UGANDA'S CHIEF LRA NEGOTIATOR ON PEACE AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000424 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018 TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU CG SUBJECT: UGANDA'S CHIEF LRA NEGOTIATOR ON PEACE AGREEMENT Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: Uganda's Internal Affairs Minister and lead negotiator with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),Ruhakana Rugunda, believes that the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) will be signed, but has serious reservations about the LRA's willingness to implement it. Rugunda believes that some LRA will assemble, but does not believe Kony will sign or come out of the bush. Nonetheless, the Government would implement its obligations and expected the international observers to support the Agreement's provisions. Rugunda encouraged a strong, clear message from the U.S. in support of the FPA. He also said that the Ugandan Government was prepared to deal with LRA leader Joseph Kony decisively if he did not comply with the Agreement, and requested U.S. help to persuade Congolese President Kabila to assist, if needed. The GOU believes the Governments of Southern Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR) would be cooperative. However, if Kony continued to move in the direction of Darfur and did not pose a threat to the security of southern Sudan, Rugunda said that it might not be worth Ugandan resources to pursue him. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On March 18, Ambassador Browning, DCM, and P/E Chief met with Ruhakana Rugunda, the Ugandan Government's chief LRA negotiator, to discuss the status of the peace process in advance of the Ambassador's meeting with President Museveni. Rugunda said that the next steps were for the FPA to be signed, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to assemble, the Government to establish the Special Division of the High Court, and then to request a deferral of the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants from the UNSC. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SIGNING, IMPLEMENTING, MONITORING THE FPA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Rugunda believes that LRA chief negotiator, Dr. David Matsanga, will get authority to sign the FPA. The Government did not expect the LRA to fully assemble at Rikwangba, according to Rugunda. Per the agreement, after the signing, the LRA has one month to assemble before the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration begins. Rugunda warned that the implementation of the Agreement would not "follow the letter," but that the Government intended on moving forward on its obligations. He expected the international community to press the parties to implement the Agreement. Ambassador Browning assured Rugunda that the U.S. was in full support of the peace process and would continue assisting as needed to pursue parallel, but complementary tracks. The Ambassador noted that our primary goal was to resolve the LRA as a security threat. ¶4. (C) Rugunda stated that the Government's preference was for the process to end peacefully, but that if LRA leader Joseph Kony did not want that, the GOU would bring the conflict to an end "by any other way." Rugunda emphasized that "we were almost there" and that the GOU would take any steps and use any means to bring closure. The Ambassador asked how the success or failure of an agreement signed by Dr. David Matsanga without Kony's personal compliance would be measured. Rugunda responded that he expected the Government, mediator, and international observers to monitor the implementation closely. Rugunda said that if Kony did not assemble, it would be cause for the "guarantors," the U.N., African observers, EU, Norway, Canada, and the United States to determine the level of LRA compliance. Rugunda said that the international community, led by "the great power," the United States, had a responsibility to ensure implementation. When pressed, Rugunda acknowledged the U.S. was an "observer," not a "guarantor" to the Agreement, but he stressd that "the commitment" was there. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador raised concerns that there could be differences of opinion among the international signatories to the Agreement on the level of compliance. Rugunda said that with sober monitoring, and meetings among the parties and signatories, more time could be given to the LRA to comply. Rugunda reiterated that the GOU was committed to implement its obligations; some LRA were ready to come out through the agreement or other means; and that if Kony did not, he could be dealt with through other means. However, if the LRA's movements in CAR and toward Chad continued, immediate action might be need to enforce the agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA),and Ceasefire. (Note: The LRA movements are in violation of the CHA. End Note.) - - - - - - NEXT STEPS - - - - - - KAMPALA 00000424 002 OF 002 ¶6. (SBU) Rugunda said a strong, clear U.S. press statement supporting the Agreement would help bring the process to final closure. Such a statement, according to Rugunda, should reaffirm support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and call on the parties to sign and fulfill their obligations and expeditiously implement the agreement. ¶7. (C) Rugunda reiterated his opinion that the agreement would be signed because Kony would not be seen as delaying or rejecting peace, due to pressure from northern Ugandans. However, Rugunda said, Kony will not sign himself or come in. Rugunda said that there was a 30-60 day implementation period that would determine Kony's intentions. Kony was not likely to assemble, but the timeframe could allow others to do so. Rugunda did not believe it would be necessary to wait out the 30 days, but it would be "good politics" on the Government's part to do so. The GOU would play a leadership role during the transition period and be willing to grant a grace period if it appeared that LRA members were trying to assemble but prevented to do so by logistics problems. ¶8. (C) The Ugandan Government remains in touch with key allies, including southern Sudan, CAR, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Rugunda said that the GOU might need U.S. help with Congolese President Kabila to allow the UPDF to go after the LRA militarily. The GOU believes that Southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir and CAR's Bozizie, despite his weak position, would be cooperative if needed to deal with Kony "decisively." ¶9. (C) Rugunda said it might not be worth the GOU's effort to go after Kony militarily if he continued to move in CAR and toward Chad. Rugunda stated that it "was always Khartoum's plan to use Kony's rebels as a mercenary force" and that the GOU would act to prevent any destabilization of southern Sudan. If Kony proceeded to Darfur, it might not be worth Ugandan resources to chase him. If he was in DRC, he could be "accessed." Rugunda noted that Kabila had agreed with Museveni in Arusha in September 2007 that force could be used against the LRA. Rugunda requested the U.S. to persuade Kabila that Kony must be dealt with decisively if he failed to implement the agreement. Rugunda said that Kabila's shift in attitude should be encouraged and supported. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶10. (C) The Government views the FPA as an opportunity to bring closure to the Juba Peace Process, diplomatically or militarily. Rugunda may not be privy to the Ugandan military's operational planning, but our contacts confirm that Kony's movement away from the DRC also has complicated military planning and could change Uganda's "Plan B" calculations. BROWNING