SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CODEL BIDEN TO AFGHANISTAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000409 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NEW DELHI FOR CODEL BIDEN STATE FOR SCA FOR A/S BOUCHER AND PMOON STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR MSHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PTER EAID AF SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CODEL BIDEN TO AFGHANISTAN ¶1. (SBU) Last year produced solid gains on the battlefield against the insurgency, on the economy, on local governance and on reinvigorated army and police train and equip programs. These gains reflect a surge in U.S. assistance in FY 2007 (more than in FY 2002-2006 combined) as well as a more targeted and coordinated approach. Regional Command-East (RC-East),where U.S. commands ten of the 12 Provincial Reconstruction Teams, has demonstrated that a coordinated civilian-military effort, backed up by sufficient resources and increasingly close collaboration with local Afghan officials, gets results. In RC-East, military and civilian assets (and assistance) are coordinated through the PRTs to support and reinforce indigenous security, governance and development efforts. The approach is recognized by the United Nation's Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and others as the model of how the international effort should work to pull together the scattered elements that are working into a more coordinated and effective effort. ¶2. (SBU) Greater investment by our partners and better international coordination are needed to expand the model beyond RC-East to other regions and to address outstanding challenges: an increase in terrorist attacks, narcotics production and trafficking, lack of capacity in the central government, endemic corruption and widespread frustration over the Karzai's government's failure to meet expectations. This frustration feeds the political and ethnic tensions that are developing in the run-up to presidential and parliamentary elections during the 2009-2010 window. President Karzai's recent criticism of the international community reflects, in part, his need to share blame for the government's performance and, in part, his need to show he is in control of the relationship. Progress Requires International Coordination and Investment -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The international effort in Afghanistan suffers from a lack of coordination, a lack of investment, and certain donors' preference for writing new plans rather than supporting the development of sustainable Afghan institutions and initiatives. We continually urge our partners to invest in military and police training, central and local governance, rule of law, elections, and development. An immediate priority is the appointment of a strong new UN Special Representative (SRSG) whom the Afghans (including Karzai) will accept as a partner. We will push for the new SRSG to be in place before the April NATO summit, as that will be a critical opportunity for force generation and a more coherent approach by the Allies. Afghanistan's March submission of its development strategy to the World Bank (including energy, roads, justice and health sectors in detail) will provide raw material for the important Paris-based donors conference in late spring or early summer. Security: Our continuing Number One Priority -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Security remains our highest priority. Under COMISAF General Dan McNeill's leadership, ISAF is bringing the fight to the enemy and creating new space for political, economic and social development. Unrelenting ISAF pressure on the Taliban through the winter, the infusion of U.S. Marines in April, and a greater role for an increasingly capable Afghan National Army are being focused on the districts where the majority of significant events (i.e., attacks, suicide bombers and IEDs) are taking place. New Pakistani engagement against extremists on that side of the border augers well for 2008. Some allies' a la carte approach and narrow focus on local responsibilities means the U.S. will need to continue to shoulder country-wide responsibility for the hardest part of the job. ¶5. (SBU) Recognizing that the Afghan police remains the weak link, in late 2007, the U.S. military launched the Focused District Development (FDD) program to retrain and re-equip entire police units, district-by-district. Over the coming KABUL 00000409 002 OF 004 year, better trained and better equipped units will return to their home districts to assume duties. Coordination with the Afghan government (including the Independent Directorate for Local Governance),ISAF, USAID, and the international community will facilitate governance and development initiatives to complement enhanced policing. The goal is sustainable security improvements introduced in the most critical districts in the country. Governance: Our Toughest Challenge -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Afghanistan's fragile institutions are under constant stress. President Karzai's cabinet represents a cross-section of Afghanistan, but it is not necessarily united, loyal or effective, and he relies heavily on a close circle of informal loyal advisors. Mujahadin commanders and warlords continue to hold both appointed and elected positions and often put tribal and ethnic interests ahead of the nation's. Strong leadership in key ministries (Education, Health, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and Finance) has produced significant achievements in some sectors. Other ministries continue to suffer from both weak leadership and capacity. USAID's Capacity Development Program works with several ministries, and we support the World Bank's work with the Civil Service Commission to develop a national network of training institutes. ¶7. (SBU) The weak legal system reflects decades of internal conflict and neglect. The system is afflicted by corruption at all levels, from the police (under the Ministry of Interior),to the prosecutors (under the Attorney General), to the judges (under the Supreme Court),to corrections (under the Ministry of Justice. Both defendants and their political patrons or supporters are able to exert undue influence---either through bribes or violence or the threat thereof---at every stage of the process. U.S. efforts are being directed to improve the training and infrastructure for all of the above judicial system actors, guided in large part by decisions and commitments made at the July 2007 Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan. ¶8. (SBU) Karzai's ongoing tug of war with an increasingly contentious parliament complicates decision making. Tajik Speaker of the Lower House Qanooni would like to challenge Karzai for the presidency but, recognizing the odds against a non-Pashtun being elected president, is now focused on pushing for constitutional changes that would result in a figurehead (Pashtun) president and (Tajik) prime minister. We are pushing the Palace and the Parliament to come to agreement on a calendar consistent with the constitution for the upcoming elections. We also urge passage of a new election law in time to use the Paris donors conference to get pledges to support Afghanistan's second round of national elections since Bonn. Half of U.S. support for the elections ($100 million) is included in the 2008 Supplemental Budget Request. ¶9. (SBU) We encouraged and support Karzai's breakthrough initiative to strengthen local governance as a means of reaching out to the population. Motivated in part by his need to win votes in the next election, Karzai established the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) in late 2007, charging it with strengthening provincial and local governance to provide services, development, and security. We are seeing results, including better appointments, coordination, and accountability at the provincial level. We are encouraging other donors to support this initiative, which represents a well-received, home-grown Afghan counterinsurgency program. Development and Economic Growth: Necessary for Success -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The Afghan economy grew by 13 percent in 2007, thanks in large part to high agricultural yields as a result of good snowfalls. This winter, there have been record snows, which augurs well for a second good agricultural year, KABUL 00000409 003 OF 004 though there have been hundreds of human deaths and thousands of farm and burden-carrying animals lost due to the hard winter conditions and the high price of grains. We have responded to the government's appeal for food assistance by providing 30,000 metric tons of grain through the World Food Program. We in turn support the strong Finance Minister as he resists calls to buy commodities at high market prices or to introduce anti-market measures to control food prices. In April, the IMF will meet to determine its response if Afghanistan has not closed the current gap on revenue collection for the current year and meet its structural reform targets. ¶11. (SBU) Our development priorities are energy and roads. USAID is working on four major power projects (including Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province) and a number of smaller-scale projects in key districts. We continue road-building, the most popular form of development assistance, which facilitates access to markets and helps secure areas. We seek to maximize the use of Afghans in our projects -- to create jobs, to cut costs, and to train the work force Much of our assistance is coordinated with the government and local populations through the PRTs, which support the official provincial planning process. ¶12. (SBU) A development proposal that will help Afghanistan rebuild its economic infrastructure will be considered by Congress in late spring/early summer. We are poised to support Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) which, along with a strategy to encourage increased trade and economic activity along the Afghan-Pakistan border, will prompt Afghan policymakers to improve labor standards, cut down on cross-border smuggling, and provide employment opportunities to Afghans. The bill will grant duty-free treatment for goods produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Counter narcotics: Afghanistan's Special Problem -------------- -------------- ¶13. (SBU) In its report for 2007, the UNODC reported that Afghanistan's poppy crop reached record levels, with some 193,000 hectares under cultivation. Favorable weather compounded the problem by making the crop particularly productive, resulting in Afghanistan alone producing 8,200 tons or 93 percent of the world's opium. In its Rapid Assessment Survey, released in February 2008, the UNODC is predicting 2008 will see Afghanistan-wide cultivation levels similar to or slightly lower than 2007. ¶14. (SBU) Successes in reducing production in certain provinces in the East and North and the links between the insurgency and continuing high levels of production in the South are reflected in a growing segmentation of Afghan poppy production. We are seeing positive results of efforts by committed governors in Nangarhar and other provinces where security allows counter narcotics campaigns. Both the UNODC and the U.S. predict continue success in reducing production in Nangarhar Province, where cultivation increased by 285 percent in 2007, but is on target to decrease by 50 percent or more in 2008. Improved security and government control nation-wide are needed for counter narcotics efforts to succeed in all regions. The new Local Governance Directorate plans to hold governors accountable for poppy production in their provinces, but the government must also be prepared to support more strident eradication measures, including the provision of force protection and possible use of chemical spray. The government has committed to providing army units for force protection this year, but nothing tangible has been put forward. President Karzai, on the advice of his cabinet, decided against the use of chemical spray for eradication in ¶2008. Regional Dynamics: A Complicating Factor -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Afghanistan's efforts to build a secure and stable state are complicated by its relationships with its neighbors. We supported the cross-border peace jirga that KABUL 00000409 004.2 OF 004 Afghanistan hosted in Kabul in August 2007, which was a first step in a bilateral effort to address the cross-border flow of insurgents and eliminate safe havens in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The jirga began a dialogue on a series of bilateral initiatives and helped temper heated public rhetoric between Karzai and Musharraf. Both presidents have new appreciation of the difficulties the other faces at home. Afghans are concerned about increased Iranian meddling and reports of arms being provided to the Taliban, but they underline the importance of cultural ties to, assistance from, and commerce with Iran. WOOD