Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KAMPALA1545
2008-11-25 11:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kampala
Cable title:  

NORTHERN UGANDA: RUMORS OF NINE-MONTH EXTENSION

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM CG UG SU 
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VZCZCXRO9064
RR RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1545/01 3301154
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251154Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0930
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001545 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/18
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CG UG SU
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: RUMORS OF NINE-MONTH EXTENSION
FOR SPECIAL ENVOY UNTRUE

REF: KAMPALA 1469

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001545 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/18 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CG UG SU SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: RUMORS OF NINE-MONTH EXTENSION FOR SPECIAL ENVOY UNTRUE REF: KAMPALA 1469 Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ugandan Government and United Nations officials believe that Government of Southern Sudan Mediator Riek Machar is behind persistent rumors that U.N. Special Envoy Chissano's mandate will be extended for another nine months. Chissano told President Museveni that he did not believe that Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony is interested in a peace deal and that he would not stay beyond the end of his mandate on December 31, according to Minister of State for International Relations Henry Okello Oryem and Chissano's Kampala Office Director, Warner Ten Kate. Chissano will only agree to stay on if there is a genuine chance that the peace deal will. He will not stay on if Kony's signature is based merely on self-preservation. Chissano there insists that Kony's signature will have to be accompanied by another concrete gesture. Our contacts in Kampala allege that it is Machar who wants a perpetuation of the peace process for his own financial and political benefit. LRA delegation leader David Matsanga may be encouraging Kony to sign to keep Chissano engaged in the process and to protect Kony from potential attack. Kony told one of his confidantes that he had been informed that "America and the Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF)" were going to kill him. We suspect that Kony could be maneuvered into signing the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with no intention of implementing it in order to buy time for himself, Matsanga, and Machar. End Summary. ¶2. (C) P/E Chief met with Warner Ten Kate on November 18 to discuss persistent rumors about an extension of Chissano's mandate. Ten Kate said that Chissano does not believe that Kony is serious about the FPA and is happy to have his mandate expire on December 31. Chissano will only stay on if there is real and meaningful progress on the peace process. According to Ten Kate, neither he nor Chissano believe that Kony will sign the FPA and that if he does, Kony is doing so to buy time. Ten Kate speculated that Machar, possibly together with Matsanga, are behind the rumors because they stood the most to gain from a continuation of the peace process. He added that it is possible that Kony has been persuaded to go along with this last attempt to sign the FPA &#
x000A;to buy time. If Kony signs, then the agreement calls for a nine-month implementation phase, which would be overseen by Machar. The FPA tasks Machar to set up the technical secretariat for the Joint Liaison Group (JLG),which would be housed in Kampala. During the November 5 Munyonyo Conference, Matsanga demanded that the GOU provide a list of the things it had done to comply with the agreement (Reftel). He also may have forecast Kony's intentions when he stated that Kony could sign the peace agreement and the details could be worked out in the JLG. This could essentially re-open negotiations on the LRA's obligations, particularly on assembly and Kony's surrender to Ugandan authorities. (Comment: The FPA lays out a clear timetable and the parties' obligations. End Comment.) Machar also would be responsible for seeking donor funding for the implementation of the FPA. ¶3. (C) Ugandan Government officials believe that Machar is the driving force behind the push to get Kony to sign the FPA, but is doing so only for personal financial and political reasons. Henry Okello Oryem told P/E Chief on November 20 that Machar needs money and a success to enhance his position within the GOSS and Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). Oryem said that Chissano clearly told President Museveni that he did not wish to stay on beyond December, but would only be willing to do so if Kony did a dramatic about face and took concrete steps to demonstrate his seriousness about the process. Chissano also would not consider a Kony signature on the FPA by itself as a sign of sincerity, according to Oryem. Previously, the Ugandan Government would only support an extension of Chissano's mandate for a short time, perhaps 3-6 months, to wrap up the process "so that another phase of the process could begin." ¶4. (C) Ten Kate also said that the biggest danger for Chissano is an insincere signature by Kony or that Kony sends another officer to sign on his behalf. Kony would have once again raised public expectations with no intention of delivering, according to Ten Kate. The FPA requires the LRA to fully assemble at Rikwangba and release women, children, and injured fighters, the GOU to establish accountability and reconciliation mechanisms and request that the UNSC adopt a resolution deferring International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants, and the Chief Mediator to establish the JLG and Oversight Forum. These steps must be taken during a 30-day transition period after signing, with an option for a 30-day KAMPALA 00001545 002 OF 002 extension, if needed. Ten Kate doubts the LRA will live up to its commitment to assemble within the transition period. ¶5. (C) Oryem and lead GOU negotiator, Ruhakana Rugunda, are concerned that Machar had unilaterally extended the life of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT) despite there being no Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in effect. They also are concerned that Machar is talking to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). They said that Machar, and likely Matsanga, met with DRC President Kabila in Nairobi and made arrangements for LRA "safe passage" to Rikwangba without consulting them. ¶6. (C) Jolly Okot, a Kony confidante, told P/E Chief that Kony said that the "Americans and UPDF" are trying to kill him. Okot does not believe that Kony wants to return to northern Uganda, even if he signs the peace agreement. Gulu District Resident District Commissioner Walter Ochora claims that his sources say that Kony has been warned that a military operation against him is likely if he does not sign the FPA. Ochora believes that Machar, Matsanga, and the LRA diaspora elements in Nairobi, Kenya are warning Kony that he has to attend the meeting at Rikwangba to stave off "Plan B" (Ugandan military operations). - - - - - - - - - MEETING LOGISTICS - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) On November 20, Ten Kate reported that the November 27 meeting date could be in jeopardy because Machar has not sent a budget to donors in Kampala. Denmark's funds for the food delivery, which is separate from the logistics, came through on November 18 and is enough time for CARITAS to make it to Rikwangba. In addition, Kampala-based donors are still scrambling to find a mechanism to fund logistical needs. As a result, Ten Kate is highly concerned that the meeting date could slip into December. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶8. (C) The peace process is again lurching forward to another potential milestone or failure. We share the skepticism of our contacts about Kony's intentions and believe that even if he signs the FPA, Kony is not serious about peace and would do so only as a means of continued self-preservation. If this is the case, the GOU recommends that a strongly worded press statement reminding the parties of their obligations could be useful. BROWNING

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