U.N. ENVOY CHISSANO ON UGANDA-LRA PEACE DEAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000481

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU CG
SUBJECT: U.N. ENVOY CHISSANO ON UGANDA-LRA PEACE DEAL

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: U.N. Special Envoy Joachim Chissano shared
his views on the Juba peace process and potential military
operations against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) with
Ambassador Browning on April 4. Chissano has requested that
LRA leader Joseph Kony designate another individual to sign
the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) if Kony did not want to sign
himself for security reasons. Chissano could not predict if
Kony would sign. He believes that it is important to remove
any excuses that would prevent Kony from signing. If the
peace process fails, Chissano said that military operations
should be multi-lateral in character and have the full
backing of the U.N. Security Council. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On April 4, Ambassador Browning and P/E Chief met
with U.N. Special Envoy Joachim Chissano, at Chissano's
request. Chissano was in Kampala after visiting Juba to
assess the status of the preparations for the signing of the
FPA. He said he requested the meeting to get an update on
LRA activities and share views on the next steps in the
process.

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KONY NEEDS TO COMMIT
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3. (C) Chissano expressed his concern about splits within
the LRA and the potential impact on the integrity of the
peace agreement. He believed that LRA leader Joseph Kony
feared being trapped at the signing ceremony and possibly
taken to The Hague for trial at the International Criminal
Court (ICC). If Kony was too afraid to sign the agreement
himself, then Chissano demanded that he designate, in
writing, another individual to sign. This would enable
Chissano to present a peace agreement to the UNSC that Kony
could not disavow because he had not signed it. Chissano
said that it was imperative to take away all of Kony's
excuses not to sign and implement the deal. Chissano
informed the Ambassador that he would not be at the signing
because the date changes for the signing ceremonies
conflicted with previous commitments.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked Chissano whether or not the
signing ceremony would take place. Chissano replied it was
difficult to know, even though he wanted to believe Kony
would sign. Chissano stated that we were in a period in
which everything was supposition. Another problem was that
the international observers, facilitator, and mediator were
forced to rely on LRA delegation leader David Matsanga for
information about Kony's intentions.


5. (C) Chissano speculated that Kony may come near Rikwangba
and have someone else sign. Kony could come and sign
himself. Chissano said that all of the observers wanted
indications that that LRA was serious about the peace deal.
One such indication would be assembly of LRA forces at
Rikwangba. Chissano said that the release of women and
children should not be one of the indicators. For Kony,
releasing women and children represented the removal of his
human shields, which would make him more vulnerable to an
attack. This demand, made by some donors and
non-governmental organizations, undermines Kony's confidence
that he will survive the process.

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DANGERS OF PLAN B
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6. (C) The Ugandan Government's "Plan B," the military
option, was not accepted by all the governments in the region
and could unleash unintended consequences, according to
Chissano. He explained that because the region had
experienced two years without war, the prospect that the LRA
conflict could be re-ignited was worrisome. During the
negotiations, Uganda's Plan B was not justified. If the
peace process failed now because of LRA's actions, then Plan
B would be justified. Chissano expressed his concern that if
Museveni launched a military operation against the LRA,
Uganda would be held responsible for starting a cycle of
retaliatory violence.


8. (C) Chissano was worried that if President Museveni
obtained permission from the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) for Plan B, and then went after Kony without knowing
exactly where he was, the consequences of a failed operation
could be disastrous. Chissano argued that the LRA's
confidence would be bolstered and civilians in the region and
in northern Uganda would be terrified.


9. (C) If the peace process failed, Chissano stated that the

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United Nations should undertake operations to "grab Kony."
He explained that between April 10 and 14, Kony's intentions
should become more clear. A key question was whether the
mediator and Government of Uganda would accept another change
of date for the signature. If the process ended this month
without an LRA signature on the agreement, then the
international community would need to design a multi-lateral
operation against the LRA. Chissano argued that a
coordinated international action sanctioned by the UNSC would
ameliorate the negative consequences of a failed Ugandan
operation. He believes that an international force
executing the ICC warrants would have credibility and more of
a chance of success. Chissano added that Khartoum's
cooperation would be needed to capture Kony.

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UNSC AND ICC WARRANTS
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10. (C) Chissano felt that, for now, persuasion was still
the best tactic with Kony. The GOU knows it needs to find a
peaceful solution to the LRA problem for domestic reasons.
Chissano was willing to take the LRA leader at his word in
order to keep Kony "on the hook." He continued his fishing
analogy and said that patience was needed to reel in a big
fish. Chissano said that the suspension of the ICC warrants
was a tool of persuasion.


11. (C) The Ambassador asked Chissano his views on the
discussion that would occur at the UNSC. Chissano said a
suspension of the warrants would be needed to persuade Kony
to come out of the bush. Chissano also said that if he were
Kony, he would choose to go to The Hague rather than face
national prosecution, which could be fraught with many
uncertainties. Chissano said that his report to the UNSC
would be a presentation of the facts. It would not be
designed to persuade members toward a particular course of
action.

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COMMENT
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12. (C) Despite his public optimism, Chissano has thought
through the various options should the peace process fail.
His proposal for multi-lateral military action against the
LRA, sanctioned by the UNSC, may have been thrown out to us
as something for future consideration.
BROWNING