views on the discussion that would occur at the UNSC. Chissano said a suspension of the warrants would be needed to persuade Kony to come out of the bush. Chissano also said that if he were Kony, he would choose to go to The Hague rather than face national prosecution, which could be fraught with many uncertainties. Chissano said that his report to the UNSC would be a presentation of the facts. It would not be designed to persuade members toward a particular course of action. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶12. (C) Despite his public optimism, Chissano has thought through the various options should the peace process fail. His proposal for multi-lateral military action against the LRA, sanctioned by the UNSC, may have been thrown out to us as something for future consideration. BROWNING