Afghan Refugee Camp Closures in Pakistan: Scenarios and

UNCLAS KABUL 000568 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS CAMP, SCA/A, PRM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR SHIVERS CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL PHUM AF SUBJECT: Afghan Refugee Camp Closures in Pakistan: Scenarios and Possible Impacts ¶1. (SBU) The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is developing a contingency plan for Pakistan's refugee camp closures and foresees three possible scenarios involving the return of 130,000, 266,000 or 400,000 refugees, respectively. NGOs are hesitant to commit resources until they know funding availability, and donors are somewhat hamstrung by their funding cycles. All scenarios present serious challenges to Afghanistan's security situation and ability to absorb and successfully reintegrate returnees. These numbers should be taken seriously and planned for, but a recent expansion by Government of Pakistan (GOP) authorities of relocation options available to those dislocated now includes moving to any existing camp in Pakistan, a development that could take the pressure off returnee scenarios. Possible Return Scenarios -------------- ¶2. (SBU) UNHCR recently dispatched a senior officer from Geneva to Pakistan and Afghanistan to meet with government officials, refugee leaders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),and donors. His findings indicate three possible scenarios, with Scenario 1 the most likely. The approximated numbers are derived from Pakistani Proof of Registration records minus repatriation records from 2007. Scenario 1: 130,000 Returns (Plus 60,000 Possible Extras) From Camps In NWFP and Baluchistan -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Scenario 1: 130,000 returnees from three camps: Jalozai - 84,000; Jungle Pir Alizai - 16,000; and Girdi Jungle - 30,000. UNHCR also expects approximately 60,000 returns from residual Kacha Gari (closed in 2007) and other urban caseloads but did not factor these individuals into any scenario as they will return gradually, if at all, rather than be forced out of camps. Jalozai residents will likely return, in descending order, to the east, central, north, and south, while residents of the two Baluchi camps would likely return to Kandahar and Helmand provinces. The GOP was unable to close these self-sustaining camps in 2007, and, although they are still slated for closure, the GOP may be unwilling or unable to confront residents a second time. The closure of Jalozai and the two Baluchistan camps has been already agreed upon in the Afghan/Pak/UNHCR Tripartite Agreement. Scenario 2: 266,000 Returns From NWFP And Baluchistan -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Scenario 2: 266,000 returnees: the 130,000 in Scenario 1; plus possible closure of six NWFP camps in Kohat District (population 65,000) and all seven camps in Hangu District (56,000). In addition, UNHCR suspects the GOP may try to close the Khogiani cluster near Peshawar in NWFP (3,100) and two camps in Baluchistan - Mohammad Khel near Quetta (5,700) and Zarkarez near Loralai (5,600). GOP officials recently indicated that camp residents can choose to relocate (UNHCR will assist) to any existing camp in Pakistan, not only in the NWFP camps in Dir and Chitral, but also to Myanwali camp in the Punjab. Residents from Khohat and Hangu, if these camps are closed, will likely return to Afghanistan's east, southeast, center, and north, while the remaining groups will head primarily south, with some movement to the north, east, and center. Scenario 3: 400,000 is "Worst-Case" -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Although this option was not presented in a February 18 briefing for donors, it appeared three days later at an NGO/donor briefing as the worst-case scenario. This scenario includes the individuals from Scenarios 1 and 2 (266,000),plus an additional 135,000 from possible camp closures in other NWFP districts. The breakdown would be Berari, Khaki, and Ichrian in Mansehra District (24,400); Padhana and Panian in Haripur District (76,200); Barawal, Chakdara, and Toor in Dir (24,800); Dabara in Tank (3,200); and Kalatak in Chitral (1,500). Returnees from these camps are expected to return to the east, north, center, and southeast. The Poorest of the Poor -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Most refugees told UNHCR that lack of land is the primary obstacle to return, closely followed by tribal feuds, lack of infrastructure (health care, water, and education),lack of housing, and security and accessibility. Returnees are also likely to be very vulnerable. Most Afghan refugees in Pakistan live in urban or peri-urban areas and depend on day labor to survive, so relocating to a remote rural area would be difficult. This group is literally the poorest of the poor, with a greater number of young children than in past returnee populations. Security and Economic Concerns -------------- ¶7. (SBU) UNHCR reports that Pakistani officials appeared surprised by UNHCR's estimates that anywhere from 50-80% of recently repatriated Afghans have since returned illegally to Pakistan for employment. These officials acknowledged privately that keeping registered Afghans in clearly designated camps is better than having illegal immigrants dispersed throughout the country. UNHCR Kabul has also heard that the GOP wants to clear all camps within a 14 km radius of any sensitive installation, including water and electrical plants. Theoretically, closing camps near sensitive installations could mean an additional 250,000 individuals would repatriate but we believe that Pakistan will not follow through on this idea. On the economic front, many contacts believe that if most Afghans repatriated precipitously, many sectors of Pakistan's economy would suffer a very heavy blow, especially agriculture, construction, carpet work, investment, and real estate. Returns May Not Be As High As Predicted -------------- ¶8. (SBU) We believe the numbers cited in all scenarios would be somewhat lower but understand UNHCR's need to plan for the worst-case scenario. Approximately 30% of Jalozai residents have already returned to Afghanistan after belated attempts last year to close the camp, and attempts to close Pir Alizai and Girdi Jungle camps could be as unsuccessful in 2008 as they were in 2007. Camp residents may choose to relocate within Pakistan or simply disappear into the underground economy, although rising food and fuel prices make it more difficult to survive outside a camp environment. UNCHR's Plan: Push Back but Consider Camps -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The next Afghan/Pak/UNHCR Tripartite Commission meeting will take place at the end of March, where UNHCR expects the GOP to identify additional camps for closure, which the Afghan government and UNHCR will oppose. There was some concern that Pakistan would resist naming specific camps until shortly before closure to prevent residents from organizing protests and blocking closure, but recent assurances by GOP authorities claim all new closures will be agreed upon by the Tripartite. UNHCR will not assist in any closures or repatriation efforts not discussed within the Tripartite context. Afghan authorities will push for a gradual approach and stress that a massive refugee influx could cause tension, violence, and economic disruption. ¶10. (SBU) In a striking departure, UNHCR also said it might consider "alternative infrastructure", i.e., temporary camps within Afghanistan, which have been heretofore anathema to their mission here. With landlessness a major problem, however, camps may have to be an option. NGOs and Donors Slow to Commit Resources -------------- ¶11. (SBU) NGOs were reluctant to commit resources to a contingency plan until they were sure of funding sources. ECHO and Embassy PRM and USAID/OFDA Officers (the only donors present at a recent planning meeting) could only reiterate our 2008 funding priorities and deadlines. NGOs noted USAID's involvement would be particularly useful, with its more flexible and robust funding. ECHO said it would reserve 1-1.5 million euros to react to a possible summer surge of repatriation. PRM has no current ability to reserve funds for mid-year distribution but it may be helpful to build geographic flexibility into regional projects. Afghan Capacity Not Up to the Challenge -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Notably absent in the discussions were the Afghan government entities responsible for handling repatriation and emergency response. These organizations proved themselves inept in handling this winter's weather crisis and will no doubt lean heavily on the international community for support. With additional forced repatriation from Iran and likely spring floods following the heavy snowfall this year, we expect a busy humanitarian season, with continuing inadequate Afghan leadership on the issue. ¶13. (U) Embassy Islamabad cleared this cable. WOOD