NORTHERN UGANDA: U.N. ENOVY ON RESUMPTION OF TALKS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000197 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL MOPS CG UG SU SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: U.N. ENOVY ON RESUMPTION OF TALKS ¶1. (SBU) Summary: U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano visited Kampala from January 25-27 to meet with President Museveni on the resumption of talks in Juba. He also pushed to secure a letter from Museveni to Congolese President Kabila reflecting a change in the January 31 deadline for the talks. Chissano explained that his role was that of a facilitator and that he would not interfere in the work of the mediator, Riek Machar. He agreed with the concept of de-linking the reconstruction of northern Uganda from the peace process and emphasized the importance of containing the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) militarily. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano met with Charge, P/E Chief, and Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley for almost three hours on January 27. Chissano was in Kampala to discuss the next steps in the peace process with President Museveni before traveling to Nairobi to meet the LRA delegation on January 28. - - - - - - - - - CHISSANO ON CONGO - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Chissano opened the meeting by relaying concerns he had heard from President Kabila and his advisor, Andre Kapanga, who serves as one of the African observers to the Juba Talks. In December, Chissano had informed Kabila that President Museveni had agreed to be flexible on the January 31 deadline and would grant the LRA one month to show progress at the negotiations. Kabila wanted a letter or written communication from Museveni informing him of the change in the deadline mutually agreed to in Arusha. Chissano said that Kabila felt under pressure from the United States to take action against the LRA at the same time Congo had agreed with Uganda to take no action until January 31. As a result, Kabila was insisting on a letter from Museveni. Chissano raised the issue with Museveni, who promised to send a letter on January 28 with a senior GOU official who was traveling to Congo. ¶4. (SBU) Chissano described his earlier efforts to encourage the Congolese and MONUC to establish and beef up their presence at Dungu. He said that President Kabila could move troops to the base, in a non-threatening manner, which could help to monitor the LRA and contain Kony's forces. Chissano thought that Kabila had stationed some 150 Congolese troops in Dungu. The U.N., however, believes that this number was reduced prior to the offensive against General Laurent Nkunda. Chissano emphasized that Kabila needed to have the capacity for surveillance, monitoring, and intelligence gathering. He stressed the need to be able to contain the LRA forces in order to prevent them from scattering into Congo. - - - - - - - - - - - - - LRA PLANS AND INTENTIONS - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) There were rumors and reports that the LRA were beginning to break into small units to prepare to defend against an attack from the Ugandan military, according to Chissano. The U.N. does not see indications that Kony was preparing for an offensive. The defensive actions included burying arms caches in several locations in Southern Sudan. Chissano also said that any military action against the LRA should be fully coordinated. He asked if the U.S. and/or Europeans were interested in supporting action against the LRA. Senior Advisor Shortley said that we would get back to him. - - - - - - - - - - - - NORTHERN RECONSTRUCTION - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Senior Advisor Shortley requested Chissano's support for a strategy to de-link northern reconstruction from the peace process to accelerate recovery and encourage returns of internally-displaced persons to their homes. Chissano was unaware that the return, recovery and reconstruction programs in Northern Uganda were largely "on hold" because of the "no war - no peace" status, and agreed to help raise the profile of the situation in Northern Uganda to the UNSC. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - U.N. ROLE IN PEACE PROCESS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Shortley asked Chissano about the U.N. role in the peace process, Chissano's own part-time status, and if his role could be enhanced if required at some future date. Chissano said that his mandate was to facilitate when needed, not mediate the talks, and that he was working on the issue whether he was in the region or not. Chissano said that he would not attend the resumption of the KAMPALA 00000197 002 OF 002 peace talks in Juba, but was departing for Nairobi to meet with the LRA delegation on January 27. He said that the U.N. was not likely to sign a final agreement as a witness or as an observer, a position based on orders from U.N. headquarters. Chissano and his staff said that New York was apprehensive about getting involved in the details of any agreement due to sensitivities on the UNSC, particularly among members who support the International Criminal Court (ICC). - - - - - - - - - - - - ASSISTANCE TO DEFECTORS - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) P/E Chief asked Chissano about his position on MONUC's facilitation of LRA defections. He responded that MONUC could continue to welcome and protect defectors in Dungu. He was not opposed to other actors' efforts to actively assist defectors as long as they were not within the assembly area. He doid not want MONUC to recruit defectors by sending people into the LRA camp, where exposure could undermine Chissano's neutral role as Special Envoy. Chissano was fine with recruitment of defectors by the GOU or other bodies/institutions. - - - - - - - - - - - REAL PROGRESS NEEDED - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) Chissano stated that Museveni agreed to renew the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement to February 29. He added that Museveni was not keen on extending beyond February 29 and that any further progress would be based on progress at the table. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶10. (SBU) Chissano was clear throughout the meeting that military measures to contain the LRA were critical. He did not come across as opposing military actions, as long as it did not push the LRA, which would likely scatter into small groups, deeper into Congo. He did not have a high level of confidence in the capability of regional forces to take on the LRA. CHRITTON