NORTHERN UGANDA: UN ENVOY ADVOCATES CHANGING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001561 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/18 TAGS: PGOV PREL UG SU CG SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: UN ENVOY ADVOCATES CHANGING THE DYNAMIC IN LRA PEACE PROCESS REF: A. KAMPALA 1552 ¶B. KAMPALA 1558 Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: UN Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano told the diplomatic corps on December 2 that Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony will not sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) unless the peace process dynamic changes. Chissano said that without military pressure, Kony will remain "in tranquility" in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Kony allegedly believes that donor food is an entitlement and Chissano advised the diplomatic corps not to provide any more food to the LRA unless it assembles at Rikwangba, as called for in the FPA. Chissano's report to the UN Security Council on December 15/16 will be a factual account of Kony's activities. The UN Special Envoy will not make any recommendations, but let the UNSC draw its own conclusions and decide on whether an extension of his mandate will be necessary. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - KONY MEETS ELDERS, MAKES DEMANDS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) UN Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano briefed the diplomatic corps on December 2 after his meeting with President Museveni. Chissano, who waited in the Rikwangba assembly area and did not talk to or meet Kony, relayed information provided by LRA delegation leader, Dr. David Matsanga, and the northern elders, who did meet with Kony on November 29 (ref A). Kony reportedly told the elders, which included Acholi Paramount Chief, Rwot Acana, that the Acholi had abandoned him and wanted to kill him. According to Chissano, Kony called them "bad names." (Note: We also heard that Kony completely disrespected Rwot Acana, strip searched the delegates, took their belongings, and forced them to stand in swarms of fire ants to be bitten. LRA leaders said they should sing funeral songs for Gulu officials Norbert Mao and Walter Ochora and lawyer Jacob Oulanya, who did not make the trip, implying that they would soon die. End Note.) ¶3. (SBU) Kony claimed that he was for peace, but could not sign the FPA as long as he is the subject of International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants. Kony also said that he would not sign any document negotiated and signed by his enemies, by whom he meant the former LRA delegation headed by Martin Ojul. Kony raised concerns about the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, which had been negotiated as part of the FPA by Ojul and okayed by Kony in June 2007. Kony told the elders he would form a new delegation, led by Matsanga (reftels). Kony also wanted to appoint lawyers to advise him and that on the day of the signing, he wanted an independent lawyer from a well-known firm to tell him he could sign the document. (Note: Essentially, the lawyer would confirm the document was what he had negotiated. End Note.) ¶4. (SBU) Kony requested that Chissano condemn the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) and DRC Government for attacking him. He also told the delegation that he had received letters and text messages from Acholi in the north that indicated that he would be killed and that there was no place for Kony in northern Uganda. Kony claimed that he had received death threats. ¶5. (SBU) During his meeting with the elders on November 29, Kony demanded guarantees for the other senior LRA commanders. On November 30, ICC indictee BG Dominic Ongwen and MG Cesar Acellam met with the elders. According to Chissano, they were even more hard-line than Kony. Ongwen reportedly said that "he (Knony) will sign nothing until our situation is resolved. If he signs, he will not leave here alive." LRA senior officers want the warrants lifted and their fates defined (ref A). ¶6. (SBU) Kony's strategy, according to Chissano, is to try to survive "in tranquility" rather than subjecting himself to the uncertainty of the ICC or traditional mechanisms of accountability and reconciliation, such as mato oput. Chissano speculated that Kony may be behaving this way because he was under no military pressure to commit to the peace deal. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - IT'S OVER, BUT DOOR REMAINS OPEN - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Chissano stated that he gave Museveni the same KAMPALA 00001561 002 OF 002 read-out he was giving to the diplomatic corps. GOU delegation leader Rugunda said that there would be no further negotiations, according to Chissano. However, the GOU left the door open if Kony decided to sign the FPA. Chissano's report to the UNSC will be a factual account of the situation. He said he will leave the decision on the extension of his mandate in the hands of the UNSC. He will not seek a mandate extension. The process is over, but Chissano would be willing to help Museveni on an ad hoc basis in the future. He suggested that "in time" the situation might change and there may be a role for him. Chissano also stated that he would leave "things" in the hands of the Governments of Uganda and the DRC. ¶8. (SBU) Government of Southern Sudan Vice President Riek Machar wanted to continue the process, according to Chissano. However, Machar believes that his government will not want him involved in the process given the latest turn of events. GOSS President Salva Kiir told Chissano that his government had no money to finance the process. ¶9. (SBU) Chissano raised the issue of food deliveries to the LRA. Kony apparently believes that the donors are obligated to give him food. (Note: Donors made regular food deliveries to the LRA during the negotiations to prevent the LRA from looting and attacking local villages. These deliveries ended in May, but one-off deliveries were made for each of the attempted meetings with Kony. End Note.) Chissano told donors that no food should be given to the LRA unless it assembles at Rikwangba. He said that the GOU wanted donors to remain ready to help the process, but for now, he did not see an active role to be played. ¶10. (C) In conclusion, Chissano told the diplomatic corps not to be too optimistic. The international community must take a tougher stance and hold Kony to assembling in Rikwangba. Museveni did not discuss military options in any depth with Chissano. Kony claimed to want to talk to Museveni directly, according to Chissano. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶11. (SBU) Chissano's read-out tracks with what we have heard from other sources. To our knowledge, this was the first time that he publicly expressed his opinion that military pressure was needed to change the dynamic of the process to persuade Kony to commit to peace. However, in private, he has speculated to us that military pressure might be required to get Kony to the peace talks table. BROWNING