UGANDAN OFFICIALS NOT SURPRISED BY KONY'S MOVEMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000410

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2018
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU CG
SUBJECT: UGANDAN OFFICIALS NOT SURPRISED BY KONY'S MOVEMENT
INTO CAR

REF: KAMPALA 301

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (S) Summary: Ugandan Government officials state that
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony's movement
into Central African Republic (CAR) came as no surprise.
They have been pointing to LRA movements on the ground, away
from the direction of the Rikwangba assembly site, as
evidence that the LRA was using peace negotiations to buy
time or divert attention from its real intentions. The GOU
will go ahead with planning processes to implement its
obligations under the Final Peace Agreement regardless of LRA
activities on the ground in order to expose the LRA's bad
faith commitments and justify possible Ugandan military
operations. End Summary.

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KONY RELOCATES TO CAR
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2. (S) Post received reports of LRA leader Joseph Kony's
movement to CAR on March 14 from Ugandan Government officials
and an International Criminal Court (ICC) analyst. On March
16, LRA Colonel Leonard Bwone Lubowa informed P/E Chief that
the BBC radio reports of Kony's relocation were true. Kony
was 50 miles inside of CAR. Bwone had traveled with Kony and
was now with ICC indictee Okot Odhiambo and General Abudema,
who were laying landmines to prevent an attack on Kony. At
the time of the call, Bwone was 30 miles away from Kony and
20 miles inside of CAR. Bwone reported that Kony had moved
at near lightening speed, traveling 270 kilometers from near
Duru, DRC, to his current location in a 48 hour period.
Bwone did not mention the locations of ICC indictee Dominic
Ongwen or Thomas Kwoyello. Bwone said that political borders
meant nothing to the LRA and that the group has moved around
without any difficulties between four countries: Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC),Sudan, CAR, and Chad.

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CHADIAN CONNECTION
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3. (S) According to Bwone, Kony was in CAR with Chadian
rebel leader Mahamat Nouri, who allegedly had 2,000 people
with him. Bwone was with Kony when he met with Nouri.
According to Bwone, Khartoum linked the Chadian, CAR, and
Ugandan rebel groups under one umbrella and was moving them
to Darfur. Bwone described the coordination by Khartoum of
these groups as "strong," and mentioned that Kony also was
talking to another Chadian rebel who may be in Cameroon or
northern CAR. Bwone also reported that Khartoum had links
with the Acholi diaspora and may be funneling some of their
support to the LRA.


4. (S) Kony plans to travel through CAR on his way to Sudan,
according to Bwone. Former LRA defectors and Ugandan
security officials tell us that Kony's destination is
Bahr-el-gazel. Rank-and-file LRA call it Darfur. Several
sources, including Bwone, said that Khartoum was moving the
LRA to Darfur to work with the janjaweed. Bwone stated that
Khartoum's intention was not to allow the "SPLA fellows to
have their elections in Juba." He also claimed that there
were some LRA members in Chad and Sudan with Nouri's forces.

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LRA MOVEMENTS AND THE FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT
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5. (S) Bwone reported that there were 60 LRA fighters at or
near Rikwangba and only 70 left in the group's Garamba
National Park hide-out. He said that Kony was heavily armed,
with "four unused large weapons that can shoot down aircraft,
weapons that had been abandoned in southern Sudan, and
ammunition delivered by the Arabs." Bwone said that any
force that attempted to attack Kony would be in for a
"beating" due to the weapons and the LRA's knowledge of the
terrain.


6. (S) Kony has no intention of signing the Final Peace
Agreement (FPA),according to Bwone. LRA delegation leader
David Matsanga, who does not have contact with Kony, would
not be signing either, Bwone noted. Matsanga's primary
contacts were General Abudema and Santo Alit, who told
Matsanga to delay signature until the grass got too tall for
the Ugandan military, the only force that Kony fears, to find
him and for the rainy season to start in April.


7. (S) The LRA movements are technically violations of the
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Minister of Internal

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Affairs Ruhakana Rugunda and External Security Organization
Director Robert Masolo told us about the likely LRA movements
before they happened based on information from LRA defectors
about Kony's contingency plans. The GOU was not surprised by
Kony's move into CAR after the large movement of LRA in
mid-February. "It was only a matter of time," according to
Rugunda. The advance group allegedly was about 200-250 in
number, according to MONUC and former LRA members, and
contained ICC indictees Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen.
LRA Lieutenant General Ceasar Acel-lam reportedly left Kony's
group in mid-February. Acel-lam fled after two "brutal"
attempts on his life by Kony, according to Bwone. Acel-lam
was located near Kiliwe, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
some 300 kilometers away from Kony's main group, which
reportedly had been encamped near Duru until it moved to CAR.


8. (SBU) The GOU's deputy negotiator, Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Henry Okello Oryem, told P/E Chief that no
firm date had been set to return to Juba in order to clarify
the signing of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA). Southern
Sudanese Mediator Riek Machar wanted the GOU to return on
March 19 or 20, but with Libyan leader Qaddaffi in Kampala
all week, the GOU declined. Machar then suggested the
following week. LRA delegation members also said no firm
date had been scheduled. Matsanga told P/E Chief on March 14
that the LRA would not sign the peace deal until the ICC
warrants had been lifted.


9. (C) Both Oryem and another negotiator, Steven Kagoda, the
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, said
that the Government would continue its planning processes for
implementing its obligations under the agreement. The GOU
would go ahead and play its role, Oryem said, which would
contrast starkly with the LRA's bad faith. Kagoda said he
was holding a planning meeting on March 18 to organize tasks
for the various government agencies involved in implementing
the agreement. The Government plans to use existing
structures, such as the Amnesty Commission, rather than
create new institutions, which would be costly given the
diminishing likelihood the LRA would follow through on the
deal. Principal Judge James Ogoola, who is charged with
creating the Special Division of the High Court, told the
Ambassador and visiting USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore
that the creation of the court was a special case, which had
never been done before. As a result, the Government's
preparations were largely a work in progress and primarily at
the conceptualization stage.

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SPOILERS WOOING VARIOUS LRA COMMANDERS
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10. (C) Several LRA commanders have claimed that they want
to leave Kony in the aftermath of LRA deputy Vincent Otti's
death, but they have yet to surface (reftel). These LRA
complained that they were tired of living in the bush and did
not agree with Kony's operational plans to move through CAR
and into Sudan. Rugunda and fellow negotiator Henry Okello
Oryem have consistently noted a negative role being played by
Acholi diaspora in discouraging LRA from defecting.


11. (S) The Government believes Bwone to be a very reliable
source and iss taking steps to assist him and the 200 people
with him to escape. Deputy Director for External Security
Organization Emmy Allio said the Government would be moving
quickly to assist Acel-lam, Bwone, and the others that wanted
to leave. Bwone said it was critical to reduce the LRA
numbers and to rescue those that did not want to go to
Darfur. Acel-lam allegedly was waiting for Bwone's group to
be able to separate from the LRA, and hoped Acel-lam would
lead Bwone's group in. Bwone said he would be leaving Kony's
group to return to his own, which was near Yambio, southern
Sudan by the end of the week.

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COMMENT
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12. (C) LRA movements support the Government's doubts about
Kony's willingness to sign the Final Peace Agreement. The
Government believes that it has gone the extra mile to give
Kony a deal that addressed his key concern, the ICC. The
GOU, particularly the Ugandan military, will use the LRA's
movements and failure to sign the agreement as evidence for
the international community and northern Ugandans that
military operations against Kony are justified. Government
officials already have made public statements de-linking the
peace process from northern Uganda's recovery to minimize the
psychological impact of the LRA's negative behavior.


13. (C) The LRA movement and alleged links with Chadian

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rebels seriously complicate efforts to bring Kony in
peacefully or through a military operation. The alleged
revitalization of Khartoum's support for the LRA, and role in
linking the LRA with other rebel groups, creates a more
dangerous and complex situation for the Ugandan military,
which continues to advocate military operations against the
LRA but would have difficulty sustaining the logistics of a
strike against a well-armed Kony in CAR.
BROWNING